Josep Colomer

Josep Colomer is a Research Professor in Political Science, at the Higher Council of Scientific Research (CSIC), and at the University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. Professor Colomer has held visiting appointments in Paris, Chicago, New York, Washington and Mexico. He is the author of more than 120 book chapters and academic articles in international journals, published in six languages, especially on democratization, elections and electoral systems, and comparative political institutions. He is also author or editor of 28 books, including Political Institutions (Oxford University Press), and the Handbook of Electoral System Choice (Palgrave-Macmillan) that received the Leon Weaver Award 2004 on Representation and electoral systems of the American Political Science Association. He has also been consultant for constitutional reforms for the governments of Colombia, Estonia, Haiti, Mexico, Spain and Catalonia.

"Constitutional Consequences"

Different constitutional formulas have different consequences on politics, policy and the polity. Constitutions favoring concentration of power, such as those regulating parliamentary regimes with majoritarian electoral rules, favor relatively stable single-party governments, while multiparty coalition governments typical of parliamentary regimes with proportional representation tend to be less durable. However, single-party governments, as well as presidential governments with a president’s party majority in the assembly and fixed terms, tend to produce more changing and unstable policies than those relying upon the support of multiple parties or inter-institutional agreements. Empirical correlations between constitutional formulas and economic growth and development are weak, which suggests that the former may have only remote, indirect consequences on the latter. There is a historical trend in favor of constitutional formulas permitting relatively high levels of social inclusiveness, political pluralism, policy stability and democracy endurance, which reflects the relatively greater capability of pluralistic formulas to satisfy citizens’ political preferences and generate endogenous support.

Georges de Ménil

Georges de Ménil is Professor of Economics at the Ecole de Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, and a member of the governing council of the research center PSE. From 1997 through 2000, he was the economic advisor of three successive Prime Ministers of Romania, and director of the Private Pension Reform Task Force of the Ministry of Labor in Bucharest. In 1995 and 1996, he co-directed a group of economic advisors for the Government and President of Ukraine. He is co-founder and senior editor of the quarterly review Economic Policy. He was formerly head of the Quarterly Forecasting Model Group of the Ministry of Finance in Paris. He served many years on the Board of Directors of Schlumberger Ltd. He has a BA in history from Harvard, and a PhD in economics from MIT. He has written about social security reform, European integration, and the European Constitution. He recently edited (with Thierry Chopin) Quelle Constitution pour l'Europe? Other books include Economic Summitry (with Anthony Solomon), A Comparative Analysis of Stabilization Policy: France and Germany (with Uwe Westphal), and Ukrainian Economic Reform: The Unfinished Agenda (with Anders Aslund).

"The Economic Implications of the Social Provisions of the EU Constitution"

The drafting and passage of the Treaty providing a Constitution for Europe is a new phase in the development of the Union. In this new phase, will EU institutions become an obstacle to liberalization and growth? The talk will identify the following four central features of the Constitutional Treaty from an economic point of view: the clarification of the 'acquis', the increased authority of the Council, the increased authority of the democratically elected Parliament and the scope of new social provisions. The Treaty for the Constitution for Europe provides potential to stimulate productivity growth in the Union. However, the social provisions of the Treaty are not favorable to productivity growth. They will tend to limit competition between Member States and, displace the resolution of societal issues from the legislative arena to the European Court of Justice.

Russell Hardin

Russell Hardin is Professor of Politics at New York University. Among other activities, Professor Hardin is a Rhodes Scholar, Guggenheim, Earhart and Honorary Woodrow Wilson fellow. He has been a Visiting Scholar in Paris, Italy and Australia. Other fellowships include the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Professor Hardin specializes in rational choice, collective action, morality behind the law, moral and political philosophy.  His recent publications include Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy (Oxford University Press), as well as Trust and Trustworthiness (Russell Sage Foundation) and Indeterminacy and Society (Princeton University Press).

"The Weakness of Constitutions"

A constitution is a weak instrument. Constitutions work when the populations that they govern are easily coordinated on doing what the constitution sets out for them to do. If a people is readily coordinated on, for example, social order, then a constitution and the institutions that it puts in place can enable them to achieve social order. It could enable a deeply religious population who share the same religion to govern according to the religion's precepts. It could allow a relatively individualistic, liberal society, such as most of the nations of Europe and North America today, to achieve a liberal society in which no strong system of values of any of the diverse groups governs. When a constitution governs an individualist society, it must be relatively limited in its scope and perhaps it must often even be vague.

Adam Przeworski

Adam Przeworski is the Carroll and Milton Petrie Professor of Politics at New York University. Professor Przeworski previously taught at the University of Chicago, where he was the Martin A. Ryerson Distinguished Service Professor, and held visiting appointments in India, Chile, France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland. A member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 1991, he is the recipient of the 2001 Woodrow Wilson Prize and the author of thirteen books and numerous articles. He has a PhD in Political Science from Northwestern University. His recent publications include States and Markets (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Democracy and the Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), and Democracy and Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

"Political Institutions and Economic Development: The Role of Accountability Mechanisms"

Adam Przeworski examined the impact of political institutions on economic development in the world between 1950 and 2000, focusing on the role of elections as a mechanism of accountability, and taking into account the fact that different types of institutions function under different conditions.

Conference Moderator: 

Professor Paul Godt, Department of International Affairs and Politics, The American University of Paris.