Session 1
Categorizing & Labelling Violence (Q-704)

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The Politics of Border Clashes: How Language Shapes Conflict

The Case of the Tajik-Kyrgyz Conflict

The whole world is shaken by the tragic events happening along Ukrainian frontlines. Other conflicts, however, including those which might be profoundly important for regional, and perhaps even global security remain overlooked. One such conflict is the recent escalation of violence on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border. The narrative used by those few international actors that talk about the conflict is built around the term “border clashes”. While the use of this term might well be a policy-driven decision in order to avoid the escalation of the situation, there is a lack of clarity with regard to when one should refrain from using policy labels and utilize appropriate language that legally describes the level and degree of violence.

This paper seeks to dig deeper into the socio-legal problematiques of using the mitigated language in cases of war and analyze whether international law obliges parties to the conflict, as well as the international community to categorize violence, even sporicidal and short-lived instances, as armed conflicts. For a better illustration, these hypotheses will be tested within the Tajik-Kyrgyz conflict.

Since 1991, the two countries have continuously exchanged fire. The conflict is an interesting example given its long history but also its discontinuous nature. In 2021, big-scale fighting began in at least a dozen of Kyrgyz villages as well as in the enclave Vorukh. As a result of the five-day armed violence, at least 41 people died and hundreds were wounded on both sides. In September 2022, Tajik and Kyrgyz forces again exchanged gunfire along different points of the border, including civilian-populated villages and towns. As a result, at least 62 people, including civilians, died on the Kyrgyz side and 140,000 had to leave their homes. Hundreds of houses and other civilian infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan were set on fire and destroyed. The Tajik government so far has claimed 35 deaths.

Given the interesting nature of the Tajik-Kyrgyz conflict, as well as the scarce scholarly debate about it, this paper will explore questions of whether labelling this conflict merely as “border clashes” poses various risks. The incorrect qualification could create an illusion that the situation does not require a serious reaction from the international community. The term “clashes” might suggest that it is normal to use heavy weapons and an official army to destroy civilian infrastructure to resolve local disputes. Additionally, the wrong classification might fail to hold those who authorized the use of force accountable.
The summer of 2020 in the United States was, to say the least, tumultuous. The reckoning that the country faced in the wake of George Floyd’s and Breonna Taylor’s murders has yet to lull, with many Black Americans demanding the federal government to put an end to the daily terror that exists in their lives. Black Lives Matter, which had originated in 2012 after the murder of Trayvon Martin, had been propelled to the forefront of conservative media as a “radical Black identity group” that sought to terrorize or worse, kill, white Americans. The very statement that Black lives mattered caused immense uproar from its first utterance and many whites considered it an act of violence against their very being. While many recall 2020 as the year that the world stopped due to the outbreak of the coronavirus, for Black Americans there are additional memories of protests, riots, and demonstrations. Political pundits questioned whether these political acts were ethically and/or socially just, and heavily focused on the behaviors and actions of the civilians to legitimize or delegitimize the grievances being presented.

I argue that by only focusing on the actions of protestors, we overlook how responses by civilians and state agents are not only violent but ought to categorize the event as violent itself. Failing to do so creates an ethical dilemma wherein marginalized communities must circumvent the egos of hegemonic groups to petition for justice. Condemnations of violence are often leveled at marginalized groups to distract from the ways in which state agents and governments have failed to properly serve these groups, which is done by critiquing the response of marginalized communities to their oppression and subjugation as opposed to addressing the routes of these injustices. In this talk I will discuss the ways in which events are deemed “violent” from the perspective of the oppressors and the privileged in society. Using the political uprisings during the summer of 2020 as an example, I demonstrate how Black Americans are deemed to be violent if they are interpreted as being too aggressive in their demands, yet accusations of violence elude police and military officials who injure, maim, and kill protestors. The designation as an event or group of people as being violent is a condemnation that permits the broader public to ignore and/or dismiss the harms committed to vulnerable and marginalized populations.
Racial Violence in America and its Turning Perceptive(s)

An act of violence becomes named by those who use it. The violence of Nat Turner was long seen as racial violence committed by an unruly slave. He was considered unjustly as a man bent on redressing the actions of slave owners. But acts of violence such as his become very different when perspectives on them evolve. Perspectives on Nat Turner change and he is seen as heroic in the novel of William Styron or in the 2016 film of Nate Parker. In like manner there are turning perspectives in the case of the 1922 Tulsa massacre. The event is also referred to as the burning of black Wall Street. The changing perspectives shown by the directors of the 2022 film recounting the event. Both of these violent uprisings are acts of mass violence. But even the death of Emmett Till an act of individual is varied from perspectives. These three acts are to be analysed in this paper. With Till there are many artistic perspectives are created but the violence put upon this young boy while done by individual triggers a massive for the Civil Rights movement. Violence is named by those who use it. But these are also named by those who see the acts of violence from other perspectives. This paper presents that renaming of violence in the examples given in this proposal.
Manufacturing Vulnerability: State Violence and the Response to Uyghur Dissent in China

In 2009, Uyghur people took to the streets of Ürümchi (the capitol of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China, often called East Turkestan by its indigenous population) to protest the murder of several Uyghur men by Han co-workers in Guangdong. The protests turned violent and as many as 200 people were killed in street fights between Han and Uyghur people. A series of terrorist and smaller attacks against state actors followed. Like much anticolonial violence, Uyghurs who turned to violence were protesting generations of political exclusion, as well as state and ethnically-targeted violence against their community.

The state’s response to isolated Uyghur violence was swift and increasingly harsh, building within five years to a “strike hard campaign,” through which regional and local governments developed a system of internment and forced labor that would affect practically all minoritized citizens of the region. Of a population of approximately 12 million, over a million people were put in extra-judicial internment camps, 3 million were conscripted by the state to work in factories, and 50% of children were moved into boarding schools.

This paper will argue that the state justified its response to Uyghur anti-state violence through two intertwined discourses that simultaneously legitimized state violence and delegitimized indigenous resistance. The first was grounded in post-9/11 anti-terrorism discourse, through which the state projected the acts of a few onto an entire ethnic group and its Islamic practice. Reducing legitimate political concerns and demands to terrorist activity relegated the group to the realm of illogic and served as justification for the development of hundreds of re-education camps. The second legitimizing discourse was the adoption of development studies rhetoric, whereby the state deployed “poverty alleviation” as a discursive strategy through which it reduced justifiable political discontent to a perceived inherent lack of interest in economic improvement. The government created a system of state-sponsored forced labor that defined the vast majority of people as “surplus labor” and assigned them to factories, and in the process, stripped people of their traditional and/or trained vocations, lands, culture, and often families.

Both strategies did result in the reduction of public dissent in East Turkestan. However, I argue that the state has in fact manufactured vulnerability that it has used to further justify its rhetoric of paternalistic care, but which at the same time is likely to increase political discontent and international support for the Uyghur cause.
Radicalization & Violence (Q-801)

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**Working-Class Neighborhoods in Conflict with Institutions**

In our different fields, I have been able to observe tensions and conflicts of all kinds between the supervisory institutions, politicians in general and young adults in working-class urban neighborhoods. Although the social paths of young people from "neighborhoods" are more heterogeneous than we are usually shown, particularly between students, galley slaves, sportsmen, petty criminals, employees or the few stuck in organized crime, there are social but also ethno-racial determinisms that seal most fates. These forms of inequality in democracy lead to antagonisms between its young people and the different forms of power that surround them. Thus, gradually a kind of distrust was established against the institutions of the Republic on the part of certain young people encountered in the halls which is linked to a social, post-colonial history and a collective and personal experience made of injustice, inequality, discrimination, humiliation, etc. Mistrust that leads to anger somehow reinforced by a social frustration that has its roots in what his teenagers and young adults apprehend as the republican lie with the triptych "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity". These recurring tensions observed for more than forty years now are manifested by "incivility", provocations, insults, urban riots or even forms of political radicalization. We are therefore entitled to ask ourselves if these different manifestations of violence and aggressiveness conveyed by certain young adults are they not in some way the expression of political forms from below or infra-politics? This question now seems central to us insofar as the political demands of the majority of the inhabitants of working-class neighborhoods have never been taken into account by the institutions, constantly leading to rage, anger, democratic manipulation because they are totally denied by the channels republican institutions and a public space held by the upper middle classes at the local level and the big bourgeoisie at the national level and above. This observation is not without consequences after 40 years now in the perception of its different generations of young people where feelings of injustice, distrust, suspicion and disbelief guide the political issues. In order to better understand the situations experienced on a daily basis, we will first come back to the difficult relationships maintained between young people and the supervisory institutions. Then we will try to reflect on the political issues that led to this situation of confrontation. Finally, in a last step, we will try to propose a reflection on the problem of politicization from below of these forms of violence.
The countries at the EU’s periphery see European integration and how it affects them in complex ways. Europeanisation has also become an instrument of polarisation affecting these countries’ politics. At times, Europe comes out as a metaphor for a liberal agenda imposed externally; at other times, it is an aspiration for certain countries left out of it undeservedly. It can signify a simultaneous expression of white suprematism and cosmopolitanism that the countries at its periphery find themselves alienating. Their constant oscillation and ephemeral identification with Europe leads to extreme opinions about the EU, making certain political ideas and movements hosts for radical ideas targeting those that they conceive as extensions of Europe in their domestic politics. In this respect, this book chapter will discuss how come a liberal and cosmopolitan integration process can become an instrument of exclusion and radicalisation when seen from outside. This book chapter proposal reflects on trends, stakeholders as well as legal and policy aspects of radicalisation in Georgia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. The Horizon 2020-funded research project D.Rad: Deradicalisation in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Reintegrate (http://dradproject.com) project (2020-2024) provides the empirical findings to support the main argument of this chapter as proposed above.

The European Union has been an instrument of political change in these countries in various ways. These countries all showed an aspiration to join the EU and some of them even NATO. However, various hurdles that they have faced in view of their trajectories have made them question the clout of Europeanising forces on the courses of their political change. While aspiring to join Europe, at least nominally, sometimes these states find the requirements of this process challenging. This is particularly in view of extending rights and freedoms to all but among many to sexual and ethnic minorities as well as migrants. When it comes to rights and freedoms, cosmopolitanism becomes the face of Europe challenging established forces of conservativism in these states.

At the same time, Europe can appear also as a metaphor to represent a beacon of white suprematism. Some movements at Europe’s periphery turn to other extremist movements resurgent in the EU to seek support for their causes against ethnic minorities in their countries. There are some conflicting trends here. While outside of the EU, Serbia as an example has appeared as the last bastion for Christian Europe. Some forces in Kosovo, a country that owes its existence to American and Western support, may allege that Europe has engaged in a crusade against the country. For Georgia, any sway in Europe’s position as to whether it can be included in NATO and EU enlargement or not stirs polarisation between those that believe that Georgia can never join the EU and those advocate Georgia doing more to join the EU. Furthermore,
conflict between Russia and Europe over the war in Ukraine has become a further element of radicalisation.

Reflecting on trends, stakeholders as well as policy and legal aspects of radicalisation in these states, in this book chapter I will assess European integration as an instrument of radicalisation in the EU’s periphery.
Why and how do some young people become radicalised, while others who share similar social conditions and sense of injustice do not? Why and how do some trajectories lead to violent extremism, while others do not cross the threshold into violence? Based on two years of ethnographic research and experimental actions carried out in a French prison, this presentation tries to answer these questions by focusing not exclusively on so-called ‘radicalised’ young people but taking into consideration a wider variety of inmate profiles and trajectories, in order to describe and analyse trajectories that could be described as “nonradicalisation”. The first part of the presentation briefly illustrates the theoretical framework for approaching radicalisation and non-radicalisation as a continuum along which individuals shift and whose journeys may be started, paused or reversed at multiple points along it.

The second part first illustrates that detachment - the breaking of emotional, social and political ties - is at the heart of radicalisation since it constitutes a process by which individuals become detached from precarious ties which connect them to social or territorial spaces.

Faced with a binary narrative, centred on desocialisation and opposing ‘true Islam’ to infidels, Us to Them, alternative narratives are developed by those who do not adhere to, or even resist, the discourse of radical Islam. To respond to a common feeling of injustice, they mobilise resources and social and cultural capital to maintain, rediscover or strengthen preexisting emotional, social and political ties. The presentation therefore concludes with an illustration of the multiple ‘safeguards’ that shield one from the temptation of totally breaking with society.
Valentina Nava

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**Subjectivation Affective et Contrôle de l’Espace Urbain. L’engagement Politique À l’Extrême-droite dans la Lombardie Nord-Orientale**

Les mouvements d’extrême-droite connaissent un taux d’adhésion croissant à travers le monde et en Europe. Les dernières élections en Italie ont montré un soutien accru pour cette aile politique, avec la victoire de l’alliance d’extrême-droite (Fratelli d’Italia et Lega). Les discours des représentants politiques et leur support par une grande partie de la population italienne révèlent une détérioration généralisée des idéaux égalitaires et démocratiques, autrefois au centre du droit constitutionnel. L’exemple italien est utilisé ici pour comprendre les déterminants structurels qui poussent les individus à s’engager à droite de l’échiquier politique et à promouvoir, voire à mettre en œuvre, des actions violentes envers une partie de la société.

Le rôle des émotions est en train de gagner un espace crucial dans l’analyse de l’adhésion aux partis populistes de droite (Wodak 2015 ; Hochschild 2016 ; Dietze & Roth 2020). En effet, les acteurs politiques de ces partis se révèlent particulièrement habiles à mobiliser les affects1 en promettant de nouvelles formes de solidarité dans un contexte où les configurations traditionnelles de protection de l’État-providence se désagrègent. Ainsi, une solidarité exclusive basée sur la limitation de la protection sociale et des droits fondamentaux peut créer un nouveau sentiment de sécurité chez la population, en ostracisant certains groupes de la société hors du demos citoyen. Ce mécanisme remplace la citoyenneté fondée sur les droits par une « citoyenneté affective » motivée sur une identité définie par l’appartenance culturelle, l’adaptation à la société du travail et l’orientation sexuelle.

Affective Subjectivation and Control of Urban Space: Right-Wing Political Engagement in Northeastern Lombardy

Extreme right-wing movements are experiencing increasing levels of support worldwide, including Europe. The recent elections in Italy have revealed growing support for this political faction, with the victory of the right-wing alliance (Fratelli d'Italia and Lega). The discourse of political representatives and their widespread support among the Italian population reflect a widespread deterioration of egalitarian and democratic ideals, which were once at the core of constitutional rights. The Italian example is employed here to comprehend the structural determinants that drive individuals to engage with the right-wing political spectrum and to promote, or even carry out, violent actions against certain segments of society.

The role of emotions is gaining crucial ground in analyzing the adherence to right-wing populist parties (Wodak 2015; Hochschild 2016; Dietze & Roth 2020). Political actors from these parties prove to be particularly adept at mobilizing affective responses, promising new forms of solidarity in a context where traditional configurations of welfare-state protection are disintegrating. Thus, an exclusive solidarity based on limiting social protection and fundamental rights can create a new sense of security among the population, ostracizing certain groups from the citizenry. This mechanism replaces rights-based citizenship with an "affective citizenship" driven by an identity defined by cultural belonging, adaptation to the workforce, and sexual orientation.

In a neoliberal context, rising unemployment rates, reduced social benefits, and a less protective and redistributive state generate sentiments such as insecurity and fear, leading to anger against individuals deemed "inactive." Extreme right-wing parties exploit these emotions by redirecting them towards scapegoats (immigrants, the unemployed, minorities, etc.). The concept of political subjectivation, traditionally employed to explain political engagement in left-wing social movements, is here applied in an unprecedented context: that of conservative and reactionary politics. A series of interviews conducted in the context of right-wing membership in Northern Italy will demonstrate how the control of urban space by the Northern League party is the result of an "affective governmentality." The obsession with order and cleanliness in urban areas, the sense of loss of identity and culture in local communities, and the exclusionary dynamics targeting racialized populations in public spaces are some examples of factors that affectively subjectivate the interviewed individuals, motivating them to join and/or participate in extreme right-wing movements.
“Let us Defend our Freedom with Force!”: Private Violence, State Police Forces and Strikebreaking Associations in Belle Époque France (1899-1918)

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, large parts of the world witnessed a continuous wave of strikes, sometimes bordering on the revolutionary. The mobilization of the working classes, as well as the resulting dread and moral panic, were confronted not just by State forces, but also by a mass mobilization of the so-called sectors of order and propertied classes. Various organizations of independent trade unionists, private industrial security forces, and strikebreaker organizations took part in the social clash, sometimes expressing ideas of society that were not necessarily in line with the existing order. This was a common occurrence throughout the Western world. Historiography has been interested in what occurred in the United States or in some European countries. Examples could be the Technische Nothilfe in Weimar Republic or the Pinkerton Agency in the United States. However, despite studies on the management of strikes by French police forces and analyses of the expanding popular participation in French social and political life, neither the methods of the so-called Yellow movement (only the doctrines of that counter-revolutionary trade union movement have been studied), nor the existence of legal strikebreaking organizations concurrent with or following that experience have been examined. The emergence of armed strikebreaker groups throughout France during the so-called Belle Époque and after the dissolution in 1906 of the Yellow movement, their use of violence, and their interactions with State police forces are instead the specific topics of this paper.

These organizations were legal, supported by entrepreneurs, and capable of successfully and violently opposing strikers. They were particularly active prior to 1914, and many of them remained active until the mid-1930s. They were present in Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Rennes, and other major French cities, and they were fully capable of adapting to police techniques, pushing the forces of law and order to side with the protection of 'labor freedom' and the struggle against working-class leftist groups. This paper will follow their history up until 1918. All of this will involve examining the historical question of the interaction between violent legally formed groups and State Forces in Third Republic France, a country that is frequently cited as an example of tight state control over violence. The paper's key emphasis will be on the historical formation of French statehood in its complex interaction with the control of social fears, violent intervention by private actors, and the governmental claim to rule territory.
Nina Janz

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**The Violent Turn in Soldier’s Letters**

The ego documents, especially war letters from the front of the soldiers, have been studied from many points of view. The letters contain much information about the use of 'violence', whether in terms of the striking power of the weapons and the encounters and dealings with locals, prisoners of war or the 'enemy'.

As the main task of the soldiers was to use violence to win or avoid being killed, the understanding and use of violence (towards enemy soldiers and locals) is a constant factor in the letters. As authors such as Latzel (Latzel 2004) and Buchbender (Buchbender and Sterz 1983) have studied the expression and use of war letters by soldiers, I, too, have come across many references and hints of the concept of violence in the sources in my current project.

In the WARLUX project, we have collected the ego-documents of Wehrmacht soldiers' (letters, diaries and photographs). In my contribution to this conference, I will discuss the use and reference of ‘violence’ in soldiers' letters during the Second World War in the context of an in-depth study of the reading and analysis of the letters. Even if the sources are biased from the interpretative side, these doubts are nevertheless urgent to consider when studying violence and the effects of violence in wars.

After a historiographical overview, I will present my current project and the extensive results of the war letters and diaries of Wehrmacht soldiers. With the help of digital tools (e.g. topic modelling and text analysis), I will present the results of the representation and justification and understanding of ‘violence’. Following the conference's theme, I will analyse different sources in which the ‘violent turn’ can be depicted. I will grasp soldiers' perceptions (and beliefs) about using force and the meaning and motivation to hold arms and pull the trigger. Even though the role of soldiers is clearly defined, the use and application of the concept of force are still worth further discussion. Soldiers' letters are one of the most widely circulated sources on the Second World War -over two billion letters were sent between the front and home. These letters are a rich yet controversial source, but they offer multiple opportunities to analyse the use and understanding of violence by millions of individuals.
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From Us to Them: Drivers of Perpetration of Mass Atrocities by Bosnian Government Forces during the Bosnian War

Mass atrocities against civilians remain a prominent feature of both interstate and intrastate warfare, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated. This demands that we continue to examine the origins, dynamics and mechanisms that cause and drive the processes and perpetration of mass atrocities. What drives the shift from policies of tolerance to those of outright persecution and violence? What makes states turn to mass violence in solving problems? And, what motivates participation in atrocities further down the hierarchy of perpetrator organisations? This paper provides initial research into these questions in relation to atrocities perpetrated by the forces of the Bosnian government against non-Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) noncombatants during the Bosnian War (1992-95).

While the Bosniak side of the conflict has received very little scholarly attention, it presents an important and interesting example in the broader discussion around violent turns. Unlike their Serb and Croat counterparts during the war, the Bosnian government did not adopt a brutal strategy of ethnic cleansing to redraw population demographics and borders amidst the breakup of Yugoslavia. Instead, the Bosnian government declared independence from Yugoslavia and sought to maintain the multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina that had long existed in the Balkans. This is the primary reason why Serb and Croat forces perpetrated atrocities in far greater numbers than did Bosniak forces. Following Serb (and later Croat) armed aggression, however, the forces defending this multi-ethnic Bosnian state increasingly turned towards identity-based violence over the course of the war. Mass atrocities were perpetrated in detention centres established for non-Bosniak civilians, as well as in the aftermath of combat operations by certain military and paramilitary groups against prisoners of war. What explains the perpetration of atrocities when we consider the Bosnian government’s macro level aims of defending and maintaining a heterogeneous Bosnian population? This paper will investigate this radical, violent turn, with a particular focus on the perpetration process at the meso and micro levels – the levels in perpetrator organisations that coalesce to implement and carry out perpetration processes. In so doing, it evaluates the extent to which violence against non-Bosniaks was increasingly viewed as necessary to achieving its war aims over the course of the conflict, as well as how the increasing brutality of opposing strategies (Serb and Croat) were reciprocated and significantly drove atrocity perpetration.
Resistance Discourses in the Early Northern Irish Troubles: A Look at How Gender and Family Informed Political Activism and Violence

In the early 1970s the decision among many Catholics to engage the Northern Irish state generally took one of two forms – one could either join a social justice movement and engage in street politics, or one could join a paramilitary movement and engage in political violence. This paper looks at how the intersection of gender and family ties informed Catholic activists’ decision to register their discontent with the state in the way that they did. By charting their decision-making process recounted during interviews and found in archival records as well as contemporary media, we can start to understand how perceptions of gender and family ties impacted on many activists’ tactical decisions, which ended up defining their lives to a great extent moving into the 1980s and beyond.

This paper addresses questions like how much did family relationships and roots as well as gender roles factor into men and women’s decisions to engage in one form of resistance over the other? Were any of them able to challenge prevailing gender roles by engaging in this way, or did they replicate old hierarchies and binaries even as they called for structural reform and revolution?

An inquiry into the discourses around what was at the time seen as apolitical, domestic, and personal factors that contributed to an individual’s decision to join a particular movement could help us frame our thinking around membership in the burgeoning radical and protest movements of today as well as provide a much-needed intersectional approach to understanding why activists chose a particular model of engagement. Finally, this paper assesses what individuals gave up or gained by committing to political activism in the way they did. Were they able to successfully challenge or shore up traditional “private sphere” matters like sex roles, gender identities and patriarchal regimes? If so, did the two movements differ in their outcomes around the heretofore private sphere arenas? The paper concludes by drawing some lessons from this comparison, making recommendations about how we can start to apply some of these concerns to other contexts.
Colonialism and Forced Labor in North America (Q-704)

Nora Slonimsky

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“Intellectual Property and Properties of Violence: Conflict and Creatorship in Early America”

In the tension between symbolic and material violence, intellectual property occupies a contested space. A recognition of ownership over the products of one’s mind, copyright and patents are effectively individual and collective rights to artistic and scientific expressions, broadly understood. Both historic and present-day copyrights and patents hinge on stability, stability that comes from state-recognized and supported practices. And yet the history of intellectual property in North America is littered with explicit violence, from the entrenchment of the brutality of slavery buttressed by patented technology like Eli Whitney’s cotton gin to the patenting of the handheld pistol by Samuel Colt, redefining the accessibility of gun ownership. Patents ensured their success, and in doing so, transformed the violence they generated from abstract to physical. And yet intellectual property was also deployed as a counter to violence, accounted in the copyright dispute over Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, a flawed yet powerful inditement of the violence of enslavement and a meaningful tool in its resistance.

This presentation will consider eighteenth-century origins of this tension amidst a web of gender, colonialism, and appropriation in the British empire. Drawing on two specific casestudies, my paper will first look at the 1712 patent application of Sybilla Righton Masters. The first person living in North America to receive a patent in London for her corn processing invention and a hat weaving method, Righton Masters was denied a patent because of her gender. While eventually granted the recognition in her husband’s name, Sybilla’s claim was further complicated by the contributions of Indigenous women, whose techniques in food production Sybilla relied upon for her invention. Spanning more than a decade and traversing back and forth across the Atlantic, Righton Masters initially named her invention, Tuscarora rice, for the violent conflict between 1711 and 1715, the Tuscarora war. While the relationship between Sybilla Righton Master’s patent and violence was more symbolic, enmeshed in the violence of Indigenous usurpation and gendered marginalization, subsequent dynamics were far more material. The second case study is the wartime service and subsequent copyright entanglement of Deborah Sampson Gannett/Robert Shurtliff. Sampson Gannett/Shurtliff was a colonial soldier in the American revolution. Sampson traversed accepted gendered boundaries of the time, enlisting as Robert Shurtliff. Their story gained considerable popularity and Sampson Gannett/Shurtliff collaborated with the writer Herman Mann to publish an account of their experience. Who exactly owned The Female Review: Life of Deborah Sampson, the Female Soldier in the War of the Revolution was not without ambiguities, ambiguities that resulted from the physical violence Sampson Gannett/Shurtliff experienced during the war and thereafter.
From Standing Rock to protests over the Trans-Mountain Pipeline, recent (and ongoing) confrontations between Indigenous activists, energy corporations, and governmental officials have brought broader public and academic attention to the tensions between Indigenous land rights and infrastructural development. This paper seeks to tie these events to a deeper history of violence wrought by and fought over colonial infrastructure. Whether in the 18th or 21st century, Indigenous resistance to controversial infrastructure projects has been bound up in defenses of Indigenous sovereignty and of treaty rights. New pathways and pipelines were more than just new routes that cut across space, potentially displacing or constraining the movement of Indigenous peoples. These conduits also disrupted a symbolic landscape that structured the North American geopolitical system.

Building upon a larger project on “path diplomacy,” this paper centers a deep-historical understanding of Indigenous sovereignties. Rather than delineated by hard boundary lines of territory, North America was crisscrossed by roads, routes, and networks that carved spheres of influence and range. Peoples, nations, and empires built, governed, policed, and maintained pathways. Diplomats, messengers, traders, and warriors traversed a complex political landscape, taking carefully prescribed paths according to traditions and treaties. Imbued with customs and political meaning, these paths were not only physical routes—they were also the language and currency of politics of a world long defined by mobility. The symbolism, the geography, and the claimed ownership of roads and paths structured and manifested relationships of subordination and alliance.

Connecting today to the colonial past, this paper analyzes Indigenous resistance to the explosion of British military infrastructure and road construction across native lands in the 1750s and 1760s. For many Indigenous nations, the response was to attack the roads themselves: Shawnees and Delawares waylaid travelers along Forbes Road; Senecas attacked British soldiers on the Niagara Portage. Other nations took a different tack, attempting to peacefully place new European infrastructure into the existing system of Indigenous path diplomacy. The 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix ultimately did promise Haudenosaunee rights to the new British military roads. However (if unsurprisingly), the nascent US state that inherited the British treaty would soon ignore its stipulations.

Placing recent events in a deeper historical context allows us to better understand the material history of Indigenous resistance to infrastructure projects and colonial structural violence, and of the “responses” of state police and officials as a means of “protecting” infrastructure from “Indigenous aggressors.” It also allows us to trace the representations of this
violence: the ways that the state and corporate interests have long framed Indigenous violence in these confrontations, highlighting the “disruptive” and “disordered” violence of supposed non-state actors, a portrayal that has simultaneously obscured Euro-American state violence and denied Indigenous violence as an expression of native sovereignty.
An estimated 50,000 Southeastern Native Americans were enslaved from 1670-1717 in the early American South, most of whom were women and children. Defined as “Indian” by colonists in slave codes and forced to labor for life, these enslaved people became gendered and racialized subjects of the English settler imagination. Even though they came from a variety of Indigenous nations such as Cherokee, Catawba, and Muscogee, enslaved Indigenous children in Virginia and Carolina plantations were forced to leave political membership of their nations behind. This paper explores the role that both representational and physical violence played in the lives of Indigenous children in the American South through an analysis of seventeenth century court records in Virginia and Indigenous cosmologies.

As they took ownership of Southeastern Native children in Virginia, planters disregarded Native understandings of childhood and adulthood. Instead of marking transitions to adulthood the Native way through changes in labor roles for boys, planters put both genders of all ages in the fields. In other words, Southeastern Native boys on the cusp of puberty continued to have to do the labor of boy children which distorted the coming-of-age process. As slaves, Southeastern Natives of both genders remained dependents for their entire lives. Marriage did not change their status as it did for white children. Sixteen—an arbitrary age for Southeastern Natives—became the only meaningful age in a planter’s mind because planters paid no taxes on their African or Native laborers until sixteen. This is a testament to how much labor came to dictate central social processes for Native children and youth on early plantations. Even the meaning of aging was transformed.

This paper tracks the shifting meanings of labor and aging applied to Indigenous children specifically after Virginians legalized Indigenous slavery in 1682. After the passage of this law, Native children captured in the continental slave trade were forced to appear before judges to have their ages and gender noted. In addition to this, their owners were forced to establish them as either servants or slaves depending on when they were trafficked into the colony. These moments of classification exposed Native children and youth to a violent system of labor grounded in ideas about Indigenous savagery and race. I argue that the ability to cut youth away from their nations through enslavement was an early precursor to the violent boarding school system of the late nineteenth century. It also had implications for how regional Indigenous communities grappled with changing definitions of sovereignty on the ground as they lost their future in their youth and struggled to maintain land claims in the face of increasing racialization of Native people.
Ivón Padilla-Rodríguez

University of Illinois Chicago


This paper expands upon adult-centric immigration histories and contributes to scholarly debates around physical and legal violence by tracing the inception of undocumented youth labor trafficking onto remote, prison-like farms in the late-twentieth century United States. The trafficking of Latinx migrant youth emerged in the 1970s as a result of the U.S.’ weak anti-child labor regime, the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico boundary, the growth of the deportation regime, and the rise of human smuggling. Growers refashioned labor camps into unofficial sites of incarceration in which they forced undocumented youth into debt peonage and denied them freedom of movement with threats of physical violence, formal arrest, and deportation.

Labor trafficking, detention, and deportation practices had connections to the legacy of slavery and were sustained by anti-Black racism and logics of carcerality, despite the fact that these human rights violations were not recognized by federal courts as bona fide forms of punishment or imprisonment. Disassociating these practices from their punitive intentions allowed employers and legal authorities to adopt a rhetoric of protection and humanitarianism, rooted in paternalistic ideas about childhood innocence, that further masked the violent and depraved nature of migrant child labor, incarceration, and deportation.

Though migrant Mexican and Central American youth challenged their labor exploitation and apprehension through various forms of explicit and subtle protest, they were exposed to the formal institutions of the carceral state in both the U.S. and Mexico through immigration raids on commercial farms, the militarization of the border, and the prosecution of smugglers. Essentially, when labor trafficked teens spoke out against their violent forced labor on prison-like farms, they were exposed to encounters with law enforcement. Migrant youth labor trafficking fueled the growth of child detention because teens discovered during immigration raids were incarcerated to testify against their traffickers as “material witnesses.” The state responded to the presence of labor trafficked undocumented teens by subjecting them to legal violence. Furthermore, the U.S. government justified minors’ incarceration as “material witnesses” as necessary for the proper prosecution of their smugglers and children’s lone deportations as belonging to their “best interests” because deportation enabled their release from immigration prison.

In the process of being subjected to multiple forms of material, legal, and state-sanctioned violence, late-twentieth century undocumented youth inspired an abolitionist movement in which they acted as important political agents. This abolitionist movement predated contemporary demands to issue deportation moratoriums and dismantle U.S. immigration enforcement agencies.
The Liberal Self in Self-Defense

Self-defense is a justification for violence that seems to enjoy universal recognition. And yet, under modern liberal regimes self-defense is not the last but the first problem of violence, because it facilitates a mutually enhancing relationship between individual identity and interpersonal violence. Self-defense speaks in the language of bodily integrity, but physical dread is always already culturally fraught, and serves as proxy for deeper ideas about ourselves that we feel compelled to protect. The history of self-defense is a history of authoritative recognition and denial, expansion and contraction of selfhoods. The paper argues that self-defensive acts, and the norms that determine their justifiability, implicate our two central frames for understanding full personhood in the modern social sphere: autonomy and authenticity. There is an intellectual history to the former, since Locke conceptualized self-defense as a vindication of individual decision-making and moralized Hobbes’s materialistic theory. However, in recent decades liberalism has come under attack for assuming that autonomy suffices for our self-understanding and quests for meaning. Once we’ve opened the door to values beyond life and limb as being at stake when self-defense is exercised, discussed, and justified, we’ve allowed an even more robust normative load to be carried in. It has gone completely unnoticed that self-defense also produces authenticity. Namely, it allows us not only to choose right but also to be ourselves.

The paper engages three bodies of scholarship: criminal jurisprudence, liberal theory, and law and literature. I argue that existing theories of self-defense cannot explain the outsized socio-political significance we assign self-defense cases, due to a failure of imagination. Novelists, in contrast, have captured a truth that philosophers have missed: self-defensive violence serves persons to situate themselves within the shifting categories of identity available to them. I analyze various literary depictions of self-defense to show how it reaches the depths of identity—beyond bodily integrity and even beyond moral agency, to persons’ civic, social, hedonic, familial, gendered, racial, and economic selves.

Political violence takes inter-personal forms and the criminal law, which governs inter-personal violence, is susceptible to political shifts. Self-defense specifically functions as a bellwether for social transformations regarding the distribution of legitimacy to use force. Fiction teaches us that individuals’ relationship with violence fleshes out deeper layers of the self. The paper argues that self-defense is a special, underexplored type of such a relationship. Tragically, liberalism has elevated self-defense into an invaluable source for articulation of selfhood.
Some derided the military tribunals at Nuremberg as performative “victor’s justice.” Certain Allied leaders dismissed it as a form of pageantry that could have easily been taken care of with mass executions of Nazi perpetrators. Yet a crucial aspect of the IMT and NMT was not just punishment, but the arriving at it; the naming of a crime and asking holders of positions of power and bureaucracy to answer for it. Professional forecasters of mass atrocities and practitioners of genocide prevention have mapped structural causes from frustrated regimes to security crises, yet the question of individual perpetration still often remains one best answered by the perpetrators themselves. The lens of the Nuremberg Tribunals, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have allowed us to see what rationales for violence are presented when under duress of prosecution. While this clearly skews the opportunity for honest voicing of motives, it also presents unique insights through the tension of prosecutorial and defense strategies.

The Nazis famously once thought of their elites as men of steel, supermen- but at Nuremberg reduced themselves to “little iron cogs” just following orders. Scholars later distilled this into the “willing executioner” versus “ordinary man” debate. While the truth is likely somewhere in the middle, the development of perpetrator studies and qualitative interviews with genocidaires, the evolution of specialized international law tasked with assigning responsibility for crimes against humanity, and contemporaneous statements by defendants to the press or through memoirs gives us insight into drivers of violence both large and small. How do these individuals locate themselves within networks and regimes, but also how do they frame interpersonal violence against neighbors and by their own hands within a legally accountable setting? Do they envision their motives as driven by larger economic, religious, or political forces? Is personal psychology relevant, or useful to legal practitioners? Is violence treated by the courts and individuals as symbolic, or material- and how do these relate to the overarching desired outcome of a reputable record of events and mechanism of justice towards long-lasting peace? And how much do these legal approaches and language alter and adapt given the different cultural contexts and temporal gaps between conflict and courtrooms across the legacies of the Holocaust, Balkans conflicts and Khmer Rouge in Cambodia?
How does a violent sensitivity develop itself in men who are a priori ordinary? This is the question that C. Browning asks himself when studying the 101rst Battalion, responsible for the application of the Final Solution. A historical interrogation on the motivations of genocidal individuals easily transferable to the more contemporary case of terrorists’ protagonists. While "violence presents itself as a type of interaction where one actor tries to control another by harming him", does it necessarily imply a process of desensitization to the suffering of the Other? More precisely, do the concepts of violence and sensitivity fall within two contradictory fields? Not necessarily in as much as violence comes, on the one hand, from the subjectivity of its author and on the other hand, because it "has meaning only through the subjective point of view of the victim". On the side of his/her protagonists, a violent commitment can explain itself through a sedimentation of multiple individual experiences of injustice, humiliation, moral shocks but also through profound collective experiences occurring within a vast constellation of relations and perceptions i.e a subjective trajectory. Both levels thus inform us on the perception and understanding of oneself, the others and the world also shedding lights on jihadists’ turning points towards a violent career. But life events, perceptions and social representations alone would never explain such engagement. The investment in high-risk activism is also the result of a cruel exposure to multiple « awareness / sensitivity-raising devices » orchestrated by the Daesh propaganda instrumentalizing the fate of innocent Syrian civilians being massacred by the Other. A horrendous exhibit of the suffering of one's religious own -felt from afar -in the face of which one cannot remain impassive, at the risk of being consumed by an "unbearable” guilt . The jihadists’ hermeneutic then blatantly unfolds itself: one must defend his community against the oppressor, this merciless executioner who does not deserve any good feelings. Through the observation of the interrogations of defendants at the trial of the 13th of November terrorist attacks and the setting up of interviews with detainees imprisoned for association of criminals in relation with a terrorist enterprise (AMT), it appears that the examination of the sensitive offers a window of intelligibility to better understand the mechanisms of entering violence. Investigating the links between two antagonistic paradigms also invites us to reflect back on the society in which we live: are we "more violent", "more sensitive to violence" or are we gearing towards a "society of sensitivity"?
Violent Horizons: Understanding Perpetrators of Collective Violence

In this paper, I discuss the various stances that researchers can take toward the study of perpetrators of collective violence. I argue for the importance and utility of stances that attempt to restore words and meanings (Ricoeur, 1970) in order to understand the horizons (Gadamer, 1960/2004) of perpetrators. Using Payton Gendron, who murdered ten African Americans in a Buffalo New York supermarket in May 2022, as a focus of reflection, I argue that restoring the horizons of perpetrators helps us to better understand the various meanings, specifically the language of moral values, that motivate and scaffold violent actions.
The Sokoto Jihad as a Metaphor for Violence in Contemporary Northern Nigeria

The use and abuse of history, as an instrument of racial, ethnic and religious polarization, is a significant feature of the place of the past in present politics and conflicts. The protracted communal violence in contemporary Northern Nigeria is occasioned by competing cultural and historical imaginaries associated with the Sokoto Jihad, which was spearheaded by Sheikh Usman Danfodio. The Jihad resulted in the amalgamation of the hitherto autonomous states in Hausaland and the creation of Sokoto Caliphate, the largest single Islamic polity in 19th century West Africa. There was stiff resistance against the Jihad in the Middle Belt region, leading to the emergence of a victimhood narrative of around a set of complex memories of Jihadi raids, pillage and slavery. Typical of the thriving culture of conspiracy theory and victimhood mentality in Northern Nigeria, the persistent violence around the settler-indigene question, farmer-herder clashes and the Boko Haram insurgency, is interpreted as the manifestation of a grand islamisation conspiracy by the Muslim elites to hang on to political power. How did the Sokoto Jihad acquire its extra-discursive power? This contribution seeks to probe the Sokoto Jihad as the most dreaded historical idiom in the Middle Belt and the complex ways in which it intersects and feeds into violent conflicts in contemporary Northern Nigeria. Based on in-depth interviews with politicians and academics, and a critical discourse analysis of historical texts and newspaper editorials, this paper unpacks four discursive contours through which the Jihad is deployed as an instrument of violence: the narrative of pastoral jihadism; the discourse of Fulani hegemony; the Mafia theory; and the Boko Haram insurgency.
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En 2017, 128 personnes ont été prises en otage dans l’arrondissement de Bélel. Parmi elles 67 ont été libérées après payement d’une rançon, 3 ont été réduits en esclavage, 2 ont été paralysés, 1 a été amputé du bras droit, 01 s’est vu coupé les deux oreilles tandis que 55 autres ont été froidement assassinés par leurs ravisseurs. Parallèlement à cette zone en proie aux exactions des bandes armées venues du Tchad et de la République Centrafricaine, plusieurs dizaines de pasteurs Arabe-Choa ont été égorgés dans les départements du Logone et Chari et du Mayo Sava par les groupes terroristes affiliés à Boko Haram. En 2017-2019, derrière tous ces chiffres effroyables des violences exercées à l’encontre des populations se cachent en réalité plusieurs communautés en situation de vulnérabilité environnementale et sociale au Nord-Cameroun. Il s’agit notamment des sociétés pastorales Arabe-Choa, Foulbé et Mbororo disséminées dans presque toutes les prairies herbeuses dans cette région. Ainsi, quels sont les mobiles qui poussent les autres communautés à s’en prendre violemment à ces pasteurs ? Quels sont les facteurs inhérents à ces sociétés pastorales qui expliquent la genèse, le regain de vitalité et la pérennisation des actes de violence perpétrées à leur encontre ? Quelle typologie dresser de ces maltraitances et quelles sont les politiques publiques développées par l’État du Cameroun et la communauté internationale pour les contrer ? La présente communication s’intéresse à la prévalence des délits de menaces sous conditions et des violences dégénératives perpétrées à l’encontre des éleveurs Arabe-Choa, Foulbé et Mbororo particulièrement ciblés par ces brutalités. Tout en présentant les principaux acteurs incriminés dans la genèse et la dissémination de ces violences diversément exprimées dans les aires pastorales exposées, ce travail s'interroge également sur leurs principaux déterminants ainsi que sur les différents mécanismes endogènes de gestions, les stratégies institutionnelles et transnationales destinées à les prévenir et à lutter contre elles au Nord-Cameroun.
Motivations, Context, and Violence in the Belarusian Nationalist Movement, 1921-1944

At the conclusion of the First World War, many states and republics were created or re-created. One group of Belarusians, however, felt that they had been denied the diplomatic and political opportunity to create a completely independent Belarusian state. Appeals to various diplomatic bodies, organizations, and higher-level officials in the west were largely met with silence. These feelings of disappointment and lack of progress using civic and legal channels frustrated many. During the interwar years, many of these Belarusians turned to other sources of inspiration that would bolster their cause. One of these was the increase in radicalized nationalism that emerged in parts of the continent. Used first in written texts, correspondence, and newspapers these attitudes later carried through much more violently, in the Second World War. During the occupation of Belarus from 1941 to 1944, many of these individuals collaborated with the Germans, engaged in violent acts against locals, and in the repression and murder of Jews and other victims of the Holocaust. They claimed that this was the necessary task to attain an independent Belarusian state.

This paper explores not only the motivations of these Belarusians to engage in heightened forms of violence, but also the context in which they came about. The reasons why certain peoples or communities decide to resort to more violent means evolves not only from their experiences, but it also becomes a possibility in the context they are living in. Here, heightened radical and racialized language across the globe normalized the rhetoric that these Belarusians began to use. Moreover, the violent actions during the occupation period occurred in the context of war and conflict.

Finally, though some individuals at the top certainly use radical language and propagate violence as a means to achieve a result, one must consider that there are many other individuals who get wrapped in these violent means. Recently, many studies have pointed to various motivating factors for individuals participating in violence, such as professional mobility and economic needs as some of them. If this is the case, can we even think about a collective motivating source? This is why the context in which such motivations come about is so crucial.
The present paper focuses on the gestural repertories of action in the presence of symbolic or actual violence in different circumstances of social and political unrest. The question is to understand how vulnerability of singular bodies before violence is transformed into acts of resistance through a variety of gestures, such as the “hands-up” and the “kneel-in” related to the Black Lives Matter in the United States (Schneider 2017), the “stand-in” of the Standing Man (Derman 2017) and the “whirling dervish” within the Gezi Uprising in Istanbul, the “hand signals” actively engaged in the assemblies of Occupy Wall Street, the historic sit-ins to oppose segregation during the Civil Rights Movement, the die-ins of the group ACTUP to draw attention to the AIDS crisis, and the notorious bed-in by Yoko Ono and John Lennon to protest the Vietnam War. In this regard, gesture as the “relational event” (Escobar 2022) draws on diverse situations contending with violence and engenders potential non-violent responses through quotidian practices. Moreover, enacting a social and/or political vulnerability, exclusion, and inequality (Butler 2015; Butler et al. 2016) through bodily gestures reveals the power of spontaneous or tactical acts in the face of various levels and forms of violence.
Violence(s) and the Relationship to Violence in Disengagement from Violent Extremism and Social Reintegration Processes

Social reintegration of terrorism convicts is a major societal issue today. How the release of terrorist detainees, returnees, and also radicalized prisoners is managed will have a significative impact on the terrorist threat level. Despite its importance, the social reintegration process of convicted terrorists in France remains largely unexplored by researchers and media (Da Silva, Amadio, et al., 2022). French research is dominated by "radicalization studies which, for the most part, are primarily a sociology of trajectories, factors and processes of 'radicalization'" (Chantraîne, Sheer & Beunas, 2022: 274).

However, international researchers and practitioners have been working for several years to understand the dynamics of radicalization (Altier, 2021, Raets, 2022). This research shows that understanding the issues of social reintegration of violent extremism requires the mobilization of multidisciplinary approaches involving social, security and judicial matters, but also questioning cross-cutting dimensions, such as violence.

The objective of this communication is to show that, while violence is an essential dimension of socialization to extremism, it is also a central dimension of social reintegration. We will draw on the international literature on disengagement from violent extremism and social reintegration, as well as on empirical data (observations, interviews with convicted terrorists and professional actors) from the ANR TROC research (ANR-20-CE39-0007). In the first part, we will define the terms of social reintegration and characterize our use of the term violence. In a second part, our discussion will focus on the importance of considering violence in terms of goal (demobilization/disengagement/deradicalization, Altier, 2021), identity process ((de)subjectivation, Wievioka 2015, Hüet, 2019) and instrumental (Collins, 2009), ideological (Bjorgo, Horgan, 2008), relationship to the group (violence as a marker of group identity and group membership) and to society (terrorism and non-targeted violence). In a third part, we will discuss the fact that social reintegration implies moving from a conflictual friend/enemy relationship based on a refusal of otherness, to a author/victim relationship from which a future coexistence can be considered - and legal responsibility accepted, or even to a relationship of adversity if a form of continuity of ideological commitment finds expression on a political level (cf. Amadio, 2020; Amadio, Ferret, 2021).

Violence(s) et Rapport à la Violence dans les Processus de Désengagement de l'Extrémisme Violent et de Réintégration Sociale

La réintégration sociale des personnes condamnées pour terrorisme constitue l’un des principaux défis sociétaux des années à venir. La manière dont est gérée la libération des détenus terroristes, des rapatrié et aussi des prisonniers radicalisés aura un impact majeur sur le niveau de

Cela fait pourtant plusieurs années que chercheurs et praticiens internationaux cherchent à en comprendre plus avant les dynamiques (Altier, 2021, Raets, 2022). Ces recherches montrent que comprendre les enjeux de la réintégration sociale en matière d’extrémisme violent nécessite de mobiliser des approches pluridisciplinaires capables d’intégrer les problématiques sociales, sécuritaires et judiciaires, mais aussi d’interroger des dimensions transversales, à l’instar de la violence.

L’objectif de cette communication est de montrer que, si la violence constitue une dimension essentielle de la socialisation à l’extrémisme, elle est également un point nodal de la réintégration sociale. Nous nous appuierons sur la littérature internationale en matière de désengagement de l’extrémisme violent et de réintégration sociale, ainsi que sur les données empiriques (observations, entretiens avec personnes condamnées pour terrorisme et acteurs professionnels) issues de la recherche ANR TROC (ANR-20-CE39-0007). Dans une première partie, nous définirons les termes de réintégration sociale en matière d’extrémisme violent et caractériserons notre usage du terme de violence. Dans une deuxième partie, notre propos se focalisera sur l’importance de la prise en compte de la violence en termes d’objectif (démobilisation/désengagement/déréadicalisation, Altier, 2021), de processus identitaire ((de)subjectivation, Wievioka 2015, Hüet, 2019) et instrumental (Collins, 2009), idéologique (Bjorgo, Horgan, 2008), de rapport au groupe (la violence comme marqueur d’identité de groupe et de l’appartenance au groupe) et à la société (le terrorisme et violence non-ciblée). Dans une troisième partie, nous discuterons du fait que la réintégration sociale suppose de passer d’une relation conflictuelle de type ami/ennemi fondée sur un refus de l’altérité, à une relation auteur/victime à partir de laquelle une coexistence future peut être considérée – et une responsabilité juridique acceptée, voire à une relation d’adversité si une forme de continuité d’engagement idéologique trouve à s’exprimer sur un plan politique (cf. Amadio, 2020 ; Amadio, Ferret, 2021).
“Woman, Life, Freedom” Movement: From the Violence of the Iranian Government to the Non-Violence of Iranian Women

About three months have passed since the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement and popular uprising in Iran. During the past months, with the increase in the scope of the popular uprising, the efforts of the Iranian government to resort to force and violence against the Iranian people have also increased. A look at the pattern of violence against women in the struggles of recent months shows that the government's violence against women is much more severe than in the past. They used every means to fight against women, but this did not reduce the amount of women's protests in this movement. The reason for that is the difference between the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement and the past movements and the increase in the agency of women and the effort to change and achieve a specific political goal, i.e. regime change. This reason, along with other reasons, fueled the government's violence against women and entered another stage of the Iranian government's practice of physically eliminating women. It is certain that none of these violent repressions have diminished women's presence in the Women's Lives and Freedoms movement, but have empowered them to create new ways to maintain and overcome their power in the political arena. The violent actions of the current government The important question of this article is that despite the adoption of violent methods by the repressive government for the people of Iran, how is it that women still use peaceful methods to protest? And despite the fact that many women were killed or arrested by the government in the current movement, what factors have made Iranian women avoid violence against the government? In other words, what are the reasons for Iranian women's non-violence in the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement? And their protest ways and methods have appeared in what forms? In the current research, we address these questions by using historical documents and discourse analysis of Iranian women's slogans in the recent Iranian movement.
Race and Otherness (Q-801)

Angela Mullis

Rutgers University

Revealing the Unseen: Violence, Whiteness, and Citizenship in the Works of Claudia Rankine

Claudia Rankine has emerged over the past decade as a leading voice in American literature, and her important work on the racial imaginary and whiteness presents alternative ways to interrogate race, privilege, and constructed understandings of space, and ultimately, citizenship. Her work presents us with ways to deconstruct America—ways to see ourselves and our participation in a larger imagined, “beloved” community. Just Us is the latest work in Rankine’s growing canon, and notably as the final book in her trilogy, she transitions from the subtitle “An American Lyric” of the previous two texts, to “An American Conversation.” Published during the Trump administration, her work in part reacts to and responds to his administration and the movements that have erupted. Just Us very much focuses on the personal—whereas former works have looked at the personal, they have done so through a different lens—one of history and the day’s headlines of police brutality or citizen violence against bodies of color. However, Just Us takes up her latest theme of investigating how cross-racial conversations (dialogue) can lead to new ways of seeing, hearing, and reimagining how we witness race, brownness, blackness, and particularly whiteness. This paper will explore a few of her key works in conversation, underscoring ways Rankine delves into the color white itself, emphasizing the history of the “white cube” and whiteness against which we view art, and how violence against many bodies (literal and artistic) are absorbed and rendered. Finally, this paper will investigate how cross-racial conversations can expose the unseen reality of whiteness and the myriad ways it perpetuates white privilege, and by extension, structural racism.
Redemptive Violence and the American Patriotic Ethos

“Hold the line patriots!” an insurrectionist cried to his comrades as they struggled to overcome police and break into the United States Capitol Building. How did this man experience this lawless action? He imagined himself as a patriotic hero engaged in a great drama of redemptive violence. This drama has salience whenever Americans justify violent action as “patriotic,” whether that action is enacted at home or abroad.

This essay examines the American cultural commonplace that service in the military and, especially, participation in the nation’s wars, is exemplary of the highest public virtue. Using rhetorician and literary critic Kenneth Burke’s agonistic theory of knowledge, a theory derived from ritual drama and predicated on suffering, I examine how this commonplace participates in a symbolic, tragic drama that portrays violence and suffering as purifying actions of national redemption within an American “patriotic” ethos.

We witness this drama whenever official or institutionalized power celebrates events, persons, and actions purportedly exemplary of an American national identity or ethos. War memorials illustrate. American soldiers are imagined as agents whose violence, suffering, and “sacrifice” is redemptive. The tragic dramas enacted at sites as variable as the Korean War Veterans Memorial and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial exemplify in material and symbolic form the enduring commonplace that American soldiers are virtuous and redemptive because of their sacrifice in armed conflict, regardless of whether the war’s meaning is inscribed at the site.

As Aristotle noted in his work, Rhetoric, qualities celebrated as virtuous in commemorative “epideictic” encounters like those at the memorial sites are turned into the “goods” used as arguments to warrant political action. The drama of redemptive violence and suffering used to praise heroes of a concluded war become resources for justifying the next war, only to again become epideictic resources for memorializing that war, as though in perpetual cycle.

This drama of redemptive violence is part of Americans’ self-understanding as “patriotic” citizens. January 6th insurrectionists imagine themselves as heroic patriots whose violence are purifying acts of national redemption. Protesters’ grievances are dismissed as “unpatriotic,” as evidenced in former president Trump’s attack on the football player Colin Kaepernick’s symbolic act of protesting systemic racism and police brutality as “disrespecting the military.” The drama of redemptive violence thus constitutes how conflicts abroad and at home are experienced in “patriotic” terms.
Session 5
Naming and Recognizing Violence (Q-801)

Revital Madar

Max Weber EUI

Looting and Rape as Boundary-Making Crimes in Sovereign Violence

Scholars have argued that sexual violence during war is often considered worse than sex crimes committed during peacetime (Benson & Gizelis, 2020), and that revelations about sex crimes attract greater international attention to conflicts (Kolmasova & Krulisova, 2019). Such sensationalisation of sex crimes overshadows other forms of violence committed during wars, as well as routine violence that states employ in order to preserve law and order. As a desensationalizing corrective, this paper contextualises the evolution and present-day form of the coupling of looting and rape and examines their role within the order of state violence in Palestine/Israel.

Its key findings show that rape and property crimes – unlike killing offences – neutralise the state's routine deferral of such cases to what Shalhoub Kevorkian (2015) called the Israeli "security theology". In this sense, both rape and property crimes form a boundary around the sovereign right to kill. Drawing on an extensive database of 80 military trials of Israeli soldiers between 1949 and 2018, this paper interrogates the prevalent tendency to sensationalize rape and unequivocally condemn looting by state security agents. It offers that condemnation of these crimes can in and of itself become part of a complex assemblage that functions as a hegemonic tool that invisibilises, or marginalizes, the more prevalent forms of state violence, such as killing.
Evidencing Caste Violence

Violence committed against dalits is a recognized phenomenon in South Asia -- some numbers show the rampant existence of this violence. Yet, why do cases of such rampantly committed violence lose their battle in the court? While caste violence often gets reported in the media, it does not receive much scholarly attention. Existing scholarship talks about the limits of the Indian state and courts as casteist institutions and the impunity enjoyed by the upper-caste perpetrators. But this paper argues that along with building a critique of the states and their institutions for their failures in giving just judgments in the case of caste violence, the existing scholarship should do sociology of caste violence – study caste violence as a sociological inquiry. This paper will attempt to initiate a humble effort towards doing the sociology of caste violence by examining the pieces of evidence – quantitative (numbers, reports) and qualitative (ethnographic snippets) – of caste violence.
More Than A Snapshot: Will Brown’s Lynching and the Violence of History

Many people first encounter Will Brown not from stories of his life but rather the photograph of his gruesome death. In what has become a stock image, steam rises from Brown’s exposed and charred body, while dozens of spectators encircle him, gazing approvingly. Though ghastly, this infamous snapshot is an isolated moment in time, incapable of illustrating the man, his story, and the complicated legacy of his death. More Than A Snapshot disrupts prevailing discourses of the 1919 murder as a city’s “darkest day.” In so doing, the meaning of Will Brown shifts from memento mori to a portrait of Black agency linking nationalism, mythmaking, and the violence of history.

In the wake of global protests originating in Midwestern cities like Ferguson and Minneapolis, there is renewed interest in documenting the regional Black experience. Moreover, as the literal and figurative center, the heartland deserves special consideration of the mechanisms which uphold social hierarchies. Regardless of era or nation, popular imaginings of a “pure” heartland underwrite core populist beliefs, asserting who is and who is not a part of the polity. In the U. S., violence created, maintained, and preserved the idealized Midwestern heartland. Encompassing Native American genocide and displacement, Black laws, sundown towns and other racially restrictive practices, white Midwesterners employed violence in service of racial exclusivity. Yet within the region, white citizens cultivated a self-congratulatory, progressive identity, denying their own sordid past. Through the sin of omission, historians perpetuate myths that the Midwest is immune to racial strife, forgoing a complicated account for a comfortable one.

In naming this historical “misremembering,” I demonstrate that violence occurs not only at the moment of bodily harm, but persistently, as Black community narratives are silenced or coopted. This paper documents how brutal histories are mainstreamed through art, curriculum, and public memory, relegating African Americans as mere props in an overwhelmingly triumphant account of white racial progress.

Memory is a vital and sustaining community exercise. As such, there is a critical need to shift the scholarly and popular gaze beyond the shocking snapshot of Will Brown, to consider the man and the world he lived in, as well as the uses and abuses of his image in the 100 years since. Without this intervention, skewed depictions will ensure that Will Brown remains not only a casualty of the mob, but also of history.
Gender and Violence (Q-704)

Emilia Lounela

University of Helsinki

Kirsti Sippel

University of Turku

Unfit for Love? Evolutionary Justifications for Involuntary Celibacy, Misogyny and Victimhood of the ‘Scientific Blackpill’

Incel (“involuntary celibacy”) online communities have received increased academic and public interest in recent years, especially following acts of mass violence connected to incels. These online communities share a strong sense of masculine victimhood (e.g. Blommaert 2018) and misogyny (e.g. Ging 2019). They attract mostly young men who have constructed an identity around their perceived lack of romantic and sexual attention from women. One of the most frequent explanations for sexual exclusion in incel discussions is “lookism”, being discriminated against because of their appearance.

Incel have built a pseudo-scientific rationale for their misogyny and male supremacy. Along with the growing intellectual and cultural authority of evolutionary psychology in explaining and justifying gender differences and inequalities (O’Neill 2016), incels are also especially fond of interpretations of Darwinism. Incels present themselves as logical, nonideological and rational (Ging 2019), differentiating themselves from “emotional” and “childlike” women, compensating for the masculinity threat stemming from sexual and romantic exclusion. Naturalisation and biological determinism are used to justify their nihilistic worldview called The Black Pill, while evolutionary science is harnessed to present the ideology as scientific and positivist. These theorisations of genders and society are presented extensively in Incel Wiki.

In this article, we examine how misogyny is justified in Incel Wiki articles titled Scientific Blackpill, that claim to use “a neutral tone and convey the scientific findings without judgment”, while talking about “female coyness, sneakiness and nastiness” and “sluts”. Using discourse analysis, we unpack the ways in which evolutionary psychology and biology are used to naturalise misogyny and to construct involuntary celibacy as both unnatural and as a discriminatory byproduct of modern equality and feminism.
Female Body, Political Violence and Bodily Resistance in Post-Revolutionary Iran; How the Quiet Revolt of Bodies Turned Into Revolutionary Bodies

The foundation of the Islamic Republic following the 1979 Revolution in Iran materialized partly in reaction to decades of Western imperialism and its cultural hegemony (Westoxification/Gharbzadegi), in which the 'modern woman' as a symbol of 'West' was represented as unveiled, publicly visible and sexually free. The regulation of the female body became instrumental to the politics of the Islamic Republic at home and abroad. Hijab, in particular, was seen by the post-revolution Islamic discourse as a counter-strategy against the West's operation to undermine Islamic identity. The female body has become the battlefield of the new political structure in post-revolutionary Iran, rendering the female body a site of the state’s physical and disciplinary violence. In response, women (and later men) have continuously resisted the regime's gender-biased body politics. The bodily resistance of women started with marching against the mandatory hijab a few days after the Islamic revolution. It continued with everyday body protests through gradually changing hijab standards, inventive ways of removing hijab, and dancing and singing in public, and reached its highest point by burning veils and cutting hair during the protests that started in September 2022; a movement some consider a feminist uprising against the regime.

This paper explores why hijab has become a symbol of collective struggle, not only for women but for a wider group of those who demand 'equality, life, and freedom'. This paper examines the brief history of body politics and bodily resistance in postrevolutionary Iran in five political stages; from the post-Islamic revolution period to the feminist uprising against the regime. By demonstrating that the form, severity and prevalence of this violence, as well as the woman's response, had been shaped by a broader political context, it clarifies the organic relationship between this naked form of body oppression against women with other systematic forms of political violence against general society. It specifically looks at the past decade when men gradually became a part of the fight against mandatory hijab, and argues that the transformation of the quiet revolt of bodies into revolutionary bodies occurred only when the hijab transcended from a feminism-focused justice issue to a social justice issue. This qualitative research builds on politics and violence studies, in particular Johanna Oksala's Foucauldian analysis of body politics, violence and anarchic body, as well as human rights reports, legal documents, media reports and social media analysis in English and Farsi sources (doctrinal methodology).
Gendered notions of nationhood and Hindu masculinity have been at the heart of the Hindu nationalist project since its very inception. The muscular nationalism that Sikata Banerjee (2012) posits in the case of Hindutva is animated by the fear of a hypermasculine ‘other’ rather than an effeminate ‘other’, and thus emphasizing on the recovery of the lost manhood. Violence against Muslim women is legitimised in the discourse of Hindutva as a retaliatory measure necessary to humiliate and assert control over the other. Muslim women have often been the target of sexual violence during events of communal riots as demonstrated in the cases of 2002 Gujarat Riots (Sarkar 2002), 2013 Muzaffarnagar Riots (Dixit 2013), 2020 Delhi Riots, among many others. The sexualised image of the Muslim woman has repeatedly emerged as a part of the Hindu nationalist political discourse where Hindu nationalist leaders have promised to make Muslim women ‘available’ to an audience of primarily Hindu men. The paper focuses on the resistance of Muslim women that emerged during the protest against the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019 that was introduced in the Indian parliament. One of the distinctive features of the movement was the leadership of young Muslim women in the frontlines of the movement, which stands in contrast with the image of the voiceless Muslim woman oppressed by the Islamic patriarchy that is projected by the proponents of Hindutva in India. Based on interviews of young Muslim women who organized and participated in the protests in Kolkata, the paper examines their primary driving concerns, strategies of mobilization, as well as how they perceived the threat posed by Hindutva to themselves as Muslims, as women, and as Muslim women. Finally I draw upon the Black feminist theorist bell hooks (2015) to theorize how these Muslim women ‘talk back’ to Hindutva’s patriarchal violence.
Washington Burning: The Role of Militarization and Enmification in the Violence of the 1932 Bonus Expeditionary Force

One of the US military’s most disgraceful battles took place along the shores of the Anacostia River less than two miles from the Capitol Building. There, on July 28, 1932, cavalry and infantry units led by General Douglas MacArthur, Major George S. Patton, and Major Dwight D. Eisenhower violently evicted the so-called Bonus Marchers. This motley group consisted of some 6,000 World War I-era veterans and their family members who had all pledged to occupy the swampy land along the river until the government agreed to redeem the veterans’ military service certificates several years ahead of schedule. Three people in the encampment would die in the violence, and media photographs of the rolling tear gas and burning shacks quickly became an acute embarrassment to the Hoover administration. As the local Daily News editorialized, “if the Army must be called out to make war on unarmed citizens, this is no longer America.”

This project addresses the dearth of scholarship on the Bonus Expeditionary Force (BEF), emphasizing the largely forgotten roots of its violent ending. A thorough study of surviving copies of the camp’s newspaper, the BEF News, demonstrates that the bonus marchers had for weeks been subject to an increasingly shrill rhetoric of outrage. In both verbal and visual appeals, the newspaper had fostered a polarized context in which the marchers and their families could see themselves as heroic combatants and the government and its agents as brutal, unfeeling enemies. As the occupation swelled, and tensions rose, the emboldened marchers became increasingly confrontational—an attitude that was soon matched by tensions within the government and police.

The appeals of BEF News to both militarization and enmification in the leadup to the Bonus March conflagration offer a rich case study of the gray areas that lie between and among justified public protest, militant political violence, and forceful state responses. In particular, the case study points to the importance of both verbal and visual discourse in fomenting an atmosphere of mistrust in which the potential for violent domestic conflict needs only a spark to ignite. By recovering this lost rhetoric, my project aims to provide insights into at least one way that violence can become manifest.
Michiel Rys

University of Durham

Questioning the Limits of Police Violence: The Aesthetics of Extremism in the Tatort Movie *Verbrannt*

The common view that the police is one of the institutions who is authorized to use violence on state territory in defense of the general interest, is one that has been supported and shaped by popular culture, e.g. by police series. This genre, which deserves scholarly attention because of its wide reach and therefore potential impact, has often been criticized for its conservative ideology: viewers follow the protagonist of a story line that is all about finding the culprit(s) who unrightfully applied violence, and restoring lawfulness. This also applies to the longest-running police show in the German-speaking world, Tatort, a co-production of German, Austrian and Swiss channels, starring different teams and inspectors stationed in multiple cities, suggesting both the omnipresence as well as the proximity of the police. The over a 1,000 episodes aired since the 1970s —usually having the length of a standard film—reflect how socio-political changes (especially after the Cold War and the several migration crises since the 1990s) have urged the police to adapt and deploy new techniques and instruments to fight ever-changing forms of crime, violence and terror.

Tatort not just thematizes the dialectics of societal transformations and the public image of the police and its functions. The episodes that really stand out are those that problematize incidents during which police force runs amok, gains excessive proportions and loses its legitimacy when it is confronted with a (imagined) danger for the socio-political order. These episodes, it can be argued, renegotiate and/or re-establish the commonly held opinions of what are considered to be the limits of police violence, within a genre that is expected to be conservative. My presentation will focus on the aestheticization of police violence in one case study, the episode *Verbrannt*, aired in 2015, when Germany celebrated 25 years of (institutionalized) unity in the peak of a European migration crisis. The gruesome story, based on true events, tells what drove police officers in a post-industrial town to burn an asylum seeker alive in his cell after he had been unrightfully arrested. *Verbrannt* deals with issues of structural racism and national identity, precarity and extremism, physical and symbolic violence. I will demonstrate how the episode addresses these topics by means of a formal visual language that is designed to influence the spectators’ attitudes, by means of shock eliciting both emotional responses and ethical reflections.
Biblical Violence, Rabbinic Remediation, Contemporary Reemergence

This paper will consider the religious roots of violence in Western religion, with emphasis on the Jewish tradition. The Hebrew Scriptures are full of divinely condoned violence. The Bible enjoins “holy war” against the indigenous Canaanite nations that inhabit the land promised by God to Israel. The prescription to destroy them is effectively genocidal in intent. Another ancient people, the Amalekites, are portrayed as locked in eternal struggle with Israel. One of the purposes of monarchy in ancient Israel is to obliterate Amalek. Comparable violence is commanded toward certain insiders as well, such as the city that turns to idolatry. The Scriptures, their immense resources for compassion and humanity notwithstanding, can be and have been read to license violence.

This legitimation of politically effectuated violence has often served as a rationale or pretext in cultures influenced by biblical motifs. The Puritans of Connecticut, for example, thought of the native Americans as “Amalek” and massacred them during the Pequot War. The Bible has served as a potent source of political theology, underwriting liberation and revolutionary movements, as Michael Walzer has shown. But it has also “justified” the assault on groups judged to be abhorrent to God.

In the Jewish tradition, the commandments involving violence were moderated by rabbinic interpretation. The Talmudic tradition contained the potential for violence through several hermeneutic strategies. Rabbinic rereading of biblical texts subordinated holy violence to legal and moral principles, which effectively eliminated the violent potential of the text. Of course, this process took place during centuries of exilic, relatively powerless Jewish life. The rabbinic remediation of biblical violence has today been challenged by the reemergence of Jewish statehood.

In the context of a sovereign state, holy war motifs have been reclaimed by fringe Israeli and other Jewish actors. The paper will consider a text displaying this reappropriation, a radical contemporary reading of Maimonides’s 13th century “Laws of Kings and their Wars” called “The Teaching of the King” (Torat ha-Melekh). This text essentially endorses near genocidal measures against the enemies of the Jews. Although marginal within Israel, it is a disturbing sign.

The thesis of the paper is that when the category of “holiness” is allowed to override the category of “ethics” in religious thought, the legitimation of violence is never far behind. The paper will be a normative philosophical analysis of religious-political violence in the Jewish tradition.
Challenging Violence (Q-801)

Clement Ferrier

Universite Bordeaux Montaigne

Opposing and Repressing the Violence of the Far Right in Democracy: A Study of Parties, Governmental and Individual Responses to the Violent Turn of the Rexist Movement in Belgium (1936-1940)

This communication proposes to explore the question of the symbolic and physical violence of the extreme right, and the responses made in democracy to repress it, especially in the case of 1930s Belgium.

The Rexist movement, led by Leon Degrelle, is a Belgian far-right movement created in the second half of the 1930s, in the French-speaking part of the country. It developed a violent political discourse initially against the political world, and those it called ‘rotten’. As the march towards radicalization of the discourse and its themes began, Rex developed an increasingly violent rhetoric, with new themes such as anti-semitism or xenophobia. This radicalization in discourse and action led to multiple and diverse forms of violence: public insults, defamations, demonstrations, symbolic and political threats to the social order and the Belgian Government. Rexist violence was expressed both in the press and in the public space during political and electoral demonstrations. In May 1936, 33 Rexist representatives swept in at the Palace of the Nation transposed symbolic and physical violence directly inside the highest political authorities.

The emergence and spread of Rexist violence clashed with Belgian political parties, which united in the ‘Common Front against Rex’, but also with strong governmental responses. The banning of demonstrations, the opposition to the violent speech in the Chamber and the Senate, but also the various court cases against Rex are examples of extensive responses to Rex’s political violence. Indeed, using all the legal means (ban on demonstrations, strict application of the general rules of the House, adversarial debates, trials, etc.) at their disposal, members of the executive and political parties attacked the ‘Rex phenomenon’, regularly and forcefully opposing its various forms of violence (physical, but also symbolic with attacks in the press and in political bodies). However, the emergence of individual responses to Rexist violence, with the implementation of actions bordering on illegality, created a new form of violence in democracy against Leon Degrelle’s movement and the Belgian far right.

This fluctuating opposition is studied mainly through the Belgian press, but also through reports in the kingdom’s political assemblies, highlighting the different responses and approaches available to individuals, the government and the Belgian political class as a whole.
There is growing evidence that some proactive policing strategies are effective in crime reduction. Most of these strategies usually address regular crimes. This raises the question of whether these strategies will show similar results in the context of political offenses and terrorism. Our study focuses on the offenses of stone-throwing in East Jerusalem, usually conducted by young Palestinians. We applied a problem-solving integrative treatment in one of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, which included strategies such as focused deterrence, place-based policing, CBT, diversion to non-enforcement tracks, and community interventions. The treatment involved agencies such as the police, persecution office, the municipality, welfare office, and the office of youth at risk. We find a large and significant reduction in the targeted neighborhood compared with the control neighborhoods. We also do not find evidence of displacement, but rather evidence of significant diffusions of crime control benefits. The results of the study show that promising strategies in the wider context of policing are also effective in responding to political offenses. Furthermore, an integrative treatment that addresses the risks and needs of these youth helped to reduce their future involvement in political offenses.
In Bogota and Paris, two very creative criminal justice experiments/performances have been carried out in the context of a moment of transition, giving an unprecedented place to victims, defendants and experts within the criminal trial.

In France, in the era of jihadist trials, we can observe that a new role for criminal courts is emerging. They become a "forum" giving voice to different actors in order to reconstruct a socio-historical phenomenon in all its complexity, as in truth commissions. These trials, and in particular the so-called "historical" trials, such as the Bataclan trial, become a space where the defendants present their path to radicalization, the victims relate their trauma and expectations, the experts situate the phenomenon in a political, social and medical context, and the police and security services expose their work but also their difficulties. The rich narratives revealed by the different stakeholders, and most notably by hundreds of victims, are at the center of this organic process, which is being constantly developed by the actors themselves. While they are governed by a binding criminal procedure, these trials thus appear as experiments, which renew penal law "from within". Instead of punishing guilty individuals, these types of justice prevail a collective reflection on the meaning of the crime, reparation and the reconstitution of a social bond. These objectives were explicitly claimed during the Bataclan (V13) trial, which represented a hybridization of criminal justice and transformative objectives.

In Bogotá, a very creative criminal justice system has been put in place to ensure accountability, including a system of alternative sentences that must be negotiated between perpetrators and victims, once the latter have acknowledged their responsibility. These processes involve thousands or hundreds of victims and are managed by the court and judges.

These two case studies open an avenue for reflecting about the field of transitional justice arguing that mass crime trials are evolving toward an incorporation of restorative and reparative goals, with significant involvement of victims, defendants, and a variety of social science professions, resulting in a hybridization of a truth commission and a criminal trial process within the criminal trial itself.
Session 7
Colonial and Post-Colonial Violence (Q-801)

Daphne Pons
Loyola University

*Violence and Interruption: Arendt’s Dispute with Sartre and Fanon*

In this paper, I propose to elucidate Hannah Arendt’s critique of Fanon and Sartre in her essay *On Violence*. Arendt views the 20th century as a pivotal historical moment: what makes this moment distinctive is the possibility of inflicting violence on a scale larger than ever before. For Arendt, along with this shift, a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of politics has taken place in intellectual and activist circles. The New Left, led by intellectuals such as Fanon and Sartre, and embodied in the 1960s student movements, has placed violence at the center of politics. On the theoretical level, Arendt is especially concerned with Fanon’s *Wretched of the Earth* and its preface authored by Sartre, where both thinkers argue that the fight for decolonization cannot take place without violence. In this paper, I propose to map out the stakes of the disagreement between Arendt, and Sartre and Fanon: in brief, my contention is that Arendt misidentifies the grounds of her disagreement with both thinkers. I begin by recapitulating Arendt’s two lines of critique, firstly that Fanon and Sartre misinterpret Marx, and secondly, that their argument glorifies violence. I then proceed to show that Arendt’s criticisms do not hold: Fanon makes it clear in *The Wretched of the Earth* that his position constitutes a modification of the Marxist framework. Hence, his argument does not rely on a misinterpretation of Marx’s work but rather, on a deliberate extension of it. Secondly, I argue that Fanon and Sartre’s position does not glorify violence; it does not endorse the emergence of a new decolonial violence into the political sphere. Instead, Fanon and Sartre consider decolonial violence as the violence of colonizers turned against them. Decolonial violence is not an intrusion into politics, as Arendt claims, but violence was always already contained within the structure of colonialism. Finally, I conclude that Arendt’s disagreement with her other set of opponents, the student movement leaders, reveals more about the substantial grounds of her discord with Fanon and Sartre than her own critique of them. As I suggest, for Arendt, political action is oriented towards the preservation of a common world: her real concern with the preponderance of violence in political rhetoric is the threat of nihilism. The loss of our sense of permanence of the world, for Arendt, is an existential threat to the activity of politics.
In this paper, which is written in the context of ongoing colonial violence against Indigenous lands and peoples in the place now commonly known as Australia, we evaluate the capacity of the discipline of history to address this violence in both its past and present forms. In the past few decades, non-Indigenous historians have increasingly drawn upon frameworks developed within postcolonial and settler colonial studies to reinterpret the colonial archive. Using methods such as ‘reading against the grain’, some historians have sought to make visible the violence that the official discourses of colonialism have often obscured, even as this violence has been continuously experienced and named by Indigenous people. We argue that such scholarly investigations have shown themselves inadequate to the task of disrupting colonial violence, because the epistemic framework and methods of the discipline are likewise a part of ongoing colonialism - a system that is premised upon the removal of Indigenous people from their lands and territories to assert their ownership and sovereignty. The system is adaptable and shifts, and thus academic re-analysis that historians and others conduct to challenge this system will only ever have limited effect. Without challenges to Western imperial knowledge systems and terms themselves, the relationship between these systems and ongoing colonialism remains. In this paper we build on the analysis of scholars in critical Indigenous studies, including Aileen Moreton-Robinson, Leanne Betasamosoke Simpson, Tony Birch and Samia Khatun, to develop a critique of the epistemic categories and methods of current historical approaches to colonial violence in the Australian context. We conclude by suggesting more productive ways forward for scholars and activists who seek to engage with violence of both the past and present.
Saadia Sumbal

*Forman Christian College University Lahore*

**Radicalization of Politics of Exclusion in Pakistan**

Identity construction was the dominant discourse among Indian Muslims in the twentieth century British India. Political and religious ideologues emphasized the concepts of ideal nation and national community. Religion acted as a political rhetoric to mobilize Muslim community, fusing the community identity into the nationalist ideology of anti-imperialism. Relationship between Islam, state and identity remained paramount in public space in the post-colonial state of Pakistan in 1947. There was a visible resurgence of Islam and the process of identity formation, concurrent to this resurgence was a growing range of activities of religious ideologues and their reach in the public and religious spheres. What created a space for them in politics was Objectives Resolution 1949, a decisive step towards Islamic state which helped to clearly delineate the boundary between Muslim and non-Muslim. The state-led ideological predicament on Islam, helped the key religio-political actors to shape a more radical and extremist variant of Islam leading to theological dissent and sectarian wedge by replacing pluralist traditions. In this process of re-identification, Khatm-e-Nabuwat (the finality of Prophethood) emerged as a rallying point where various religious groups like Deobandi, Barelwi and Majlis-i-Ahrar converged and tried to stay at the level of an intellectual and moral struggle against minority religious groups, the Ahmadiyya and Shias with a unified and extreme exclusionary disposition. This paper makes a historical analysis of how religious ideologues in the post-colonial state of Pakistan, articulated their religious authority to gain their political objective of participation in the national narrative constructed on the idea of a consensual singular Islamic identity. How they manifested their distinct religious positions into the political positions and turned to violence by kicking off 1953 and 1974 Khatm-e-Nabuwat movements. It analyses the state’s role as twopronged, the policy of accommodation of minority groups in 1953 movement, however in 1974 movement, religious ideologues enhanced their political role, manipulated by pressing upon government for legislative and religious exclusion of Ahmadiyya through legal and administrative measures, hence legitimized the violence against the minority groups. The paper will also highlight how Barelwi ideologues, who drew their strength from the charismatic authority of moderate and peaceful Sufi leaders, now turned to radical politics by using panIslamic symbols to create for themselves a growing space in the modern mosaic of Pakistan’s state structure.
Igbo people did not anticipate that Nigeria’s return to a democratic republic in 1999 would have such a profound influence on them. It did not strengthen their ties to Nigeria, but it did result in the formation of separatist organizations - The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), a political organization, founded in south-eastern Nigeria in November 1999, which rose to prominence in Igboland within two years. This was followed by the rise of another separatist group, the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB). Why was there such enthusiasm for separatism and violence, despite the fact that the first Biafra Republic (1967–1970) was associated with gruesome memories? Many scholars have dealt with the war and post-civil war era, but the issue of Igbo agitation for sovereignty has not received adequate historical research. Using oral and archival sources as evidence, my work seeks to fill this gap by exploring the background changes, dynamics and trajectory of the Igbo Agitation for Sovereignty in post-colonial Nigeria from 1960 to 2015. This research argues that the Igbo struggle for statehood evolved in the post-Biafra war era due to socio-political, economic grievances and a strong sense of collective victimisation against the Igbos. Consequently, this renewed agitation led to the birth of radical and sometimes violent groups who began to clamour for Igbo secession upon Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999. This Igbo agitation has existed in Nigeria for a long period of time, which is significant because it may help us comprehend other ethnic violent agitations in the West African country, for example, in the Niger Delta and the Middle Belt, and the terror group Boko Haram. Moreover, the Biafra narrative brings together many topics into one event, including the effects of colonialism, the challenges of nation-building, and the politics of ethnic plurality. These matters also illuminate a great deal of what historians find fascinating about the past and why they think it is crucial for individuals to grasp in order to make sense of the world.
The Laws of War and the Legitimacy of Civil and Colonial Conflicts

For a long period, civil and colonial wars were left outside the realm of international law and the laws of war – which emerged in the late nineteenth century with strong statist and colonial biases. As such, the exclusion of civil and colonial conflicts from the realm of the laws of war was not merely accidental, but consubstantial to a legal conception of war as a public event that can only occur between legitimate actors – only between ‘civilised’ states. Therefore, wars waged among European states were seen as a legitimate activity involving legitimate actors.

However, the question of the legitimacy of violent subversion against governmental or colonial rulers was not absent from the discourse of the laws of war. Indeed, this legal regime distributes level of legitimacy by the type of conflicts it includes or excludes and by the rights, duties, and privileges it attributes or denies to different actors. For a long period, the exclusive source of legitimacy was the legitimacy of the status – the European state. Thus, to include civil and colonial wars within the realm of the laws of war via the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 additional protocols, it has been necessary to mitigate but also challenge this legitimacy of the status grounded on statist and colonial biases.

The result is that in the current legal framework, civil wars are regulated only if actors involved look like a state by meeting criteria of organisation, hierarchy, and territorial control. Even though insurgents do not enjoy the same privileges as belligerents do in an interstate war, the legitimacy of the status remains in the form of a war between a state and a proto state. For colonial wars, the source of legitimacy moved from the legitimacy of the status to the legitimacy of the cause. Individuals fighting against colonial domination are thus not entitled to legal privileges such as the prisoner of war status because they represent a particular political organisation whose legitimacy is recognized upstream, but because they are fighting for a cause whose legitimacy is recognized upstream.

The current laws of war regarding civil and colonial conflicts are thus structured by two different sources of legitimacy. Ultimately, this illustrates the tension within the international legal order regarding non-state violence – an order both committed to maintaining a status quo inherited from statist and colonial structures, and also wiling to accompany violent subversions of this latter.
Carwil Bjork-James

Vanderbilt University

**Turns Toward and Away from Violent Repression in Democratic Bolivia**

Military rule prevailed in Bolivia from 1964 to 1982 (with brief interludes) and massacres, “disappearances,” and other extrajudicial executions were commonplace during the years of dictatorship. The country’s post-1982 democratic period has been marked by continued political dynamism, but far less political violence. Where 50–500 people died annually in political conflict during military rule, deaths dropped to an average of less than 8/year from 1983 to 1997. Deaths peaked at over 130 in 2003 under President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, before dropping to approximately 10/year under Evo Morales. Finally, a renewed spike in violence claimed 38 lives in the 2019 political crisis. In general, state security forces rather than armed non-state actors have been the principal perpetrators of deadly violence, while the dead have been largely unarmed participants in protest.

An effective account of this history needs to explain both the intense, concentrated use of violence (and its divergent effects on protest) and the political forces that restrained deadly violence during major parts of the democratic period. In this paper, I focus specifically on two phenomena that form the background and foreground of a long-term picture of state repression during Bolivia’s current democratic period. First, a wide variety of political figures have publicly disavowed the use of deadly force to stop protest. This includes heads of state who pledged (sometimes successfully) to avoid deadly repression on their watch, legislators and civil society leaders who repudiated violent turns by the government, and protesters who defined any and all violent repression as an echo of pre-1982 dictatorship. It may also include the leaders of the country’s neoliberal turn, who innovated methods of repression that smothered the leadership of the anti-neoliberal labor movement, but did so without bloodshed. Second, I consider the dynamics of the presidencies and events where state repression claimed ten or more lives, asking what about these leaders and situations caused these restraints on violence to be overcome.

This paper is grounded in Ultimate Consequences, a quantitative and qualitative database of over six hundred conflict-related deaths in Bolivia since October 1982. The database spans twelve presidential administrations, four episodes where protests ended a presidency, and 192 protest events in 17 domains of conflict. The paper also serves an introduction to this open data research project, which will offer researchers access to detailed information on political violence in Bolivia via an R package and website beginning in 2023.
Between mid and late October 2020, a popular mass uprising codenamed ‘ENDSARS’ swept across many states in Nigeria. The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), an undercover special police unit established in 1992 to curb crimes in the country had become notorious for human rights violations. Despite the overwhelming discontent with the SARS operatives, state actors appeared unperturbed. In 2017, a trendy ‘hashtag Endsars now’ campaign commenced on Twitter to seek avenues for a conversation on police brutality in Nigeria but this effort was short-lived. Following an impressive social mobilization in year 2020, the Endsars movement was born. Arguably this was a culturally impactful movement in Nigeria’s recent history. Major participants of the Endsars movement included members of Nigeria’s youth demography inclusive of the LGBTQ+ community, a perpetually marginalised group in Nigeria’s socio-cultural, economic and political spaces. For ‘appearing queer’ or expressing a gender identity that is not in line with heteronormative social expectations in Nigeria, this group has repeatedly been subjected to untoward violence, the Endsars protest being a visible example. This paper uses the frame of ‘marginality’ to provide insights into the lived experiences as well as the violence against sexual minorities in Nigeria. I examine the sources and patterns of violence against the queer community in Nigeria which emerges against the backdrop of their now ‘centred’ rather than ‘marginal’ presence. I interrogate how the LGBTQ+ group also leverage the Endsars protest to advocate for impartiality in their relationship with non-queer persons in the country. I conclude by reflecting on LGBTQ+ deviance and the limitation of the Endsars protests, given the violent conduct of a group of protesters towards the LGBTQ+ group.
Session 8
Exiting Violence (Q-801)

Hugh McDonnell
University of Groningen

**The Authority of Violence and Non-Violence: General Jacques Pâris de Bollardière**

In April 1957, general Jacques Pâris de Bollardière abruptly quit the French army. He had only been promoted a few months before, and was the youngest officer of that rank to serve in France’s escalating counter-insurgency campaign against the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). However, Bollardière refused to accept the use of torture in the “pacification” of France’s North African departments. In doing so, he jettisoned a celebrated career forged during the Second World War at Narvik, in Abyssinia, Syria, the deserts of North Africa, the Resistance maquis in the Ardennes, in the final Allied advance on Germany in 1945, and in France’s colonial war in Indochina (1945-1954).

Bollardière would subsequently reinterpret his commitment to military service that had characterized his conservative family upbringing in Brittany. Instead of continuing the proud military tradition of generations of the Bollardières, he gradually came to the conclusion that, counterintuitively, remaining faithful to his formative values meant throwing himself into the non-violence movement. He was a founding member of the Mouvement pour une Alternative Non-Violente (MAN), in the deliberate (and indeed, problematic) acronym. In his commitment to non-violence, he engaged former military colleagues in now forgotten, high-profile national debates about the violence and legacy of France’s wars. He championed conscientious objectors, campaigned against nuclear weaponry, critiqued the French military establishment, and advocated alternative non-violent forms of defense and local democracy based on self-management.

This paper analyses Bollardière’s references to his experience of war in the French army as a highly decorated soldier precisely as the basis of his authority to advocate for nonviolence. Conversely, it examines how opponents of Bollardière countered his claims to authority on this basis. The paper’s analysis of the dynamics of these contestations of the authority to speak about violence and non-violence focuses on three key episodes: first, the curiously forgotten high-profile media debates incurred by general Jacques Massu’s 1971 publication of La vraie bataille d’Alger, Bollardière’s 1972 response in Bataille d’Alger, bataille de l’homme, and the flurry of articles that ensued in the French media by both men and their defenders and detractors. Second, Bollardière’s expedition to Mururoa in 1973 to put himself in the way of French nuclear bomb tests, again causing significant media fallout. And third, Bollardière’s participation in the Larzac movement, which campaigned throughout the 1970s against the extension of a French army base in the area.
Movements Opposing Ethnic Chauvinism in Diversifying Societies: Opposing Violent, Organized Racism in the Northwestern United States

Is a slide towards ethnic and racial polarization in a changing society reversible? What kinds of mobilizations and coalitions can reverse it? The United States is currently facing increasing antidemocratic threats and targeted violence in response to increasing racial diversity, as current racial minorities are projected to become a majority of the population by 2042. White nationalism is a political movement struggling for the Balkanization of an existing multiracial society and has leveraged demographic change to broaden their movement. Since the 1990s, the movement sought to use electronic communication and targeted offline efforts to spread conspiracy theories and targeted violence. Their opponents, self-identified antiracist and civil rights advocates, worked to consolidate cross-racial coalitions. This paper draws on interviews and participant observation with antiracist activists in the northwestern United States to explore how advocates of multi-racial democracy employ democratic means to counter extremist violence. While many efforts to counter extremism focus on either counter-recruitment strategies or encourage individuals to leave extremist movements, this research uncovers an approach that mobilizes democratic institutions to protect communities from the effects of extremist, antidemocratic movements.

Social scientific studies show that the real or perceived loss of privilege of a dominant group is often a precursor to outbursts of violence (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) and other forms of backlash (Alter and Zürn 2020; Gest 2020). This is possibly one reason why diversifying or democratizing societies often experience a rise in extremist or authoritarian movements. Dominant groups often understand these shifts in demography as a potential loss of privilege and develop resentment of those they see as challenging their privileged position. Depending on the context, this resentment can manifest either in political mobilizations or in extrajudicial violence (Petersen 2002). Social scientists have proposed several different theories for understanding this type of resentment, including: “status threat” (Mutz 2018; Wetts and Willer 2018); “recalcitrant politics” (Hale, Calla, and Mullings 2017); “ethnic antagonism” (Bartels 2020); or “racial resentment” (Kinder and Sanders 1996).

Through investigating movements designed to challenge racist violence, this paper adds new knowledge to what Cynthia Miller-Idriss—a leading scholar on far-right extremism—describes as a “herd immunity” approach to countering extremism (2020, 167). This approach has been widely implemented outside of the United States, but has been the subject of very few studies, particularly in the US.
Timothy William Waters

Indiana University

**Not Enough Death: The Perverse Incentives of Remedial Secession**

Theories about the proper response to oppression and persecution – up to and including a right of revolution – have traditionally focused on the improvement or replacement of the government rather than exit from the polity – curiously, since one of the early cases in modern theory was the American Revolution. That revolt was also an early example of the one major contemporary legal doctrine allowing exit – what is now called ‘remedial secession.’

Remedial secession – the right of a group to form its own state in response to great harms emanating from the existing state -- is a controversial doctrine, but also often the only meaningful tool available to communities facing persecution and genocide.

But remedial secession is a reactive doctrine, only deployed after violence and harm have reached intolerable levels. Indeed, the doctrine creates perverse, truly terrifying incentives for oppressed communities to *maximize* their suffering in order to strengthen their claim for exit.

Focused is it on thresholds of violence, remedial secession fails to address the political logic of the crises in which the doctrine is deployed. The kind of communities that invoke remedial secession are, in fact, what traditionally would have been recognized as self-determining communities that might have claimed statehood not as a remedy for suffering, but as a right.

If we accept the moral case for remedial secession, we should follow its logic and recognize that the crises in which we invoke the doctrine are self-determination disputes even before the violence metastasizes. Law should treat them as such: We need a doctrine not only to alleviate suffering, but to vindicate human political desire.

This paper proposes such a model: It outlines the current doctrine of remedial secession, the perverse incentives it creates to increase rather than mitigate state violence, and an alternative that recenters claims for protection around political identity rather than narratives of suffering.
State Violence II. (Q-704)

Robert Sukiasyan

USC Shoah Foundation


This presentation will analyze the “Temporary Law of Deportation” of May 27, 1915 passed by the Ottoman parliament during the first months of the Armenian genocide. It was a legal framework and cover-up used by the Ottoman government to mislead and destroy the Armenian population.

Deportations, mass displacements of large groups of people, involve large-scale operations, which are inevitably associated with obstacles and possible violations of law and are often implemented with the introduction of certain legal regulations. It is well known that the risk of displacement with atrocities is especially high during war. This realization brought to life the “Lieber Code”, an instruction to the Union forces of the United States during the American Civil War that dictated how soldiers should conduct themselves in wartime, which had a major influence on national statutes, the Geneva Conventions of 1899 and 1907 on the conduct of land warfare, and the formation of customary law and later legislation. However, the existence of such laws did not prevent the future genocides and other crimes.

This talk will examine the case of the Ottoman empire during the World War I. The background of the “Temporary Law of Deportation” of May 27, its text, the general context and implications. The discussion will include details about the law’s realization on the ground as an organizational tool for the deportations of its own subjects. The talk will examine several examples of how the law was cited to legitimize the crimes, as well as other mechanisms that perpetrators used to make deportees comply with their orders. Additionally, the law was instrumental in providing a strong point for solidification of all branches of government, sharing of responsibility and direct involvement in the events, while effectively preventing and reducing the potential resistance by the deportees.

A general question will be raised about the potential risks of similar legislation and a need of meticulous monitoring of the like from the expert community in hopes of prevention of future crimes.
Yesim Yaprak Yildiz

Goldsmiths University of London

Exploring Complicity and Complacency in State-led Atrocities in Turkey

There is not a single decade in Turkish history without massacres or grave violations against ethnic and religious minorities or the political opposition. While these acts of violence were often carried out under direct state control, various segments of the population actively or passively participated, further complicating the layers of denial, guilt, and responsibility. This long-standing history of political violence against different segments of society has also been a history of disciplining the population over what to see, what to hear, and what to say. The cultivation of docile citizenship in Turkey has been achieved through various mechanisms, including education, media, judicial harassment, and physical threats. Consequently, the result has been a largely silent society in the face of political scandals and atrocious crimes against civilians. Although fear plays a significant role in this silence, I argue that complicity and complacency have become the defining features of the moral order in Turkey. Navaro-Yashin previously defined cynicism as a primary characteristic of the Turkish public in the 1990s when the state's links with organized crime became undeniable. In this paper, I aim to demonstrate that complicity and complacency now largely define the moral order in Turkey in response to state-led violence against individuals and communities. To support my argument, I will analyze public and media reactions to the killing and burning of a Kurdish family in the central Anatolian city of Konya in 2021, allegedly over a nonpolitical dispute as well as to the Turkish state's cross-border operation into the Kurdish Syrian city of Afrin in 2018. By exploring the emergence of complicit and complacent subjectivities within public debates surrounding these cases, I aim to explore the role played by the wider population in the protracted violence against Kurds.
The Roma community in Greece, has been constantly the focus of state violence (and police authorities in Greece). Recurring phenomena of police shootings against Roma civilians, raids into Roma camps, and arrests of Roma people for theft and crime comprise the landscape of state violence against a group that carries a “tradition” of marginalization in the Greek society. It is the aim of the paper to examine these cases of state violence (specific ones) that triggered a civic unrest by the Roma community and look at them through a twofold perspective. The first through the lenses of the key concept of the Roma identity as it is projected by the Roma people themselves through interviews and their social networks and the second one from the policy making perspective, since Greece along with other European countries and in the context of the EU, have created and implemented many strategic plans for the integration of Roma people and their empowerment. This twofold goal will also look at the media’s portrayal of the victims of violence as part of the traditional “stereotypes” existing in the Greek society and manifested by the media narratives, regarding Roma people and to try to highlight the root causes of violence as expressed by the State’s law enforcement authorities. It is worth noting that even though there have been recent protests by the Roma communities against the Greek authorities regarding the injury of a sixteen-year-old Roma by a policeman, in the Greek society we did not observe any phenomena of a social movement for the rights of Roma people as for example in the case of Black Lives Matter movement in the US. It is like the Greek society keeps its distance from the group thus maintaining a “gap” which is deeply rooted in its culture and tradition. This is the case for similar incidents that have happened in the past against Roma people. A fundamental question that will be looked at through the discussion of the state violence against Roma people is that of Human rights (and the identity of the group) and social inequality. Disinformation by members of the far right and others, combined with excessive security measures and police abuse, also frame the Roma people as a public threat, reinforcing and politicizing hatred. All these key elements are going to be part of the discussion of the paper proposed to be presented at the conference.