Panel 1.1 Silences and Negations

Lillian K. Cartwright, University of California, Berkeley, “There is a Silencer on the Gun”

In the paper I explore the concept of "negation" as a from of murder. I begin with the premise that we are social animals and want recognition and connection.


By shunning or brutally ignoring another human being, we figuratively "kill" them. Illustrations come from several sources including literature (Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man) as well as cultural practices such as shunning and prison practices of "solitary confinement". Last, the relationship between narcissistic parents and their children resonates with the concept of negation. Using a Winnicot model, the child is "not recognized" and not heard by the parent who is absorbed with her/his own activities and fantasies and cannot mirror or consol the child. The child is abandoned. The above are examples of micro-killings that can go unnoticed yet by ignoring them we miss out on the nuances and wide spectrum of violence.

Lillian K. Cartwright received her MA from the University of Illinois and her PhD. in psychology from the University of California, Berkeley. She is a practicing artist, writer, and educator.

Allan Moore, University of the West of Scotland, “Words Matter: Why History Shows that Remaining Silent and False Equivalence Are not an Option for President Trump”

On 14th August 2017, what appeared to be a reasonable statement was released from the Whitehouse on behalf of President Trump: "we condemn in the strongest possible terms this egregious display of hatred, bigotry, and violence... No matter the color of our skin, we all live under the same laws, we all salute the same great flag... Racism is evil. And those who cause violence in its name are criminals and thugs, including the KKK, neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and other hate groups that are repugnant to everything we hold dear as Americans." However just one day later at a press briefing, President
Trump’s sentiments were quite different, arguing that: "You had a group on one side that was bad and you had a group on the other side that was also very violent. And nobody wants to say that, but I’ll say it right now. You had a group, you had a group on the other side that came charging in without a permit…” This paper analyses the highly debated issues linked to the Charlottesville violence including the removal of statues, allegations rewriting of history, and in particular the problems associated with silence and false equivalence. Methods include both a discourse analysis (DA) and a conversation analysis (CA) of the written and oral communications between President Trump to both a general audience and to more specific meetings with members of the press and media. A substantial comparison is drawn with the events that led up to the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994, before returning to the Charlottesville incident and discussing the highly contentious issue of whether or not far right extremist groups ought to be allowed a public platform to discuss their ideologies, with specific reference to the paradox of tolerance noted by philosopher Karl Popper. The results of the research conclude that if the continued rise of far right extremism and other linked violent conflict are to be prevented, then care must be taken to avoid both silence and false equivalence in future public communication.

Allan Moore holds a PhD in law and criminology. Her leads the program on criminal justice at the University of the West of Scotland.

Nicole Hall, Independent scholar, “On Silence, Hate Speech and Authority”
Rae Langton has recently written on the relationship between authority and hate speech. While it would otherwise and ideally be undesirable to endow hate speech with any form of at least "legitimate" authority, I agree with Langton that hate speech assumes and accumulates authority in specific situations, circumstances and contexts - otherwise, it would not be able to gain traction or seep into ordinary or public discourse.

I am, however, interested in inverting the question by addressing a different issue: what is the relationship between authority and silence? Langton writes that, in relation to hate speech, authority comes in epistemic and practical forms: that "the words of hate speech can be verdicts that tell someone how things are, and directives that tell someone what to do".
Silence is a concept often used in the context of the silencing of others, such as pornography's silencing of women. It is argued that pornography gives permission to the perpetrator of rape to persist in his actions despite a woman's denying sexual consent. A strong case is made for the silencing of women who's "No!" is not heard except as an invitation for him to convince or ignore her (or not). One might argue, as does Nancy Bauer, that the onus ought to be on the perpetrator to listen and take seriously the woman's refusing sexual advance rather than emphasizing the silence with which her refusal is met. However we construe the problem, it seems any authority is removed from the victim in this case.

Although presented as a feminist issue, this sort of example carries over to cases of race. Propaganda - such as the propaganda representing any ethnic group (nazi propaganda or anti-muslim slurs such as "sale arabe") - could also be said to silence a group seen as inferior in voicing their concerns or being taken seriously. In both the feminist and race cases, one can easily imagine a process of the victim's internalizing the silence with which they are persistently met, feelings of disempowerment and giving up on speaking out at all, reinforcing the silence.

The form of silence I am interested in exploring is silence as an act of communication or of information despite the lack of an act of speech and as a means of demonstrating or retaining power or authority. I am also interested in the exploitation of silence to perpetuate and reinforce the apparent salience of hate speech.

The epistemic and practical forms of authority related to hate speech also apply to silence, especially if silence can be thought of as a gateway to knowledge and action. Yet there is another form of authority derived from silence - not only that which is not said because it is supposedly ineffable, as Wittgenstein famously quipped - or that which is not said because it is not deemed important or relevant to the concerns of the receiver of silence, but the effect silence has on that receiving end.

Nicole Hall completed a PhD in aesthetics and the philosophy of perception at the University of Edinburgh. She also took up a post-doc at the Institut Jean Nicod (ENS, EHESS, CNRS), where she has been doing research at the intersection where the philosophy of mind, philosophy of perception and aesthetics meet.
Jelena Marković, Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research in Zagreb, “Silences that Kill: Hate, Fear and their Silences”

Based on a concrete research of public political discourse in Croatia (which produces fear by means of explicit and implicit speech of exclusion and often also hate speech) and the research of personal narratives of fear and anxiety of marginalized groups, this presentation aims at providing answers to three basic research questions. Firstly, how is hate narratively shaped, in public discourse and personal narratives, that is, how is hate affected by the narrative or how hates enables the narrative to be affective? Secondly, how the language of hate affects those who are designated as objects of hate? Thirdly, can and to what degree the subject of anxiety/fear (i.e. the explicit object of hate) narrate their experience and emotional response to hate?

In order to examine the conditions of narrating fear and the effects produced by fear, I will primarily focus on the places of absence or reduction of verbalization - on the silence present in the contact zone between the terrifying, hating object and/or the terrified, anxious subject. I will be interested in the places in which hate generates fear and silence, the places in which hate erodes the subject’s need for intersubjectivity and leads to a deep sense of isolation and being silent. In other words, I will focus on the relationship between hate and the spatial reorganisation of fearing bodies, entailing not only an emotional experience and social exclusion, but sometimes also articulated resistance.

Jelena Markovic is research associate, and she works at the Institute of ethnology and folklore research in Zagreb. She is also an assistant professor at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb.

Panel 1.2 The Rhetoric of Indigenous Extermination and Genocide in Colonial and Postcolonial North America

Brenden W. Rensink, Brigham Young University, “‘Progreso y Orden’: The Porfirian Rhetoric and Campaigns of Extermination, Deportation, and Enslavement of Yaquis in the late-19th and early-20th Century Mexico”
Starting in the late-19th century Mexican President Porfirio Diaz directed a series of operations and campaigns to rid the Yaqui River Valley in Sonora of its indigenous Yaqui peoples. Long the a thorn in the side of Spanish and Mexican empire, Yaquis persisted as one of the last truly unconquered indigenous peoples in Mexico. Mexican government officials and academics justified their actions against the Yaquis in the positivist philosophies of the day. They emphasized the need to modernize the Yaqui River Valley and pursue "Progreso y Orden," Progress and Order - all of which they cast Native Yaquis as impeding. Using this rhetoric the Porfian regime directed campaigns of "extermination" against Yaquis in Sonora. Simultaneously they deported Yaquis and sold them into slave labor on henequen and sisal plantations to the south in the Yucatan and elsewhere. Between the extermination campaigns and horrific conditions of deportation and enslavement, many Yaquis perished. This presentation will examine the types of rhetoric Porfrians deployed against Yaquis and how their words and actions align with other examples of violence against and genocide of indigenous peoples elsewhere in the world.

Brenden W. Rensink is Assistant Director of the Charles Redd Center for Western Studies and Assistant Professor of History at Brigham Young University.

Ari Kelman, University of California, “For Liberty and Empire: How the Civil War Bled into the Indian Wars”

"For Liberty and Empire: How the Civil War Bled into the Indian Wars" will place conflicts involving federal authorities and Native peoples in the 1860s and 70s against the backdrop of the U.S. Civil War and Reconstruction, weaving together narrative and analytical threads that have typically been disentangled in history and memory, and arguing that longstanding efforts to cast the Civil War as a good war have obscured darker elements of these critical chapters in American history while eliding the role of Native people in the national narrative. "For Liberty and Empire," by contrast, will argue that the Civil War, often understood only as a war of liberation, was also a war of empire, fought in part over the right to shape the process of continental expansion, and that the impact of Reconstruction, usually depicted exclusively along a North-South axis, also stretched into the trans-Mississippi West. The slaughter and removal of Native
people, then, stood at the core rather than on the periphery of national development during the Civil War, and later provided rare common ground, a point of reconciliation, for Southerners and Northerners who served together in the U.S. army during Reconstruction and the Indian Wars.

Ari Kelman is Chancellor’s Leadership Professor of History at the University of California, Davis.

Elizabeth N. Ellis, New York University, “The Violence of Historical Erasure: Southeastern Indians, Settler Narratives, and Federal Recognition in the Lower Mississippi Valley”

In Jackson County, Mississippi the Pascagoula River sings. According to local legend, the river resonates with the death songs of the Pascagoulas and Biloxis, two Native American nations of long ago. As the story goes, both nations became so heartbroken that they committed suicide in the river, and left no trace of their peoples except their names on the lands of the Gulf Coast.

Nineteenth-century Americans did not envision a future for Indigenous people in the modern U.S., and so they either forcibly removed Native nations, or refused to recognize the Indigenous communities that escaped removal as autonomous polities and rightful landowners. To nullify Indian land claims, settler-Americans constructed fictive histories of Native disappearance, decline, and destruction. By the 20th century these myths became embedded in historical literature and popular perceptions of Native Americans, and we frequently teach schoolchildren that all Southeastern Indians were removed to Oklahoma. This public perception has had serious ramifications for contemporary communities and has prevented many of these Native communities in Louisiana and Mississippi from obtaining federal status as Indian nations. Only with federal recognition can Native Americans formally assert title, sovereignty, and jurisdiction of their territories. In short, historical erasure has led to tribal land loss and physical and cultural violence against these communities, and federal policy continues to fail these resilient Native nations.
This presentation provides brief histories of the Tunica-Biloxis and the Pointe-au-Chien Indian Tribe during the late eighteenth century, and then compares their experiences in the late twentieth century as both polities pursued nation to nation relationships with the federal government. Using archival records I illustrate the connections between settler land acquisitions and the claims that Native polities have been destroyed, and compare these narratives to Native peoples’ own oral accounts of this history. As Biloxi, Naniaba, Pascagoula, Tunica, and Chitimacha peoples retreated from the imperial gaze during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, settler Americans constructed narratives that romanticized and reified the disappearance of Native people, and thereby opened the fertile lands of the Mississippi River valley to white settlement. Therefore, as long as we refuse to recognize this other set of Southeastern Indian histories and experiences, Americans continue the violence of Indian removal, and the 19’th century project of preventing Native nations from existing in the modern US.

Elizabeth N. Ellis is Assistant Professor of History, New York University

Rhiannon Koehler, University of California, ""Hostile Nations': Rhetoric, Destruction, and the 1779 Sullivan-Clinton Genocide"

United States General George Washington was known as Conotocaurious, or Town Destroyer, to the Haudenosaunee, or People of the Long House. It was no wonder. Washington and his subordinates had spent years, by 1779, publicly urging "civilization or death to all American Savages." In fact, language in Washington’s public speeches, letters, and diary entries, along with corresponding death tolls, reveals the 1779 Sullivan-Clinton Campaign to be an example of genocide as defined by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This essay examines the persuasive and positivist rhetoric that promoted and defended the 1779 Sullivan-Clinton Campaign and juxtaposes it against convergent language in centennial historical addresses regarding the Campaign. It argues that the 1779 genocide of the Haudenosaunee occurred in a broader ideological framework in which United States leaders chose not to recognize the sovereignty and humanity of the Iroquois in order to better-facilitate future national expansion and settler occupation of the American Northeast.
Rhiannon Koehler is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of California, Los Angeles

Panel 1.3 Thinking Violence through Cinema and Literature

John Michael, University of Rochester, "National Literatures, Hate Speech, and the Return to Philology"

Literary studies, as traditionally pursued in departments of national literatures, have an unexpected affinity or affiliation with the logics of national exclusivity and ethnic supremacy that underpin forms of hate speech today. Philology, deeply implicated in the nationalist foundations of literary studies, also offers a way to think through and beyond ethno-nationalist paradigms. The assumption that national literatures coincide with national languages, which coincide with the spirit of the nation state and its people requires reexamination. Few would still admit to these assumptions, but they still shape the institutions of literature pedagogy and research.

The way out of the bind of national exceptionalisms and the work that literary studies have done to sustain them lies through yet another reconsideration of philology. The ideal of national literatures often represses the mediation of the nation and of culture through the inherent heterogeneities of language and culture that destabilize the identities and hierarchies of belonging that language and literature have sometimes been thought to ground. Philology can test how little skepticism about identity, meaning, and dwelling literary nationalism can afford. Nationalism and exceptionalism base their legitimacy on a series of familiar but false congruencies, of a political border with a linguistically grounded cultural or ethnic identity, of a symmetry between a "native" language and native belonging, of the ease with which a language or culture may be understood to be "ours" and opposed to foreign languages and cultures existing elsewhere.

These imagined congruencies ground the logic of othering that in turn grounds the logic of hate speech. A revitalized philology can call close attention to the inherent and historical porousness of language and of the literary and cultural forms. Philology encourages us, even when engaged in studies of national literature, to remain attentive to the cosmopolitan circulations, appropriations, and otherness inscribed
with any cultural or linguistic artefact and characteristic of the peoples who claim it. As an example of such a philologically informed rereading of putatively nationalistic literary work, I will present a poet usually understood as an autochthonous hero of U.S. literature, Walt Whitman, and analyze his derivations from enlightenment cosmopolitanisms on the one hand and his influence on literary forms in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and South America on the other. I will also consider another writer usually claimed as a purely American original, Henry David Thoreau, his style and views on language. Each of these writers embarks on a philological investigation of the multivalent language in which they find their literary being. Each challenges crucial aspects of nationalism and exceptionalism to which they have been thought to contribute. These writers indicate one way to uncouple literary studies from the logic of hate speech. To follow their indications may require rethinking our sense of literature and the institutional and intellectual divisions that isolate most literary scholars into departments of national languages and literatures.

John Michael is Professor of English and of Visual and Cultural Studies at the University of Rochester

**Russell Williams, American University of Paris, “Michel Houellebecq’s Soumission, a Contemporary ‘Dog Whistle’ Novel?”**

In 2002, following an interview with the magazine *Lire* where he described Islam as ‘la religion la plus con’, the French novelist Michel Houellebecq was prosecuted, and eventually acquitted, for "injure raciale et incitation à la haine religieuse". In discussions of Houellebecq’s case, supporters were quick to invoke the "special value" of the literary space for the free discussion of ideas, however provocative or unpalatable. Houellebecq’s acquittal, and support from figures such as Salman Rushdie, have contributed to permitting the writer a high degree of literary freedom. His most recent novel *Soumission* (2015) shows the author fully inhabiting this freedom in order to undertake what amounts a provocative critique of contemporary French society. This paper will argue that Houellebecq’s technique here is oblique: by means of implication and innuendo related to race and religion, his work mirrors the "dog whistle" rhetoric of contemporary post-truth politics. It will suggest that this comes at the expense of the literary since the framing of provocative ideas and assertions
expounded in his fiction has become less robust and more fragmented throughout his career. This leads to, I suggest, a greater porosity between Houellebecq's fiction and that of contemporary right-wing essayists such as Alain Finkielkraut, Eric Zemmour and Renaud Camus. Are we, I will speculate, still correct to describe Houellebecq as a "novelist"?

Russell Williams is Assistant Professor in the department of Comparative Literature and English at the American University of Paris.

**Natasha Marie Llorens, Columbia University, “Une Si Jeune Paix: Premature Claims to Emancipation”**

Jacques Charby's *Une Si Jeune Paix*, released in 1965, was the first long-form film made in independent Algeria. It recounts the experiences of two young war orphans in the years following Algerian Independence who, coming into conflict over the score of a football game, try to resolve the disagreement by re-enacting the war between the colonial settler's extreme right militia, the OAS, and the Algerian revolutionary military force, the FLN. The two main characters form alliances with the other young boys in the orphanage, they plan strategic attacks, they give impassioned speeches from improvised platforms. The game culminates in a dramatic courtroom scene in which one of the boys is being tried for treason by the rest of the orphans. But instead of passing mock-judgement, one of the boys draws a real gun and executes the defendant in the middle of the play-proceedings.

Ahmed Bedjaoui has argued that the rhetoric of war is compulsively repeated by the boys until it erupts into actual murderous violence. He reads the repetition as an acutely prescient diagnosis of the way cycles of violence that formed colonized subjects and armed militants alike would progressively rip Algeria apart over the second half of the 20th Century.

In my paper, I extend Bedjaoui’s analysis to think more specifically about how these boys speak to each other, what rhetorical forms they employ, and how these build the diegetic tension in the film. My thesis is that violence escalates because the children are using rhetorical forms of address borrowed wholesale from the colonial regime, un-attenuated by the consensus-based models for conflict resolution that are more proper to Algerian society both before and during colonialism.
I will argue that the rigorously structured militarism of the FLN was in large part the result of the exposure of generations of Algerian men to military service in the French Army by Algerian men, and that the way orders were related and discussions were shown to be held in the film descend from the legacy of their training. I will argue that at each junction the way the boys speak to each is marked by a Franco-European notion of masculine justice.

Further, I contend that the death of the one of the main characters is the inevitable result of their collective repetition of these rhetorical structures, rather than the result of their experience of violence during the war. It is words that kill these children, not simply compulsively repeated psychological trauma.

Natasha Marie Llorens is a PhD candidate at the Departement of Art History and Architecture at Columbia University

**Alice Mikal Craven, American University of Paris, “Whistles that Kill: James Baldwin’s The Blues for Mister Charlie”**

In 1955 in Money Mississippi, Emmett Till, a 14-year-old black boy was brutally massacred for wolf-whistling at a woman Carolyn Bryant. His body was found in the Tallahatchie River a few days later. The event spawned many cultural reactions and was one of the events responsible for accelerating a move towards the Civil Rights movement in America. From Bob Dylan to James Baldwin, recounting Emmett’s story, born from a wolf-whistle, shows that symbols of gender and racial difference have always been engines for perpetuating extreme violence. The dangers of exaggerating those symbols or demanding that they “justify” said violence has set a precedent for decoding violence in contemporary America.

The exaggeration in this case parallels the imaginative parameters of Carolyn Bryant’s own story, which she has recently admitted was totally fabricated (Guardian 27 January 2017).

Emmett’s gesture thereby encodes white supremacist mythologies evoked by the wolf whistle. As is evidenced in contemporary America, white supremacy is fueled by its myths such as the Lost Cause. In the case of recent violence linked to the debate over Confederate statues and the Confederacy, the myth of the Lost Cause is essential fodder for political and media reports. In Baldwin’s 1964 play, *The Blues for Mister*
Charlie, Baldwin uses the backdrop of the Emmett murder to consider the complicity between religion and white supremacy in American racial conflicts. As Baldwin himself suggests in his preface, the play explores the American crime of allowing the white father to deny the black son.

Alice Mikal Craven is Associate Professor of English and Comparative Literature and Chair of Film Studies at the American University of Paris

Panel 2.1 The Production of Dehumanizing Representations

Steven Luckert, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Words that Kill: How the Nazis Used Atrocity Stories to Justify Persecution and Incite Mass Murder”

Atrocity stories serve as powerful tools to call public attention to mass violence carried out against innocent civilians. They play upon human emotions by exposing a hideous crime, identifying the perpetrators, and demanding justice. As such, they function as morality tales by urging human action to halt the killing and punish the culprits. That human action might come in the form of buying a Liberty Bond as in World War I, enlisting in the armed forces, establishing commissions to investigate the crimes, or promulgating international laws or conventions to prevent future mass atrocities.

But atrocity stories also can incite and justify violence against groups once they are falsely accused of being perpetrators. In my presentation, I will examine the ways in which the Nazis repeatedly exploited the atrocity story to facilitate persecution and mass murder during the Holocaust. Essentially, the atrocity story in the hands of Nazi propagandists served:

- To win over German and international public opinion to support German territorial demands by publicizing stories on the persecution of ethnic Germans
- To incite and justify mass reprisals against civilians by falsely accusing them of committing atrocities
- To mask their own crimes by accusing the Allies or the Jews of fabricating atrocity stories about Germany
• To foster a climate of cynicism in the international community by countering stories of German atrocities with reports of Allied or Jewish crimes.

The Nazis used the atrocity story to dehumanize their internal and external enemies and, at the same time, to present the Third Reich to the populace as a morally righteous regime dedicated to dispensing justice to perpetrators. This propaganda strategy served to justify the persecution of Polish citizens after 1939 and to incite and German police units (and mobs) to carry out the mass murder of over 1 million Jewish men, women, and children in reprisal for Soviet atrocities. The Nazis understood that psychologically populations were more willing to support harsher measures, or even participate in them, if the targeted groups had been properly stigmatized as willing and guilty executioners of innocent civilians.

Sadly, the use of the atrocity story to foment mass violence did not end with the Holocaust. It has been used to incite or justify murderous actions in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and more recently in Kenya and ISIS-occupied territories in Iraq and Syria.

Steven Luckert, PhD, is the Senior Program Curator at the Levine Institute for Holocaust Education, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC

Shuxi Yin, Hefei University of Technology, China, “Narrating and Dehumanizing Landlords in Chinese Revolution”

During the land reform initiated by the Chinese Communist Party from 1947 to 1952, the land in rural China was forcibly taken from landlords and redistributed among peasants. The campaign was notable in that, unlike under Soviet practice wherein the security apparatus redistributed land and punished landlords, the people themselves were encouraged to overthrow and kill landlords. The land reform campaign increased the Communist Party’s popularity among Chinese peasants, and resulted in approximately 1 million - 4.5 million deaths.

Maoist discourse engineered revolutionary emotions as a method of political mobilization. According to Mao Zedong, nowhere in the world does there exist love or hatred without reason. The theme of victimization mobilized indignation in
struggle campaigns such as the land reform, in which propaganda was used to incite mass violence against landlords. Maoist discourse propagation employed dehumanization as a major technique. The Chinese revolution can be described as a series of aesthetic experience and activities that narrated the evil of the exploitative classes. The landlord - perhaps the most important cultural icon of villainy and dehumanization - dominated the Mao-era imagination of society before the 1950s. Beginning in the late 1940s, party- and state-sponsored historiography fiction, film, and art portrayed landlords as a class that inflicted suffering, pain, and trauma on the peasants, and individual landlords became the personification of the "evil old society", which destroyed humanity.

The best-known Chinese landlords, some fictional and others historical, included: Huang Shiren in White-Haired Girl (Baimaonil), an opera and later a film and a ballet; Nan Batian, in Red Detachment of Women (Hongseniangzijun), a film and a ballet; Zhou Bapi, in the semi-fictional persona I memoir Gao Yubao; and Liu Wencai, a real person who died in 1949, and who then went through a long process of demonization. The names of these landlords, as archetypes, pervaded the political narration and historical imagination of the Mao era, so much so that Chinese who grew up after 1949 easily refer to these names when they think of the terms "landlord" and "old society". Villainous landlords not only appeared in novels published, but also were prominent in visual media: operas, films, ballets, children's comic books, puppet shows, and sculptures.

Focusing on the most notorious villains who brought suffering to the people in fiction as well as in reality, this paper examines the continuous and complex process of historical narration and dehumanization of a few landlord archetypes as part of the larger discourse of class oppression and emancipation. To be specific, I address the following issues. Firstly, how did propaganda officials and artists construct this hostile imagination and its negative reputations of landlords? Secondly, how did audiences accept these villainous images?

Meanwhile, I consider the uniqueness of the Chinese creation of bad reputations in the context of state propaganda as a multidimensional project. In other words, evil landlords were part of a comprehensive system of state propaganda. I contextualize
and historicize this process and engage in textual analysis of the narrative strategy of the stories and their implication.

Shuxi Yin Hefei holds a PHD in history from the University of Tuebingen in Germany. She now teaches history as a professor at Hefei University of Technology in China.

Charikleia Kefalidou, Université Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), “Dehumanizing Narratives and Hygienism as Strategies of Nation-Building: The case of the Armenians in the Late Ottoman Empire”

The presentation deals with the emergence of dehumanizing metaphors towards the end of the 19th century in the Ottoman public discourse, targeting the Christian minorities of the Empire.

The presentation focuses on the crystallization of the image of the Armenian (and the Greek) as an "infidel dog" and a "parasite" leeching on the Empire, alongside the introduction of urban hygienist strategies in the beginning of the XXth century, which aimed to modernize, homogenize and transform the Ottomansociety from an oriental, decadent empire to a Western model state. The Hayırsızada Dog Massacre of 1910 aiming to get rid of the stray dogs of Instanbul considered by then a nuisance and a remnant of the laissez-faire mentality of the Empire, bears a similarity to the 1915 Armenian genocide, as they were both executed in the light of recently established Western hygienist politics so as to dispose of the parasites and threats to the well-being of the Turkish state. In both cases, patterns of racial, social and urban hygiene symbolically undermining the humanity of the Armenians were applied; analogies between the "stray dogs" and the "infidel dogs" were frequently drawn as a means to incite hate and provoke a reaction against all perceived threats.

To this day, persevering Armenian advocacy in favor of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide as a consequence of genocide denial by the modern Turkish state has led to the perpetuation of hate speech towards the Armenians. The death threats of the vice president of the Federation of Swedish-Turkish Labor Associations
targeting "all the Armenian dogs" during a public rally in Sweden in 2016 are an example of hate speech perpetuating even in the diaspora.

These dehumanizing metaphors have recently been reappropriated by the victims and employed in the arts and literature in order to tackle denial and expose the perpetrators. French-Armenian writer Dennis Donikian has published the theatrical play "L'île de l’âme (The island of the Soul)" dealing extensively with the dehumanizing metaphors and the despoilment of the Armenians as well as several contemporary artists and filmmakers who have incorporated the dog metaphor in their militant art.

Charikleia Kefalidou is a PhD candidate in French and Comparative Literature at the University of Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV)

Panel 2.2 Uses and Misuses of History (1)


At all stages of genocide and other mass atrocities, the past plays a fundamental role. The way in which societies interpret, instrumentalize, and respond to the past—especially past episodes of systematic violence—is often a determining factor in whether that society will transform itself into one that values human rights and protects its most vulnerable populations, or whether it will become yet again a perpetrator of atrocity violence. This presentation presents research gathered over a one-year research project at the Alliance for Historical Dialogue and Accountability at Columbia University. It examines the role that historical narratives play at all points within the processes of genocide and other mass atrocities, as well as their prevention.

This presentation both details the ways in which historical narratives promote the perpetration of atrocity violence and suggests strategies through which narratives can also contribute to the prevention of mass atrocities. It begins by examining histories of violent conflict as a risk factor for atrocity violence, before
engaging with notions of how to mitigate this immutable risk factor. Next, it turns to the role that historical narratives can play in accelerating and triggering mass violence, as well as how differing uses of the past can quell violence that is already occurring. Finally, it describes the ways in which history can be a continuing source of conflict in the aftermath of mass violence, particularly in the cases where differing narratives of the past exist, invoking the concept of agonism to suggest modes for negotiating contested views of the past in order to avoid violent conflict.

Kerry Whigham is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Columbia University's Institute for the Study of Human Rights, as well as a member of the faculty consortium for Stockton University's graduate certificate program in genocide prevention.

Aurélia Kalisky, Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung, "A Case of Historiographic Perversion? Regarding the Genocide of the Tutsi"

Concernant la Shoah, les formes de négationnisme les plus directes ont globalement été mises en échec, à la fois par l’évolution de la recherche en histoire et par des procédures judiciaires ou elles ont été jugées non conformes aux critères fondamentaux de scientificité propre à cette discipline. Il existe pourtant d’autres types de discours qui, tout en relativisant l’importance du génocide des Juifs au point d’être qualifiés de “révisionnistes”, demeurent à l’intérieur du champ de l’histoire. Ainsi Ernst Nolte, par lequel débuta la fameuse “querelle des historiens” et qui interprèta l’idéologie exterminationniste comme « réponse » rationnelle à la violence stalinienne, fit certes l’objet d’accusations d’idéologisation de l’histoire, mais sans être désavoué par ses pairs. En 2006, le philosophe Marc Nichanian publiait un essai qui traitait de cette question des « limites de la représentation » en histoire en relation avec les génocides du XXe siècle, en particulier celui des Arméniens. Il proposait d’appeler « perversion historiographique » la possibilité inhérente à l’histoire de produire une interprétation « inadéquate » sans déroger pour autant aux règles propres à la discipline. La violence génocidairesse viserait la destruction du fait et donc de la réalité en tant que tels, et face à cette destruction, l’histoire s’avérerait doublement impuissante, à la fois dans sa démarche positiviste fondée sur l’archive et la preuve, et dans sa production d’interprétations concurrentes. Radicalisant les thèses dites « narrativistes » et prolongeant ainsi cette idée de Michel de Certeau...
selon laquelle il existe « une série indéfinie de 'sens historiques' » (L'Ecriture de l'histoire, 2007, p. 56), Nichanian affirmait non sans provocation que face au phénomène négationniste c'est le droit qui est in fine amène à se poser en « gardien du fait » et du sens de l'événement.

Prolongeant le questionnement de Nichanian, je voudrais m’interroger pour ma part sur la ligne de démarcation épistémologique qui sépare une représentation ou la mauvaise foi est manifeste - à travers la négation des faits, les procédés de falsification ou d’omission volontaire de certaines sources - et une représentation élaborée dans le respect des procédures historiographiques, mais jugée comme reposant sur une interprétation inadéquate. A la lumière d’un débat concernant la publication d’un « Que Sais-je » consacré au génocide des Tutsi du Rwanda, je voudrais tenter de répondre à une série de questions : comment débattre de l’adéquation du récit historique à son objet à partir de seuls critères historiographiques ? Comment distinguer la vérité historique de la déformation idéologique et du mensonge négationniste ? Faut-il nécessairement prendre en compte au plan épistémologique des considérations éthiques, juridiques et philosophiques ? Faut-il se résoudre à l’impossibilité « d’éliminer du travail historiographique les idéologies qui l’habitent » (de Certeau), ou faut-il espérer que l’historien « s’aventure a prêter l’oreille aux agents de la connaissance » (Lyotard) ?


Raphael Nkaka, University of Rwanda, "Le mauvais usage de l'Histoire et le génocide contre les Tutsi" [The Misuse of History and the Genocide against Tutsi]

La propagande raciste contre les Tutsi avant et pendant le génocide de 1994 laisse croire que le génocide perpétré contre les Tutsi au Rwanda en 1994 prend ses racines idéologiques dans la radicalisation de la société rwandaise depuis la fin du 19e siècle. Cette racialisation s’est beaucoup inspirée de l’idéologie raciale construite en Europe occidentale entre la fin du 13ème siècle et le début du 20ème siècle. Cette racialisation de la société a été initiée depuis la fin du 19e siècle par les explorateurs allemands, les agents
coloniaux allemands et puis beiges, les Peres Blancs, ainsi que par les chercheurs beiges de l’Institut pour la Recherche scientifique en Afrique centrale. C’est ainsi que les Tutsi, les Hutu et les Twa ont été considérés comme des races différentes avec tout ce que cela comporte sur le plan épistémologique. Ce processus a abouti à décrire la société rwandaise de manière à l’ajuster sur les éléments de l’idéologie raciale. Tout en s’inspirant de l’idéologie des races, ce processus a également racialisé les mythes précoloniaux, en particulier le récit d’origine de la dynastie Nyiginya alors régnante au Rwanda. En racialisant ce dernier, les origines différentes des Tutsi et des Hutu étaient ainsi validées.

Cette racialisation va être la principale source d’inspiration de gestion coloniale. Ainsi les Tutsi étaient représentés à travers une image positive aussi bien sur le plan social, politique qu’économique. Sur le plan politique, ils seront décrits notamment comme des "chefs-nés", ce qui va justifier le monopole politique dont ils vont jouir depuis les années 1920. A l’inverse, les Hutu étaient représentés à travers une image négative comportant taus au presque taus les defaults, justifiant ainsi leur mise à l’écart de la gestion politique du pays.

Ces interprétations raciales de la société ont fini par être intériorisées par une élite rwandaise coloniale et post coloniale. A l’inverse de la période coloniale, l’élite Hutu post-coloniale au pouvoir va produire un discours anti-monarchiste et anti-Tutsi à la fois à travers la presse, les discours politiques et les chansons officielles des régimes politiques. Alors que, durant l’époque coloniale, les Tutsi étaient nés pour gouverner, pendant la période post coloniale, ils étaient présentés comme étant des monarchistes exploitant la masse Hutu. Ces discours ont souvent précédé des massacres ponctuelles des Tutsi et ont été fortement utilisés avant et durant le génocide.

En développant le processus de racialisation de la société durant le 10ème siècle, cette étude veut souligner la contribution de l’idéologie raciale dans les "Uses and misuses of history: mythmaking and mass violence".

Raphael Nkaka is Senior Lecturer at the School of Communication Sciences and Arts, University of Rwanda.
A nefarious symptom of the Trump phenomenon is revealed in a frequent verbal tic: "Mexico will pay for the wall, believe me,"; "I know more about ISIS than the generals do. Believe me,"; "Believe me, there is no collusion [with Russia]"; "Not all of those people [in Charlottesville] were neo-Nazis, believe me. Not all of them were white supremacists"; etc. Why does the President of the United States constantly reaffirm that his statements are worthy of belief? This verbal tic resembles what Austin calls a perlocutionary act, speech which aims to persuade or convince. But, in Trump's language, repetition substitutes for felicity. "Believe me," is often invoked to bolster a statement that is demonstrably untrue, wildly irresponsible, or preposterous wishful thinking. Trump's almost incantatory expression functions like a poker tell: whenever he says, "believe me," his detractors know what he is saying is not believable.

Lying in politics isn't new, but Trump was elected specifically by embracing brazen falsehoods and conspiracy theories, while denigrating criticism as "fake news." The administration's obsession with lying has poisoned the well, reducing political discourse to the standards of reality television and internet provocateurs. Trump's supporters and detractors are informed by an entirely separate set of media sources, reinforcing an epistemic solipsism that prevents resolving debates through any sort of deliberative reason because each side claim its own set of "facts." We are witnessing what Foucault called an "epistemic break," where the prevailing regimes of truth and falsehood have been turned on their head. The cleavage between two worldviews culminates in Trump's appeal, "believe me."

How can we convince someone to abandon a belief, particularly when it seems ludicrous? I argue Wittgenstein's reflections in On Certainty on the grammars of knowledge and belief can help us understand the epistemological problem on display in our divergent reactions to Trump's verbal tic, and they suggest possible remedies. "Why shouldn't I think of the earth as flat?" Wittgenstein asks. A plethora of empirical reasons make us certain it is round. But when pressed for further proof, we ultimately revert to belief: "How do you know that?" -- I believe it." Our certainty about the facts of the world reposes on a bedrock of beliefs, and contesting a surface-level belief without addressing the deeper
commitments that give rise to it will never change someone's mind. To believe the world is flat, one must reject the entire scientific picture of the world, and cling to entirely different presuppositions. Wittgenstein writes, "When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions." This insight is valuable for understanding the responses to Trump's appeal, "be lie ve me." Responding to this perlocutionary act doesn't affirm or reject a specific proposition, but an entire worldview.

The "post-truth" world was created by a certain breakdown in language - what Wittgenstein calls, "when language goes on holiday" - while the symptoms of "post-truth" have proven bloody, racist, and misogynistic. Confronting this breakdown demands therapy for our words and beliefs.

Yesim Yapruk Yildiz, University of Cambridge, “Performing Truth and Subjectivity in Public Confessions”

This paper aims to examine the rhetorical and performative tools employed in public confessions of state actors on past atrocities, with a focus on state violence against Kurds in Turkey during 1990s. Confession of a wrongdoing is regarded crucial for both legal and moral reasons as it supposedly addresses guilt and responsibility. By locating guilt, confession singles out an individual or a group as guilty of that act. In some cases, they reveal crucial information on past cases, which could be used to hold the state accountable. In that sense, they could be celebrated as forms of speaking truth to power. Yet as I will argue in this paper through references to public confessions of a paramilitary officer, a policeman and an intelligence officer in Turkey, public confessions hardly challenge state power. The discourse of truth in public confessions of perpetrators often presents a complex picture of legitimization, justification, glorification, disavowal or individualization of state violence. While confession might ascertain individual responsibility for the criminal deed in question, it also objectifies it through narratives of self-excuse and self-justification. While acknowledging the wrongdoing committed and admitting guilt and responsibility, it
simultaneously effaces guilt and responsibility through varying rhetorical and performative strategies.

Confession is not solely a constative statement, that is, a declaration or an acknowledgement of a wrongdoing, but a performative speech act transforming the individual who utters it, the utterance, the audience and the relation between them. The effects that public confessions produce depend on both the way it is performed and its performative force. In this paper, I will explore both what public confessions say and what they do in terms of accountability and responsibility for the wrongdoing confessed. To do this, I will first discuss the theatrical and dramatic aspects of confession including actor, acting, script, stage, and audience drawing upon Leigh Payne’s *Unsettling Accounts*, and then analyse its performative effects drawing upon the literature on confession in law and literature, particularly Peter Brooks’ *Troubling Confessions*, Jacques Derrida’s and Paul de Man’s commentaries on Rousseau’s *Confessions* and Arendt’s discussion on guilt and responsibility.

Yesim Yaprak Yildiz is currently a PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Cambridge, UK. Her doctoral research examines public confessions of state officials on past atrocities with a focus on Turkey and state violence against Kurds.

**Neri Marsili, University of Sheffield, “Lies, Uncertainty and Deception”**

Lying is a familiar and important moral phenomenon that affects us on an everyday basis. Dishonest communication can have dramatic effects: recent, blatant examples are the false promises that supported the Brexit campaign, and the falsehoods that helped Donald Trump to get into the Oval office. Given the significance of dishonest speech, it is not surprising that disciplines as diverse as sociology, linguistics, and psychology have displayed an increasing interest in its analysis. One fundamental philosophical question that cuts across these disciplines concerns how to define and characterise lying, sincerity and other concepts that apply to dishonest communication.

In the last 20 years, the philosophical literature has focused especially on the question of how to define lying. Lies come in a variety of forms and kinds, and this is part of what makes them elusive and difficult to identify. As Montaigne nicely stated, while truth is unique, “the opposite of truth has many shapes, and an indefinite field” *(Essays, I.X)*.
There is a whole grey area of deceptive utterances that are difficult to classify and, quite importantly, it is in this grey zone that liars strive. To shed some light in this obscure area, this paper considers the problem of classifying statements that are neither fully believed to be false, nor fully believed to be true.

In the public debate, it is not uncommon for politicians to be caught making statements of this kind. For instance, when in 2003 George W. Bush claimed that Iraq possessed weapon of mass destruction, he had very little evidence for his claim - arguably, he was neither sure that it was false, nor sure that it was true (cf. Carson 2010). Are statements uttered in such conditions of uncertainty lies? And how much confidence in their falsity is required for them to count as lies?

To characterise these statements, I will present a definition of lying according to which you lie only if you make a statement that you believe more likely to be false than true (Marsili 2014). From this definition, it follows that the more confident you are in the falsity of what you are saying, the more your utterance is insincere. This provides a criterion for the moral evaluation of lying: the wrongness of a lie can be understood as a function of the extent to which a speaker violates a sincerity norm. However, political speech often aims to deceive without explicitly lying. In the concluding remarks of the paper, I will sketch a tentative extension of my analysis to the deceptive intents of speakers. I propose a model to understand the moral wrongness of attempted deception in a way that parallels my proposed understanding of insincerity: as a function of the extent to which it aims to direct someone’s degree of confidence away from the truth. The resulting picture provides a unified model of what it means to be insincere and to be deceptive, and of what is morally wrong about linguistic dishonesty.

Neri Marsili is an Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Sheffield, where he recently completed a PhD on insincere communication.

Panel 3.1 Hate in the Modern United States

In 2005, artist Matt Furie anthropomorphized "Pepe the Frog" as part of his Boy’s Club graphic comics series. Pepe’s was a decidedly slacker existence. He mostly chillaxed with his (anthropomorphized) pals; smoked dope; and played video games. Nothing about Pepe the Frog was politicized. However, unexpectedly, by autumn 2015, Anti-Defamation League officials classified him a hate symbol. How did this happen? The culprits were Internet trolls that "captured" Pepe and maliciously transformed him into a Nazi/Holocaust meme.

Throughout 2015-2017, "Pepe's Army" vigorously conflated the frog with Holocaust mockery. Their creative method was online meme. Nothing about this campaign appeared technologically sophisticated. The contributors photo-shop Pepe’s smirking countenance against Auschwitz backdrops; holding Mein Kampf, sipping from a swastika teacup while wearing a Hitler mustache. Tallies from social media and other picture sharing platforms indicate that millions of people, apparently, have had some form of currency with this effort to find humor from dehumanization. It bears mention that not the entire racist Pepe re-brands intersected with Nazism. At times, people have depicted him in Ku Klux Klan robes, as a white power vigilante, and also a Border Patrol agent turning away non-white immigrants. Perhaps not surprisingly, these trendy fringe Pepe representations soon attracted the attention of public figures messaging similar ideas. Throughout 2016, the American hate monger Richard Spencer sported a Pepe the Frog lapel pin at his rallies. During the closing months of the 2016 American presidential election, a contest gripped by "build-that-wall" tribalism, Donald Trump Jr. tweeted out a meme that positioned Pepe alongside his candidate father. Dozens more Donald Trump-Pepe iterations resulted. For the purveyors and consumers of bigotry, Pepe became a high value public amplifier. He helped normalize expressions of racism and antisemitism, bigotries that many Trump (and, Nixon) supporters used to express their political opposition to liberalism. Such convolutions were too much for Matt Furie. In early 2017, he killed off his slacker-frog.
What happened to Pepe is less an amusing anecdote than it is a cautionary tale about the impermanence of truth in our “fake” and “nothing-burger” public discourse. Particularly such environments are toxic to Nazi/Holocaust memory. The American forgetting has already started. President Donald Trump omitted all mention of Jews in his first Holocaust Remembrance Day statement. In a separate incident, the White House spokesman denied Hitler’s use of chemical weapons during World War II and refened to the death camps as "Holocaust centers." Such soft memory misuse is part of a larger continuum. Especially for those onlookers possessing no factual link to this bygone past, these false words, images, and semiotics matter. Computer-mediated interactions give constant rise to fresh iterations---GIFs, smashups, and comical Hitler Youtube rants- forever changing how this wisdom is evoked, discussed, and remembered. Although he probably didn’t know it, Pepe the Frog’s unfortunate sacrifice to hate speech trolls teaches a weightier lesson, that the subvention and elimination of accurate memory is the last stage of genocide. 

Jeffrey Demsky is a tenured professor of history at San Bernardino Valley College. His scholarship exists at the intersection of American cultural history and Holocaust memory. 

**Stephen Whitfield, Brandeis University, “The Persistence of the Protocols”**

No text in modern history has exercised the malevolent influence that can match the Tsarist police forgery of little more than a century ago, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Beside reading of the last of the Romanovs, ardently subscribed to by prominent National Socialists (including Hitler), disseminated by the most iconic of American industrialists (Henry Ford), readily available in the Arab world to fortify the case against Zionism, the Protocols constituted words that helped kill, or at least sowed a malignant hatred whose influence has not yet spent itself. For even now those words somehow cannot be expunged, despite the important scholarship of Norman Cohn half a century ago. In Warrant for Genocide (1967), Cohn offered a definitive account of how the Protocols were concocted and promoted, and traced how widespread the publication of this document became, especially in the interwar years. That it was a
preposterous fabrication, and that no international Jewish conspiracy has ever existed, did not entirely diminish the power of the Protocols to tap into subterranean anxieties and prejudices. Its notorious inauthenticity has robbed it of any respectability, consigning the Protocols to the outer fringes of political belief in the Western world, where antisemitism has dramatically declined since the Second World War. But Arab societies in particular have kept alive the sense of a sinister global power to account for the survival of the state of Israel, which won a decisive military victory over neighboring states in the year that Warrant for Genocide was published. Perhaps the persistence of the Protocols is the strongest possible evidence of human irrationality, which neither education nor enlightenment can entirely defeat. Perhaps problematic features of human history cannot satisfactorily be accounted for except by recourse to some version of "the paranoid style" (in Richard Hofstadter's indispensable phrase).

Perhaps also, however, Judeophobia can find its most accessible corroboration in a "secret" text that exposes the insatiable grasp of this tiny minority for domination over the majority, through the deployment of financial resources, through the manipulation of the media and through the sinister conversion of politicians into puppets. Yet even when this document is not explicitly invoked, vestiges remain. When the inordinate power of Jewry is criticized or described, the danger to which the Protocols had drawn attention can still incite fear and animus.

Once widely available, now confined to the shadows, this document persists in the sense that its animating idea can still tempt the credulous and the bigoted. The paper that is proposed for presentation at the conference on "Words that Kill" will offer textual and graphic illustrations, over the course of the past half-century, of how--even implicitly--the Protocols can be said to continue to seep into public discourse, helping to sustain the lingering spasms of antisemitism that can still be located in Western societies.

Stephen Whitfield holds the Max Richter Chair in American Civilization at Brandeis University, where he received his doctorate in 1972.

Raymond Arsenault, University of South Florida St Petersburg, “Wild Words: Donald Trump, American Demagogues, and the Politics of Scapegoating”
My paper will place Donald Trump and "Trumpism" in the context of the long tradition of American political demagogy. On the campaign trail and as President of the United States, Donald Trump has resorted to a political style and rhetoric that relies on highly aggressive identity politics, xenophobia, and ethnic and racial scapegoating. His bombastic approach to political discourse is reminiscent of the demagogic politics that dominated the American South and some Northern cities during the period 1890-1970. He is, however, the first politician of this stripe to win the Presidency, succeeding where earlier figures such as Huey Long, Strom Thunnond, and George Wallace failed. Trump's appropriation of emotional and potentially explosive themes such as personal persecution, contempt for the mainstream media, disdain for the governmental authority of educated public servants, and denigration of immigrants and racial minorities has set him apart from the traditions of the American political mainstream.

Throughout much of my career I have explored and written about the political pyrotechnics of regionally based "Southern demagogues," but their ability to disrupt national politics and international relations was limited by the limitations of their localized or state-based followings. As President, Trump has no such restrictions, which makes his nationalization of a largely regional tradition both historically important and a threat to national and international civic order and reasoned dialogue and diplomacy. In my paper, I will offer a comparison of Trump and the American demagogues of the past; and I will examine the images and rhetorical devices— the words and the tone— that he has employed during the last decade, from his anti-Obama 'Birtherism" to his refusals to condemn police violence against black Americans, neo-Confederate ideology, and neo-Nazi extremism. Although he is clearly an unpredictable work in progress, Trump has already placed himself in the dark pantheon of political leaders willing and able to exploit "words that kill."

Raymond Arsenault is the John Hope Franklin Professor of Southern History and chairperson of the Department of History and Politics at the University of South Florida- St. Petersburg, where he has taught since 1980.

Panel 3.2 Use and Abuse of Memory in Illiberal Democracies
Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias, Polish Academy of Sciences, “Weakening Liberal Democracy, Limiting Free Debate on the Past – Poland as a Case Study”

The freedom to conduct open, matter-of-factly and honest debates on difficult times in the history of a state or a nation are among the benefits enjoyed in liberal democracies. Although the vast majority of such democracies restrict freedom of speech to a certain extent, the prohibitions they impose apply to extreme cases only: ban on incitement to hatred or Holocaust denial. They nevertheless protect the right to hold disputes and arguments regarding history. Any attempt to restrict the freedom to discuss history can thus naturally be seen as a warning, signaling that the principles of liberal democracy are endangered. Warnings of this kind are currently being heard in Poland where an effort is under way to amend the penal code to prohibit defamation of the good name of the Polish nation and where laws are in the pipeline that will significantly limit the freedom of the media, central to freedom of speech.

Another sign of a creeping erosion of liberal democracy in the context of debates over infamous moments in history is the failure on the part of the government to respond to overt expressions of nationalist hatred fueled by historical animosities. The authorities' strife to assume actual control over the finances of non-governmental organizations, including those dealing with historical debates, completes the picture of the disconcerting developments that unfold in today's Poland. The proposed presentation is designed to reveal the facts as well as the possible consequences of censoring debates on history and memory.

Dr. Aleksandra Gliszczynska-Grabias is Senior Researcher at the Polish Academy of Sciences, an expert in the fields of anti-discrimination law, constitutional law, freedom of speech, hate speech and memory laws.

Uladzislau Belavusau, University of Amsterdam,”Ukrainian Memory Laws from the European Legal Perspective”

Following the tragic events in Maidan amidst Russian military and political interventions, in April 2015, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted four laws targeting the legacy of Soviet Communism. The presentation will look into the mechanics of legal prescription of certain historical memories in Ukraine, from gaining independence to the recent military conflict
with Russia. These memory laws and court interventions will be analyzed as a part of European mnemonic space, in particular, due to the membership of Ukraine in the Council of Europe and its clearly articulated aspirations to join the EU. From the perspective of the Council of Europe, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights supplies indispensable standards on the permissible interference of state with historical memory. In the meantime, central to the reconstruction of the EU law and politics of memory are EU citizenship and prohibition of genocide denials. Hence, the major focus of this paper is on deducing relevant aspects in European legal governance of historical memory, for the subsequent interpretation of Ukrainian case study in light of European law. This paper will help to analyze whether mnemonic legal practices in Ukraine are compatible with European standards of foremost freedom of (academic) expression, as well as freedom of assembly, non-discrimination, dignity, and ultimately, the rule of law in liberal democracies.

Dr. Uladzislau Belavusau is a Senior Researcher in European Law at the T.MC. Asser Institute in The Hague, on secondment with the University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands).

Marina Bán, University of Amsterdam, “Building the Illiberal State via the Instrumentalized Memory of Communism: The Case of Hungary”

In the last decade, the Hungarian state has become a symbol regarding the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. The state has been pioneering of the idea of ‘illiberal democracy’, and thus the country’s public life and legal system has transformed since 2010. My paper intends to examine one specific area during such a transformation: the role of memory politics and the legal governance of Hungarian historical memory. Since 2010, antagonizing the legacy of the country’s pre-1990 communist regime has been significantly stressed in local politics of memory. The Fundamental Law of Hungary, entering into force in early 2012, has placed particular emphasis on distinguishing itself from the previous communist constitution. In addition, it has created the Committee of National Memory, tasked with investigating the ‘crimes of the communist past’ and, if necessary, bringing those responsible to justice. Furthermore, the state’s previous memory-related legislation has been altered to include the prohibition of the ‘denial of the crimes of the communist regimes’ in
addition to the renewed prosecution of a communist political leader of the 1950s. Nevertheless, in its eagerness to reject the memory of communism, several controversies arise in the transformation of Hungary's memory laws. These include questionable standpoints on historical events, omission or distortion of historical facts, as well as the legal development of particularly distinct and fascinating system of historical memories. The paper looks for answers regarding (1) the development of the changes in Hungary's historical memory with the aid of the law, (2) the content and controversial aspects of Hungary's current memory laws and lastly (3) the ongoing conflicts such transformation brings with different European institutions, especially concerning the right to freedom of expression.

Marina Ban is a PhD researcher for the MELA's team based in the Netherlands. She holds a BA in History and an MA in Human Rights.

**Panel 3.3 Conspiracy Theories and Myths**

**Elsa Marmursztejn, Université de Reims, “Constructions médiévales et usages de la figure du juif infanticide” [Medieval Constructions, Representations and Uses of Jews as Child-Killers]**

Dans la gamme des expressions de l'hostilité antijuive, l'accusation d'infanticide tient une place cruciale, qu'elle a conservée dans la longue durée. La figure de l'enfant assassine se prête en effet à l'élaboration et à la perpétuation de mythes mobilisateurs, qui ont suscité une répression institutionnelle et des violences populaires effectives à l'encontre des juifs.

Au Moyen Age, l'accusation d'infanticide s'est construite dans des sources de genres divers (sources exégétiques, sources narratives, sources théologiques...) dont elle n'est pas toujours l'objet principal et qui se font écho, nonobstant leur hétérogénéité, sans coïncider chronologiquement. L'accusation d'infanticide a fait l'objet d'une ample vulgarisation, assurée par l'extrême variété des supports (textes, traductions en langues vernaculaires, sermons, enluminures, vitraux, etc.) qui en ont assuré la diffusion. Surtout, cette accusation a affecté diverses formes : antérieur à la Passion du Christ, le massacre
des Innocents apparaît à la fois comme un véritable mythe des origines du christianisme et comme le premier massacre d'enfants chrétiens par les juifs auxquels Hérodé est assimilé; l'accusation de meurtre rituel, née en Angleterre vers le milieu du XIIe siècle, est fondée sur la croyance suivant laquelle les juifs tuaient des enfants chrétiens pour en utiliser le sang à des fins rituelles; l'accusation de profanation d'hosties, surgie au milieu du XIIIe siècle, se relie à la précédente dans la mesure où certaines hosties profanées ont pris forme enfantine dans les récits de miracles; enfin, dans les discussions théologiques du second Moyen Age sur la nécessité de baptiser les enfants des juifs contre le gré de leurs parents, l'infanticide apparaît comme un risque auquel on exposerait les enfants destinés au baptême; c'est ce danger qu'illustre la célèbre légende du « petit juifel », jeté dans un four par son père pour avoir communie parmi ses camarades chrétiens, et dont les versions abondent à partir de son introduction en Occident au VIe siècle.

On examinera ces constructions majeures de la figure du juif infanticide sous l'angle de la problématique d'ensemble qui parait les unifier, à savoir la haine du Christ et des chrétiens prête aux juifs. En l'occurrence, la haine antijuive, porteuse de conséquences meurtrières, est suscitée et stimulée par l'imputation aux juifs d'une haine anti-chrétienne invétérée, dont les dangers - et singulièrement, les dangers que cette haine représente pour les enfants - sont exprimés et répétés, sous des formes diverses, dans la longue durée. L'infanticide est censé traduire spécifiquement un refus du christianisme (et plus particulièrement de l'Incarnation) qu'illustre la réitération du déicide originaire: la victime enfantine y tient le rôle du Christ et meurt «pour lui» ou «à sa place», comme les Innocents avant la Passion. On envisagera, outre les constructions chrétiennes médiévales, la pérennité de cette accusation d'infanticide, les controverses historiographiques auxquelles elle a donné lieu, et les problèmes historiographiques que soulèvent ses occurrences dans la longue durée.

Ancienne élève de l'ENS de Fontenay-Saint-Cloud, agrégée d'histoire et docteur en histoire médiévale de l'EHESS, Elsa Marmursztejn est maitre de conférences en histoire du Moyen Age à l'université de Reims et membre du Centre d'études et de recherche en histoire culturelle (CERHiC, EA 2616).
Kerri J. Malloy, Humboldt State University, “Marshall, Whitman and Baum: Selections from the American Terminal Narrative”

Intertwined with the elements of the origin story of the United States is the narrative that the indigenous populations of the country were destined to die as Euro-American civilization progressed from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. A narrative of predestined termination was used to excuse, encourage and celebrate the atrocities that accompanied westward expansion in fulfillment of the prophecy of manifest destiny. Written into the legal opinions penned by U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Marshall, the works of Walt Whitman and L. Frank Baum were the promotion and normalization of the terminal narrative. A narrative of predestined extermination became ingrained within the literature of the United States as an inseparable part of the nation’s origin story.

This paper will examine the perpetuation of the terminal narrative in works of law, literature and the press, and its use as a tool of dehumanization against the indigenous populations of North America. These works, which are not generally categorized within the discourse of hate, encouraged and condoned mass violence against indigenous people will be examined through their individual and collective historical contexts, and the effects of their influence. When these words were penned to paper they supported the unfounded and false concept of predestined extinction in three very distinct areas of the body of United States literature: legal jurisprudence, humanist poetry and essays, and newspaper editorials. This paper will demonstrate how words were used to justify and incite violence against indigenous people as a means of fulfilling the terminal narrative.

It will consider how these works have contributed to the dehumanization process and as a justification for inciting violence against indigenous people. Further, it will address the generational trauma that has been inflicted upon and experienced by indigenous people because of these works and the resulting adulation of their authors. To understand the impact of the terminal narrative within the origin story of the United States requires the examination of the literature which promoted it and the historical context of the times in which each work was authored. By using selected works, this paper will provide a framework that will lend itself to providing a mechanism for understanding how the terminal narrative has been worked into the
literary fabric that constitutes the body of literature around the western expansion of the United States.

Kerri J. Malloy (Yurok/Karuk) is a Lecturer in the Department of Native American Studies at Humboldt State University where he has taught for the past three years in the Law and Government pathway of the degree program.

Daniel Véri, Eötvös Loránd University, "Imagining Ritual Murder"

This paper examines how ideas of "Jewish ritual murder" were created, transmitted and popularized. It draws on case studies from the cultural history of a Hungarian blood libel (Tiszaeszlar, 1882-83), examining two separate discourses. Firstly, the genesis, function and diffusion of anti-Semitic propaganda paintings in the last two decades of the 19th century and secondly, folk songs related to the blood libel, their characteristics and the role they played in post-WWII pogroms.

Already in 1882, a monumental propaganda painting was created in Zagreb, depicting the imagined murder scene. This image was popularized by photographs (sold locally and via mail order by the painter himself) as well as further graphic interpretations. Another monumental (2 x 4 meters large) painting related more loosely to the specific blood libel was created in the 1890s as part of an anti-Semitic business venture. This work was exhibited at multiple venues from Paris to St. Petersburg (usually in shopping arcades fashionable among the bourgeoisie), mostly with the alleged attribution to a famous Hungarian painter living in the French capital, Mihaly Munkacsy. The painting was toured across Europe in order to capitalize on the international fame of the supposed creator as well as the scandalous topic, in accordance with the taste of political anti-Semitism emerging in this period.

On the other hand, from the time of the Tiszaeszlar case up until - at least - the 1970s, a substantial reception of the affair can be attested in folk songs, which showcase - rather than the original blood libel accusation - blood-drinking and cannibalism. Characteristic of these songs is the contamination of the blood libel myth with different, familiar elements (religious motifs as well as popular fables such as the Little Red Riding Hood), which helped substantially the embedding of the story. The social knowledge about "Jewish ritual murder" perpetuated in and transmitted through
these songs offer an explanation for the emergence of blood libel accusations in Hungary against survivors of the Holocaust. Although this "knowledge" was not necessarily the major drive behind post-WWII anti-Jewish pogroms, it certainly guided and channelled the hostility along certain violent patterns.

The two case studies represent different facets of the cultural reception history of a specific blood libel. The paintings were intended for the bourgeoisie as part of an anti-Semitic business venture, while the folk songs developed in a rural setting. Although we are not aware of the imminent effect of the anti-Semitic imagery analysed above, the potential dangers and violent consequences of the diffusion and perpetuation of such "social knowledge" are exemplified by the role these folk songs played in post-WWII pogroms.

Daniel Véri is an art and cultural historian, post-doctoral fellow at ELTE University, Budapest and head of scientific affairs at the Ferenczy Museum Center.

PANEL 4.1 MEDIATING HATE AND VIOLENCE

Maria Hadjiathanasiou, University of Bristol, "'Little Room Left for Further Incitement': Propaganda and the 'Cyrus Emergency', 1955-1959"

This paper will focus on the use of propaganda in Cyprus at the end of empire, during the Greek Cypriot anti-colonial revolt against the British ruler, 19 55-19 59. It will analyse the propaganda methods deployed by both the British and the Greek Cypriot/Greek sides, and will argue that propaganda played a catalytic role in the incitement of violence in the colony and final outcome of the revolt. The paper will identify the propaganda media used by the two rivals, who each intended to persuade their respective local Greek Cypriots and international audiences that they offered a better future for Cyprus. The paper will look at the use of sound (radio), print (newspapers, leaflets and cartoons), vision (television) and clandestine propaganda media (rumours, disinformation and 'rogue' organisations). At the same time it will examine the perceived importance of 'public opinion', and at the issue of what one contemporary called 'the splitting of sympathy' between the Greek Cypriots and the British due to the use of
coercion by the colonial regime and the EOKA guerrilla organisation. The paper will emphasise the significance of personal agency by giving special attention to some of the protagonists involved in the conflict, and examining the ways in which these individuals shaped policy through their ambitions, plans and expectations about propaganda for the future of the island (e.g. Governor Harding, Archbishop Makarios and General Grivas). Using the case study of the Cyprus anti-colonial revolt this paper aims to present propaganda as a vital aspect of the history of colonial insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, and to intervene in wider debates about propaganda and the end of empire. Through an investigation of bilateral uses of propaganda it will bring new insight into British counterinsurgency tactics, and into the Greek Cypriot response to the revolt. The paper will draw attention to the ways in which those tactics were successfully undermined by the Greek Cypriot/Greek side and, even more interestingly, unintentionally weakened by the British themselves. Finally, it will aim to shift the focus of the current historiography away from an overwhelming emphasis on the use of 'wholesale coercion', by arguing that propaganda was, along with coercion, the joint driver of the conflict for Cyprus.

Dr Maria Hadjiathanasiou holds a PhD in Historical Studies from the University of Bristol, UK.

Rachel Thompson, Harvard University, “Spectres of Marx in Indonesia: Trauma, Haunting, and Democratic Emergency”

As Indonesia approaches the 20th anniversary of the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime, many fear the country may be slipping towards the nadir of this era of democratic reform. In recent months, hate speech has proliferated while other forms of speech have been criminalized, most dramatically illustrated by the imprisonment of Jakarta’s governor-a double minority, both Christian and ethnic Chinese-on blasphemy charges, after a doctored video of his off-handed comments about the Koran went viral.

On 16 September 2017, at the Jakarta headquarters of Indonesia’s legal aid institute (YLBHI), police forcefully terminated an afternoon seminar on the topic of human rights abuses during the anti-leftist violence of 1965-66-events termed genocide by a 2016 international people’s tribunal. Later that evening, lawyers, activists, and survivors took
to the web for an impromptu, live-streamed press conference, during which they launched the hashtag #DaruratDemokrasi (#DemocraticEmergency). The following day, in reaction to the seminar’s forceful dispersal, YLBHI hosted a peaceful action—an afternoon of poetry and song in support of a generalized struggle against injustice and hate in Indonesia. After nightfall, dozens were trapped inside when an angry mob surrounded the YLBHI headquarters, throwing stones, shouting death threats, and calling for the building to be burnt to the ground. The mob gathered after rumors spread via social media networks known for dissemination of intolerant rhetoric—that event participants were singing the song Genjer-Genjer. Composed during the period of Japanese occupation during WWII, the song is an ode to the resourcefulness of women in East Java who fashioned sustenance out of paddy weeds (the titular ‘genjer’), after Japanese soldiers seized the entirety of the rice harvest. While the song was known to be popular among Gerwani, the women’s branch of the Indonesian Communist Party, it was later inextricably sutured to the myth that on the night of 30 September 1965, during the kidnapping and murder of six army generals (events that precipitated the mass violence of 1965-66), Gerwani members had lasciviously danced to the tune while inflicted genital mutilation upon the generals. Although this sadistic fiction has been proven false by forensic experts, the alleged event has been indelibly embedded within the public imagination through graphic and prolonged depiction within the state-sponsored docudrama propaganda film Treachery of G30S/PKI, which was required annual viewing for school children beginning with its 1984 release.

This paper examines what conference organizers describe as the "continuum linking symbolic and physical violence," through analysis of the discursive, sonic, and imagistic regimes animating a pair of spectral events during the 2017 run-up to the contested national remembrance of 30 September: 1-the double siege of YLBHI by police, and then mob; and 2-a three-hour live broadcast of the television program Indonesia Lawyer’s Club, devoted to the topic “The Indonesian Communist Party: Ghost or Reality?,” an episode prompted by the Army Commander General’s call for the reinstatement of mandatory viewing the 1984 propaganda film.

Rachel Thompson is a musician, filmmaker, and writer currently pursuing a PhD in anthropology at Harvard University.
Ksenia Gusarova, Russian State University for the Humanities, “Just look at her Face!: Rape Victim Blaming in Contemporary Russia”

The proposed paper will examine the public discourse surrounding several recent highly publicized and much discussed rape cases in Russia. In each situation, despite the court's verdict (or rather, precisely because of its perceived strictness), the public opinion was inclined strongly in favour of the perpetrator(s), while the victim was demonized as deceitful, scheming and manipulative. Especially the two young women who chose to appear in popular talk shows in the aftermath of the events became the target of aggressive online attacks and caused a proliferation of insulting memes.

Particular attention in the paper will be paid to language and visual imager y commenting on rape victims’ looks and personal style. I would like to argue that the misogynist attitudes revealed in such representations operate within the framework of a specific understanding of the value of appearance and its status as a potential site of manifestation of a certain "truth" about a person.

These notions date back to the emergence of modern metropolises in the 19th century, when the demands of state control coincided with the individual need to navigate the social and urban space, giving birth to a new politics of the gaze.

Among other things, this penetrating, "unmasking" gaze served to marginalize cosmetics as a device aimed at deliberately misleading the observer. I will highlight parallels between the 19th century discourse on cosmetics as a visible sign of women's invisible vices and contemporary Russian treatment of rape victims, who are accused of being not "proper" victims, but rather wolves in sheep's clothing, to which their make-up is believed to testify. The new relevance of the 19th-century paradigm of looking is evident, for instance, in the seemingly anachronistic but nevertheless persistent appeals to physiognomic knowledge and the ability to read facial expression made in the course of talk shows as well as in subsequent online discussions. Thus, popular video-bloggers and other similar "experts" set out to analyse the victim's face during the show for undeniable signs of lying and immorality.

Importantly, the effects of the media seem to mirror and reinforce those attributed to make-up, in that they both create a spectacular impenetrable surface, blurring the borderline between truth and falsehood while simultaneously challenging the viewer to reestablish this distinction. The paper will attempt to disentangle this deadly
combination of age-old gender stereotypes and latest digital technologies in order to define the idea of normativity which makes women’s self-fashioning appear as more destabilizing than violence.

Ksenia Gusarova is a Lecturer at the Russian Academy of National Economics and Political Administration.

**PANEL 4.2 HATE SPEECH AND FREE SPEECH**

Devika Sethi, Indian Institute of Technology Mandi, “Hate Speech or Free Speech?”
The Public Sphere and Muslim Identities in Britain and India in the 1920’s-1940’s”

This paper examines publications from Britain from the 1920s-40s that offended Muslims there as well as in India, and which were demanded to be banned. It analyses publications the demand for a ban on the circulation of which was met, as well as those where it was rejected, in order to understand the criteria used by the Government of India and the India Office in accepting or rejecting these demands. It focuses on events surrounding the publication of a biography of the Prophet R.F. Dibble’s Mohammed: A Biography of the Prophet and the Man, published in New York in 1926-that exemplifies many of the issues that were to recur repeatedly in the context of other publications during this period.

The conflation of an antagonistic or inflammatory article in one journal with the entire policy of the British state was a common thread in all the letters of complaint sent by various Muslim pressure groups in India and in Britain. While the Government of India frequently took the view that frivolous publications did not deserve to be banned as this would invest them with undeserved importance, Muslim pressure groups nevertheless demanded bans on light-weight journals, the audience and circulation of which (primarily among European women in India) was extremely limited. On several occasions, complaints were made much after publication, and public agitation focused attention on long-forgotten issues of journals and obscure books. In the case of publications that outraged Muslim sentiment, every petition to the state and to the public opinion seeking ban necessarily gave enormous publicity to the offensive material. Ironically, the demand that certain words be put out of circulation was accompanied by the
determined, repeated and widely publicized circulation of those very words. These case studies will illuminate not only the networks of circulation of publications within the British empire, but also the complex processes by which such publications were attacked, defended, promoted, banned, and consumed.

Devika Sethi is an Assistant Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Mandi.

Jocelyn Maclure, Université Laval, "The Regulation of Hateful and Hurtful Speech: Liberalism’s Uncomfortable Predicament"

The regulation of speech is a highly sensitive and always evolving ethical, political and legal issue. On the one hand, hateful and hurtful speech is on the rise, especially, but not exclusively, with regard to the relationship between Islam and the West. Islamophobic discourse is widespread in Western societies and some radical Islamists call for violence toward non-Muslims and "heretic" Muslims. We can also think of the radicalization and polarisation of discourse brought about by the interactive phase of the Internet (social medias, blogs, comments sections, etc.) On the other hand, demands for the suppression of certain forms of speech proliferate. Requests for "safe spaces" and "trigger warnings," for the condemnation of "microaggressions" and for a right not to be offended or insulted are proliferating. From that standpoint, free speech does not justify hurtful speech and a broader and subtler notion of "harm" needs to be factored in the analysis of the scope of our freedom of expression. Normative philosophers need to be alive to these social mutations and actualise the reflection on free speech.

I will first briefly review the argument in favour of both freedom of expression and the harm principle. Starting from the suspicion that the notion of harm defended by Millian liberals is too narrow but that an "offense principle" is too broad, I will side with theorists such as Jeremy Waldron and Rae Langton who argue that an adequate version of the harm principle ought to include anti-hate speech laws. I will concede that such laws need to target the speech acts that express the most severe forms of aversion and denigration toward a particular group only. I will then reflect on the status of "hurtful speech", which I see as including the performative utterances that stop short of being hateful but which nonetheless erode the social standing and bases for self-respect of
those who are targeted. I will argue that the secular state has no ground for prohibiting blasphemous speech even when it is hurtful. I will conclude with the idea that the free speech debate reveals a limit of liberal political morality and therefore leaves liberal normative theorists with an uncomfortable predicament, as they have to rely more on the complementary role of pro-social personal dispositions and civic virtues than they generally wish to. I will suggest that the ethical counterpart of our legal right to offend, ridicule and hurt is to think carefully about the impacts of our expressive acts on others, given their deepest values, commitments and attachments.

Jocelyn Maclure is Full professor of philosophy at Université Laval (Canada), where he teaches ethics, political philosophy and philosophy of law.

Assaf Sharon, Tel Aviv University, “Democracy and Populism: The Problem of Free Speech”

In an age of click-bait journalism, uncurated social media, and a fading distinction between propaganda and news, is democracy compatible with free speech? In particular, can the ideal of collective self-government be meaningfully realized while news media is privately owned and profit driven, social media is largely unregulated, and political speech is subject to minimal, if any, substantive restrictions? The paper examines these questions within the framework of deliberative democracy - the conception of democracy as a system of collective self-government by shared reasoning on matters pertaining to the common good. Analyzing recent research on political behavior and the effects of "fake news" and other forms of propaganda, the paper argues that the main threat to this ideal, arises not from voter incompetence, as many have recently claimed, but rather from the opportunities to pollute "the democratic commons" provided by unrestricted, profit-driven media. If valid, the argument implies that regulating campaign finance may be necessary, but is not sufficient for defending democracy against the corrupting effects of deceptive, manipulative, inflammatory, or violent speech.

Assaf Sharon is assistant professor of philosophy at Tel Aviv University and the head of its Philosophy, Political Science, Economics and Law program.
PANEL 4.3 INCITEMENT OF VIOLENCE

Willis Okumu, University of Bonn, «From Cattle Raids to All Out Violence: A Processual Analysis of the Baragoi Massacre in Northern Kenya”

In this paper, I analyse escalation of violence in raids as precipitated by a combination of structural and processual factors. Using the example of the Baragoi massacre, I analyse the key issues that contributed to killing of 42 police officers on the 10th of November 2012. To achieve this I give a critical look at the series of events that occurred to propel the raid into a massacre.

My aim is to explain why some raids escalate into 'all-out violence' that lead to devastation of pastoralists livelihoods while others are easily resolved through the intervention of local peacebuilding mechanisms. I argue that for raids to become massacres a series of events precede; immediately after a raid occurs, the opportunity or window for dialogue is shut by the entry of secondary actors with vested interests in violent action. Entry of secondary actors not directly affected by the raid prompts the abandonment of 'soft' approaches such as inter-communal dialogue and brings into play the pursuit of 'hard' solutions such as revenge raids. Secondary actors increase the availability of instruments of violence through procurement and distribution of arms and ammunition in readiness for retaliatory attacks. They shift the focus of the dispute from a single raid to several past injustices against whole communities. The invocation of past injustices or raids is aimed at galvanizing communal support for the planned violence and serves to mobilize warriors and solidify ethnic 'identity against the 'enemy'. Once the 'we' group identity is solidified; the enemy defined and identified, the ultimate goal of the conflict then changes from recovery of livestock to 'finishing' the enemy. I argue that massacres that arise out of raids are therefore products of processes such as warrior mobilisation and distribution of arms based on ethno-nationalistic identities.

Willis Okumu is Kenyan citizen and a Social Anthropologist affiliated to the Right Livelihood College based at the Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn, Germany.
Chuka Fred Ononye, University of Nigeria, “Engagement Markers and Identity Construction in Boko Haram Response Texts”

Social violence, such as the one associated with the Hoko Haram sect in sub-Saharan Africa, is bred and sustained by the construction of symbolic identities through rhetorical use of engagement markers and performative acts that stimulate hate and disenchantment in the target audience, thereby creating a radical inclination towards mass violence or genocide. This reality in Nigeria, for example, leaves one with the concern about the sort of radicalising rhetorical 'magic' invested in the language used by the terrorist group to draw emotion and trigger lone terrorism from citizens. Sadly, this concern has not borne enough manifestation with respect to linguistic scholarship on terrorist propaganda in Nigeria. The present study therefore examines the rhetorical 'magic' in Boko Haram response texts in order to establish the linguistic engagement markers and their attendant identity construction patterns, which are capable of not only changing the peaceable outlook of the audience, but also inducing violence and authorising killing.

Boko Haram, which is originally *Jama'atu Ah/is Sunna Lidda' await Wal-jihad*, meaning "people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teachings and jihad, has not only been associated with the killing and displacement of innocent citizens in Nigeria, the groups has also continued to create identity divisions in young folks through such rhetorical tools as engagement markers. Its activities and language have attracted humanistic attention from (non-)linguistic angles. While non-linguistic studies have focused on the history, manifestations, and socio-political implications of the crisis, the linguistic category- being more related to this study- has utilised stylistic, pragmatic and discourse analytical tools in exploring (social) media representations of the radical group's activities. Regrettably, this linguistic effort has not fully accommodated the actual speeches of the group, much less exploring the rhetorical strategies utilised for identity construction, thereby preventing a full understanding of the violence-inducing potency of the group's response speeches.

Dr Chuka Ononye is a conflict discourse analyst based at the University of Nigeria.
Ozge Kelekci, Independent Scholar, and Meral Akbas, Middle East Technical University, “Appropriation of the Word ‘So-Called’ in the Phantasmagoric World of Power in Turkey”

In this paper, we will follow the story of how a word has been tragically transformed into a political tool of negligence and of extermination by different power groups of Turkey. It all started to circulate when the harsh discussions of Armenian genocide collapsed onto the everydayness of Turkish political life. The catastrophe instantly became "so-called" and was/is suppressed as if none of these ever happened. Then came the discussions on equal participation and representation of Kurdish people in the parliament, and all of a sudden with an e-memorandum declared by the Turkish General Staff, Kurdish people living in Turkey were termed as "so-called" citizens. Afterwards, after ignoring all sorrows, pains, wounds, losses and also rights/demands of Armenian and Kurdish people, sometimes a geographical territory or a political organization, sometimes a complete political issue or an object like flag, book or a person have been in place of so-called such as "so-called independent Kurdistan", "so-called Justice Movement", "so-called Kurdish problem", "so-called intellectual", "so-called women’s rights defender". In other words, "anything" has been continued to be depoliticized with a declaration of "problem", of people, events, testimonies, that are not being there in reality. Finally, in the history of Turkish political life anything stigmatized with a so-called, because of that it is not only a discursive strategy, also points to the targets of power for making war, destruction and extermination. It means that language and selection of words in political discourses not only are reflections of social relations, but also have the power to shape and direct political practices.

Denoting the unreality of anything and/or underlying it as unbelievable, in fact, creates a field of violent practices. Discursively labelled identity/event/experience/history as "unreal" are exterminated in reality. As a strong example of how language might affect the everyday life, how words might operate and act upon the reality, in hegemonical political language, sozde [so-called] is activated to connote not only the denial of identities of other social groups including Kurds, Armenians, women, but also the word is absurdly used to point out what it is not accepted as a legal/political entity such as so-called organization leader, so-called flag.

This absurdity of us age, though, orients a political and physical violence against what has been marked as so-called. On the other hand, although the word strongly underlies
the urge of extermination and physical violence against the indicated groups, it should be highlighted that the usage also powers up the visibility of the indicated group or identity as a strange outcome of the recognition dynamics.

In this study, with starting from the many uses of "so-called" in political struggles and/or political talk, we would like to analyze how a word might turn into a "message" of threat and state violence against other people, identities, social groups and even objects; how Turkish political language evolves around a word so-called making itself active and affective; how reality and truth are (re)produced and (re)constructed around and attached to a word.

Özge Kelekçi graduated from Bogazici University with a master’s degree of Philosophy titled as “The Disclosure of Petrified Unrest: The Gezi Protests from the Perspective of Jean-Luc Nancy and Walter Benjamin”.

Meral Akbaş is a PhD candidate at Sociology Department at Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.

**PANEL 5.1 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF PERPETRATORS AND VICTIMS**

**Benjamin Nestor, Marquette University, “Victimization as Revision: The Einsatzgruppen and the Narration of Mass Violence”**

My essay considers "words that kill" in the mass shooting operations carried out by the Einsatzgruppen in the "Holocaust by Bullets." Relying on the Operational Situation Reports routinely filed by Einsatzkommandos, my interest lies in the ways in which the narrators of mass murder engaged in a revisionary process that articulated the Einsatzgruppen, and Germans more broadly, as victims and the Jews as perpetrators. The victimization thesis posited by Einsatzkommandos formed a type of mythmaking that acted as a justification for mass murder. Further, Einsatzkommandos routinely based violent Aktions on conspiracy theory and rumor, especially in regard to potential dangers posed by the Jews and Jewish-Bolshevik connections.

Taken together, these forms of justification narrated by the perpetrators of mass shooting operations speak to their ideological convictions, but also situational
justifications, which seen in this light, helps synthesize disagreements between historians that highlight long-term ideological and short-term situational motivations. My essay concludes by considering the broader ranging impact of these reports. Read by officials in Berlin, the narration of mass violence both corroborated and complicated their understanding of the so-called "Jewish problem" in the east. In this sense, "words that kill" by mid-level functionaries in the Holocaust had broad reach and formed one means by which the Einsatzgruppen furthered the overall process of "solving the Jewish question."

Benjamin R. Nestor is a second-year history PhD student at Marquette University in Milwaukee, WI, USA, specializing in Modern Germany, the Holocaust and Taterforschung.

Sarah Federman, University of Baltimore, “The Social Construction of Perpetrators as Discourses of Violence: French Railways and Beyond”

Mass atrocity requires the participation of numerous individuals and groups, yet only a few find themselves held accountable. How are these few selected? Criminologists, social psychologists, and other theorists have long studied how and why we punish (Mani, 2005). Victimologists have long considered the social construction of victimhood and what constitutes an ideal victim (Christie, 1986). Less attention has been paid to whom we punish and how binary victim-perpetrator frameworks perpetuate cycles of violence. This study considers the labeling process in the context of mass violence; the perpetrator label once administered can be hard to shake even when the perpetrator can also claim hero and victim status.

Transitional justice struggles with overlapping identities (McEvoy and McConnachie, 2014; Alexander, 2006; Enns, 2012), and so too does the public, privileging clear victim-perpetrator binaries to complex roles. Without exploring whom we condemn, other culpable actors hide easily in the shadows. Focusing on the evildoer, we also distract ourselves from examining our own potential contributions as well the habitus which created the context for violence.

The act of sorting victims from perpetrators does not just perpetuate violence it is violence at the discursive level (Jabri, 1996; Alexander, 2006). Once sorted into groups, Arendt (1998) warns we have made space for totalitarian responses to violence. The cycle continues; war relies up this compelling mythology of good and evil to justify the included
and excluded; once we assign roles, "the rules for everyday life change." (Jabri, 1996: 6-7) The torture, killing, ethnic cleansing, rape, etc., viewed as incomprehensible and abhorrent in peacetime becomes justified. Clean victim-perpetrator binaries sooth because they reassure us of our innocence and tell us whom to fear. Yet far too soon these clean divides become like rusty hinges unable to provide the movement necessary for moral and social development. We may march too confidently towards a dangerous justice, leading us back into violent confrontations. This paper uses as a study the on-going conflict in the United States involving the French National Railways (SNCF)'s role in the Holocaust. In spite of transparency, commemoration, apologies as well as its own claims to hero and victim status, the SNCF has found itself unable to shake its association with the Holocaust. The singular focus on the SNCF has obscured other culpable actors past and present and inhibit ed reflexiv ity regarding how our own discourse and comforting binaries may threaten long-term security.

Sarah Federman is Assistant Professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Baltimore.

**Cillian O Fathaigh, University of Cambridge, "Manufacturing Survivors: Refugees and the Problem of Internally Displaced Persons"**

The "European Refugee Crisis" since 2015 has received a great deal of critical focus from those across university disciplines. In particular, there has been much focus on the return of camps to Europe, and that his been approached from a variety of frameworks, such as the work of Giorgio Agamben. Most of these approaches make explicit or implicit comparisons to Europe of the 1930s and 1940s, center on trying to understand and testify to the experience of these refugees, and aim often to make political as well as critical interventions. What I will argue in my paper, however, is that while these analyses have proven fruitful, they have served themselves to manufacture a conception of survivors that is exclusionary. In particular, these frameworks exclude the experience of victims of conflict left behind in their countries, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). These are victims of war who have been forced to leave their homes, but who have remained within the borders of their home country. This presents a problem for understanding of the victims of war, precisely because legally IDPs do not fall into the category of refugees;
however, they remain by far the largest category of people impacted by and at risk of violence and death.

My argument consists of two parts: firstly, to outline the ways in which are approaches have excluded IDPs, and argue that this has three sources. First, a teleological conception of the end of the nation-state, whereby it is assumed that the victims of war will be able to freely cross borders; second, a Eurocentric perspective that has been heavily influenced by the singular experience of concentration camps in World War II; however, above all else, I will argue that the privileging of refugees in our discourse is a result of and response to the growing increase of right-wing discourse in Europe, which has partially determined our own experience of recent conflicts.

The second part of my argument consists in proposing a way to address this issue - I will look to employ Jacques Derrida’s conception of La zone, a concept that he put forward in his second seminar on hospitality, and which I will propose was partially influenced by the plight of IDPs during the Yugoslav Wars. I will outline some ways in which this might adjust our conception of "refugees" and how survivors are manufactured within our discourse.

Finally, I will argue that the problem of IDPs demands urgent intellectual engagement and that this requires a vigilant reassessment of those excluded from our present methods of analyzing this "crisis".

Cillian O Fathaigh is a doctorate student and Gates Cambridge scholar in the department of French at the University of Cambridge.

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Mohamed Yacoub, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, “Words that Kill: Anti-Muslim Rhetoric in Fox News’ Hannity Show”

We, Muslims living in the United States, are more likely to face identity struggle due to the anti-Muslim sentiment that has recently surged. It is argued that hate speech leads to physical and emotional violence against minority groups (Ali, 2014; Awan & Zempi, 2015; Bail 2016; Oswald 2005; and Yacoub, 2017). 2016/2017 reports of FBI,
CAIR (Council of American-Islamic Relations), Pew Research Center, and SPLC (Southern Poverty Law Center) indicate double or triple violence against Muslims living in the United States. I argue that such violence is born from the womb of hate speech such that of Fox News’ renowned show Hannity's, which is one of the most listened-to hosts in the United States with 13.5 Million Listenership ("Sean Hannity," 2017). In this presentation, I analyze the language of Hannity in order to uncover biased language practices that lead to violence against Muslims. Krista Ratcliffe's (1999) concept of rhetorical listening was then used as a lens to help understand this rhetoric.

The data of this study were obtained from the official website of Fox News. Muslim, Islam, Sharia, Sharia Law, Saudi, radical, and ban were the keywords used to obtain data which were then coded and grouped into six anti-Muslim, biased language practices:

1. **Non-hedged or sarcastically hedged statements:** Hannity's statements are not hedged, or sarcastically hedged, in an indication that his arguments are not to be doubted.

2. **Cornering:** A technique Hannity uses to force a Muslim guest to answer an off-topic question to make the guest appear fragile and tenuous.

3. **Leading questions:** Asking Muslim guests questions that do not leave much space for answer but reinforce the image created for Muslims.

4. **Presupposition:** Enhancing previously created negative images for Muslims and building on those images.

5. **We vs. them contrast:** Using words that emphasize that Muslims are not us and we are not them.

6. **Polls say:** Using alleged polls to support his claims without providing the parameters of the polls.

These strategies were then problematized in the light of Krista Ratcliffe’s rhetorical listening. Ratcliffe asks, why is it difficult to listen to each other? She then answers that our debates are almost always based on and aiming at the arguments: "I'm right" vs. "No, you're wrong." This leads to a status of non-identification in cross-cultural communication or reiterates the status of disidentification. Either status drains blood from the veins of understanding. Understanding as Ratcliffe defines it means listening
to a discourse not for intent but with intent to understand not just the arguments, not just the cultural logics within which the claims function, but the rhetorical negotiations of understanding as well. The language practices that Hannity uses hinder rhetorical listening and seem to lack such intentions. The result of such sentiment is audience who have not been given the chance to listen, but a chance to hate.

Mohamed Yacoub is a PhD candidate in Composition and Applied Linguistics at Indiana University of Pennsylvania in the United States.

Narelle Fletcher, University of Technology Sydney, “The Curious Case of Georges Ruggiu and the Radio Télénvision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM): Broadcasting the Intent to Destroy”

RTLM, the so-called 'hate radio' in Rwanda, was a powerful tool used for disseminating genocide propaganda both before and during the 1994 genocide that targeted the Tutsi ethnic group. Its enormous influence is attested by the frequently cited image of the killers having "a radio in one hand and a machete in the other". The radio station broadcast from July 1993 to July 1994 and all of its presenters were Rwandans, with the exception of Georges Ruggiu. Ruggiu was a young Belgian man who had been attracted by Rwandan politics, particularly the views of more hardline Hutus; this led him to move to Rwanda in 1993.

Ruggiu can be seen as a 'curious case' in many respects. He was the only non-Rwandan to broadcast on RTLM; however, he had no training or previous experience as a journalist and he did not speak the local language, Kinyarwanda. He was also the only non-Rwandan to be tried and sentenced at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for his involvement in the genocide. Ruggiu's trial is equally noteworthy for the fact that it was the first to note the use of the Kinyarwanda term 'gukora' (to work) as a euphemism to exhort Rwandans to participate in the extermination of the Tutsi.

This paper will draw on the transcripts and video recordings of Ruggiu's trial at the ICTR to explore some important features of these "words that kill", including the sociopolitical significance of Ruggiu's use of the French language in his broadcasts, and the linguistic strategies used to convey the intent to destroy, particularly the
exploitation of euphemisation as a technique to normalise the "unspeakable" act of genocide.

Narelle Fletcher is a lecturer at the University of Technology, Sydney, Australia, where she is coordinator of Genocide Studies and lectures in French language and contemporary French society.

**Imen Neffati, University of Sheffield, “Bête et méchant et de mauvais goût', Charlie Hebdo and the Right to Offend"**

This paper demonstrates how the pursuit of artistic freedom shown by *Charlie Hebdo* and its predecessor *Hara Kids* extraordinary graphic, thematic, and verbal satire re-evaluates the moral and social acceptability of the comic. Over recent years, *Charlie Hebdo* has faced consistent criticism that its cartoons depicting minority groups feed into wider discourses of discrimination that promote hatred and violence. This paper examines the different ways humour could transcend the Manichean terms that dominate the debate around free speech and hate speech, and re-evaluates the old question of "how to reconcile order which is not oppression with freedom which is not license".

*Hara Kiri* was created in the 1960s by Françoisois Cavanna and George Bernier to challenge the post-war moral austerity of Gaullist France through graphic images, drawing on scatological, sexually explicit material, and elements of the grotesque. The term *bête et méchant* was coined to label *Hara Kiri*’s satirical ethos in 1961, and subsequently applied to *Charlie Hebdo* until 1982. The editors’ ethos aimed to break taboos, advocate for a free society, and provide journalism that transcended mediocrity. By emphasising the lewd and the grotesque, and casting its satirical net wide enough to encompass a wide range of meanings, *Hara Kiri* demonstrated its capacity to produce humour that could both draw and alienate the reader. The message was therefore often problematic, open-ended, and resistant to formal closure. It was a publication that did not lend itself to a rigid structure and typology, and the constant recurrence of controversial images involved the risk of being perceived as either politically informed, or plainly distasteful by being sexist or racist. *Hara Kiri* established a new doctrine that posited that satire did not require thematic unity, formal clarity, and most importantly, a moral function.
My analysis of Hara Kiri and its sequel Charlie Hebdo centres on the narrative and the visual with a special emphasis on the covers, editorials, and selected stories to demonstrate the unique and novel brand of humour which served as a vehicle for the overarching amoral spirit of the publication. It situates the amoral tone of satire featured in Charlie Hebdo within the larger academic literature on theories of humour and what counts as harmful speech. This paper uncovers the exceptionalism of Charlie Hebdo which resided essentially in the way the satirical publication renamed the 'laughable', redefined 'good taste', and reinvented humour.

Imen Neffati is currently in the third year of a White Rose College of the Arts & Humanities funded History Ph.D. at the University of Sheffield.

**PANEL 5.3 PERFORMING VIOLENCE**

**Irina Astashkevich, Brandeis University, ““For Everyone to See’: Spectacle of Rape as a Weapon of Genocide during Anti-Jewish Violence during Civil War in Ukraine in 1917-1922”**

In early September 1919 the anti-Jewish violence, broke out in Rossava - the town south of Kiev, Ukraine, when the regiment of the Russian Officers and Cossacks, known as Volunteer Army entered the town. The looting turned into savagery very fast, as Cossacks beat and tortured the Jews, mutilated bodies and brutally raped every Jewish woman and girl in the town, leaving them naked on the streets to bleed to death. The offenders did not differentiate by age or physical condition: they raped a seventy-year-old woman before her husband’s eyes, the twelve-year-old daughter of the local distiller, and a new mother who just gave birth. This description of the massrape and torture during pogrom is far from exceptional, and reflects the general patterns of genocidal violence against Jews during the Civil War.

The Civil War started in Ukraine after the Russian Revolutions of 1917 on the backdrop of the First World War and lasted till 1922 when Ukraine became Soviet. Over two hundred thousand Jews lost their lives in about a thousand anti-Jewish riots, known as pogroms, that took place during the Civil War on the territory of Ukraine in approximately five hundred localities. Emerging scholarship on the subject defines...
this "holocaust before holocaust" as the forgotten genocide. The mass rape of Jewish women occurred in at least two thirds of pogroms and involved the majority of the Jewish female population. Nearly half of Ukrainian Jewish women were victims of sexual violence and many more Jewish men and women witnessed it. Almost every rape during pogroms was executed as a spectacle and was orchestrated to achieve maximum dramatic effect to punish and disgrace Jews it brutally humiliated victimized community by public destruction of female dignity and honor. Public exposure and ritualized performance of rape was utilized by predators as a strategic weapon of genocide, aimed to remove the act of rape from a private domain, to strip it of emotional and intimate aspect of sexuality, to absolve a perpetrator from responsibility, and to validate rape as an act of punishment in public domain. The exposed rape was calculated to target not only women whose bodies were exposed, violated and degraded, but the men of the victimized community, who are degraded and humiliated in the eyes of the enemy, of the onlookers, of their peers, of their tortured women and in their own eyes. Spectacle of rape also served to empower the perpetrators and contribute to their bonding. Rape imagery and the process of looking manipulated communal and personal identities of the victims in the way that promoted their "social death" and impacted the Jewish community for generations to come.

Irina Astashkevich is a research associate at Tauber Institute for the Study of European Jewry, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA. Dr. Astashkevich is recipient of research grants from the Jewish Memorial Foundation and Hadassah-Brandeis Institute.

Sharon Willis, University of Rochester, "Performance: Hate Speech and Violence in the Work of Spike Lee and Quentin Tarantino"

This paper explores performances of hate speech in Spike Lee's Do The Right Thing (1989) and Quentin Tarantino's Django Unchained (2012). It pays special attention to the confluences of these films' use of racial epithets in relation to violence. While the two filmmakers under consideration present significantly different profiles, they have in common that their films spark significant critical debate about cinematic violence in relation to hate speech. Both films offer stunning verbal performances, turning pivotally on hate speech-repeating the most degrading racial epithets available in English and in U. S. culture.
These directors and their films have in common a lively attentiveness to speech and violence; they have received a concomitant critical response that scrutinizes their use of hate speech. Popular negative responses to these films stress uneasiness that they may provoke extra-cinematic violence. This paper interrogates the relationship of filmic representations of violence to real world acting out. It examines relationships of fantasy and reality and fantasy to identification.

Spike Lee famously asserted that he could not see Django Unchained because he could "not disrespect his ancestors." In the same moment of popular discussion, Tarantino claimed that he had jumpstarted a conversation about slavery—for the first time in 30 years. These utterly divergent perspectives may tell us quite a bit about the state of racial cultures in the contemporary US. This paper examines what we might learn from their strategies in using hate speech and representations of violence about U.S. culture and its vexed racial discourses.

Sharon Willis is Professor of Art History and Visual and Cultural Studies at the University of Rochester. She has written numerous articles on race and gender in popular cinema.

Ivona Grgrinovic, University of Zagreb, “Salute as Hate Speech: The Effects of Historical Revisionism”

This presentation focuses on a historically burdened salute used by adherents of a totalitarian regime, its contemporary uses and appropriations, and the ir effects on a community.

Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, independence and the war of the 1990s, Croatian society has lived in a constant revision of history, especially one related to wars (Second World War, the war of the 1990s). The debates related to these conflicted histories and memories of the two groundbreaking events in the recent history of the country and the region, and their more or less constant presence in the public arena, have generated various effects and taken different shapes over the course of the years. One of the more recent debates pertained to the nature of the salute used by the adherents of the Nazi collaborator regime in Croatia (the Ustasha) during the Second World War - Za dom spremni, the local variant of the Sieg Heil salute. This salute (as well as Ustasha iconography) has been appropriated by some units that fought in the war of the
1990s, and is frequently revoked by the extreme right wing of the political spectrum, has infiltrated youth and popular cultures. The effects of these appropriations are twofold: on the one hand they homogenize the members of the hate group, on the other they produce fear in the historical objects of the regime under whose rule it came to life. This presentation will analyze the different historical contexts of the usage of the Za dom spremini salute (Second World War, the war of the 1990s, contemporary usages) and its symbolic capital within mainstream politics, youth culture and education.

Ivona Grgurinovic, PhD, is a postdoctoral research and teaching fellow at the Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb.

PANEL 6.1 MANUFACTURING OTHERNESS (1)

Himadri Sekhar Mistri, Jawaharlal Nehru University, “Pluralism on Deathbed: Hindu Majoritarianism and Construction of Muslim 'Other' in Contemporary India”

The notion of 'other' is a political construct and deeply interwoven in social interactions of different groups and subsequent 'self-reflections' based on that exchange. The 'other' as an identity simultaneously is imposed and perceived; but this two way processes are hardly balanced. The 'imposed' other is not merely 'different'; the language of 'othering' demands 'exclusivity' for majority and minority transformed into imagined 'inferior' hostile, unreasoned reason for perpetual misery of majority and became inspiration for majoritarian mobilization that look for death for pluralism in society and advocate a homogeneous 'nation'.

The slogan "Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan", an imagined Indian nation based on one language and one religion existed for long in Brahminist (highest position holder in hierarchical Hindu caste system) Hindu supremacist agenda. Perceiving and projecting society as static and ignoring very basic historical processes to create a narrative; where selectively showing Muslim as invaders and alien to the land and thus creating a permanent sense of 'insecurity' in minds of non-Muslim others; a constructed sense of identity; which sees anything different as threat.
This paper intends to analyse the process of formation of 'Muslim Other' identity and role of historical discourses forwarded by 'Hindu majoritarian' organizations in that process. To do so, this paper uses Agamben’s (1998) concepts of the sovereign ban and bare life; which show transformation of excluded individuals from the 'bias' (life as a part of political group) and pushing them to 'bare life' (life void of any rights). This paper, especially analyses the role played by RSS(Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh); self-proclaimed largest Hindu Socio-cultural organization and ideological guiding force of right wing Hindu nationalist party BJP in construction of the narrative historically and in contemporary time, within the framework of India's pluralist constitutional democracy and while doing that it focuses on discourses of modernity, democracy and it s interaction with majoritarian ideology and how that interaction challenges pluralism and construct an identity based on 'included self' but 'excluded others'.

Himadri Sekhar Mistri is a student of M.Phil/PhD (Social Systems) at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India and is interested in right wing politics in contemporary India, social movements, power, and identity.

Liina Mustonen, Asfari Institute, “Discourses of De-Civilizing”
Liina Mustonen holds PhD from the European University Institute (Florence, 2017). She is currently a visiting scholar at the Lebanese university in Beirut funded by the Finnish Middle East Institute.

Oliver Coates, Cambridge University, “Between Words and Acts: British Racism and Anglophone African Soldiers in World War Two”
Rather less is understood about the strategies and contradictions through which British officials produced an image of the African soldier as inferior to the European and South Asian combatants. Undoubtedly, this discrimination was immensely complex and varied in its conceptual and semantic makeup, but it is all too easy to forget that the fluid racial constructions honed by colonial officials resulted in
genuine physical abuse. This paper will consider two different cases where narratives about racial difference triggered physical violence: corporal punishment and conscription. Focusing on West Africa, it will show how colonial and military officials’ assertions of racial difference became more tenacious precisely as these ideologies came under unprecedented challenge (Cooper: 1996). Questions of race had long been central to colonial military service, but during the Second World War we witness a unique development of these claims in antagonistic directions, towards both accommodation and repression, that presage the ambiguities and conflicts of late-colonial states in Africa.

Oliver Coates is college supervisor in history at Cambridge University. He is currently working on a social history of military service in South western Nigeria, 1939-1955.

PANEL 6.2 GENOCIDE DENIAL (1)

Melanie Altanian, University of Bern, “Genocide Denialism: Renewed Dehumanization and Epistemic Oppression”

The wrong of genocide denial is usually described in terms of a further violation of the dignity of victims, survivors, and their descendants, by attacking their memory, and ultimately, the truth. In my PhD project, I attempt to shed light on this relationship between dignity, memory, and truth in the context of genocide and its denial, by considering particular patterns of genocide denial as instances of ‘epistemic injustice’. Inspired by writings of contemporary epistemology and more particularly by Miranda Fricker’s (2007) novel idea of epistemic injustice, the project aims at identifying the ethical-cum-epistemological implications of certain practices of genocide denialism: those wrongfully undermining the credibility and intelligibility of members of the (former) victim group. Genocide denialism will thus be investigated under the normative framework of epistemic injustice, with a particular focus on denialist practices within the realms of academia and politics, illustrated with the example of Turkey and the Armenian genocide.

In my presentation, I would like to introduce the concept of epistemic injustice, i.e. describe my normative framework and illustrate it with some examples from the Turkish denial of the Armenian genocide. As one form of epistemic injustice,
**testimonial injustice** occurs when a hearer refuses to give due credibility to a testifier because s/he holds a prejudice towards his/her social identity. A second form of epistemic injustice is *hermeneutical injustice*, which occurs when members of a particular group are hermeneutically marginalized so as to prevent them from participating in the very practices through which shared concepts and meanings (particularly of social experience) are created. Epistemic injustice is thus a form of oppression, and it is an ‘intrinsic injustice’: *it wrongs someone particularly in his or her capacity as a knower, and therefore in a capacity of essential human value*. In focusing on those on the receiving end of an epistemic injustice, we become aware of the immediate intrinsic epistemic and ethical harm that it poses to members of the formerly victimized group.

But those subjected to an epistemic injustice are not only experiencing a primary harm in terms of renewed humiliation, they may also experience secondary harms in terms of further epistemic, economic, legal, and political injustices - that is, further practical disadvantages. Genocide denial will thus be theorized as a type of oppression in the form of disrespectful and unjustified challenges to the memory and testimony of members of formerly victimized groups in the aftermath of genocide. It entrenches otherness and perpetuates social as well as political exclusion, by endangering the intelligibility of members of formerly victimized groups, preventing them from successfully putting knowledge into the public domain, thus willfully maintaining hermeneutical ignorance within society and polity.

Melanie Altanian is a second year PhD student of philosophy at the University of Bern, Switzerland, and member of the doctoral program *Interdisciplinary Cultural Studies* at the Bernese Graduate School of the Humanities. Her project entitled *Genocide Denial as an Epistemic Injustice* is funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, SNSF Doc.CH.

**Roland Moerland, Maastricht University, “Genocide Denialism: Demystifying the Role of Denial in the Process of Genocide”**

Despite important advancements made by those who have pioneered the study of genocide denial, to date no comprehensive theoretical model has been developed that explains the role that denial plays throughout the process of genocide. To address this
lacuna this paper introduces a new and innovative model of genocide denialism. The reference to 'denialism' instead of 'denial' denotes that we are not dealing with a single act or type of denial, but with a more elaborate continuum of denial that involves a variety of denialist and denial-like acts which all play a role throughout the process of genocide. The model ultimately reveals that genocide thrives on a more elaborate denial dynamic than recognised in expert literature until now. This paper aims to elaborate the ways in which the model advances our knowledge and understanding about how denial operates in the context of genocide. Furthermore, several pressing policy implications arising from the model will be discussed.

The paper consists of three parts. The first part elaborates the model by explaining how the two phenomena of denial and genocide are interrelated. This shows that the role of denial is not limited to the last stage of genocide, as is often depicted in scholarly work on the topic. Instead, the model clarifies which functions denial performs throughout the process of genocide and it makes insightful how denial operates before, during and after extermination. This first part of the paper finally presents a typology of genocide denialism which encompasses a variety of denials as well as other denialist and denial-like practices on which genocide thrives. This typology also sheds new light on the scope of implicated actors thereby challenging the stereotypical conception of so-called 'genocide deniers'.

The second part of the paper focusses on the unique nature of the violence involved in genocide denialism, an aspect that is often poorly addressed. In addition to showing that denialist and denial-like acts can motivate genocidal violence, the analysis elaborates how certain actions can be constitutive of violence, instead of being merely facilitative to it.

The model's insights about the range of actors involved, the scope of their actions and their violent nature have implications which force us to re-examine how we currently address the problem. The last part of the paper will therefore critically reflect on the policy implications that the model has for the two main strategies used to address genocide denial, which are education and criminalization.

In developing the model, the author has taken an interdisciplinary approach integrating insights from a variety of relevant scientific fields such as cultural criminology and genocide studies and theoretical perspectives such as the psychology and sociology
of denial, speech act and discourse theory. The model is illustrated by and applied to concrete cases, in particular the genocide against the Tutsi, which is often overlooked in the study of genocide denialism.

Roland Moerland holds a Master's Degree in Criminal Law (Maastricht University) and a Master's Degree in Criminology (University of Sydney). He wrote his PhD on the subject of genocide denial at the Faculty of Law of Maastricht University in the Netherlands, where he currently is Assistant Professor of Criminology.

Sevane Garibian, University of Geneva/University of Neuchâtel, “Genocide Denial: The Distortion of Law and History”

The 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide was also the year of the revision by the Grand Chamber of the Doğu Perinçek v. Switzerland judgment rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on December 17, 2013. This controversial judgment gave the Grand Chamber the chance to rule on the denial of (the Armenian) genocide facing human rights law for the first time, a step awaited by many. The Grand Chamber delivered its final decision on October 15, 2015 and concluded that there was a violation of the applicant’s freedom of expression in this specific case.

This presentation will recall the main arguments set forth by the ECHR, which disfavored the Swiss criminal jurisdictions, for a better understanding of the reasoning adopted by the (short) majority of the judges (ten votes to seven). It will then show how, and why, each one of the outstanding assessments of the Court is questionable from both a legal and philosophical point of view, shedding light on the paradoxes and consequences of such assessments. In particular, the presentation will discuss the differentiation made by the ECHR between this genocide denial case and the cases of Holocaust denial; as well as the importance, necessity and complementary of the “fact work” produced by both judges and historians. Based on the paradigmatic Perinçek case, this presentation will aim, more generally, to reflect on the distortion / manipulation of both law and history by denialist speech, and the concrete effects of such ideology against the facts. It will hence highlight some of the current challenges of genocide prevention and, in this context, of the (mis)uses of criminal law, human rights and history.
Sevane Garibian is a Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) Professor of Law at the University of Geneva, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Neuchatel and Visiting Professor at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. She is also an Associate Researcher at the Institut de recherche interdisciplinaire sur /es enjeux sociaux (EHESS/CNRS, Paris) and the Laboratoire Anthropologie bio-culturelle, Droit, Ethique & Sante (Aix-Marseille Universite / CNRS).

PANEL 6.3 Uses and Misuses of History (2)

Taylor McConnell, University of Edinburgh, “‘They are Looking at the Stars Again, Waiting to Conquer Them’: Memory, Abuse, Violence and Power in Yugoslavia’s Demise”

This paper addresses the historical abuse of cultural memory as a contributing factor to the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), using then-Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s speech commemorating the 600th anniversary of the 1389 defeat of the Serbs by the Ottoman Empire at the Battle of Kosovo Polje as a case study of the intersections of memory, violence and power in recent European history. Milosevic’s "Gazimestan speech" foreshadowed the armed violence of the 1990s in Yugoslavia and built from an earlier speech in 1987, in which he stirred Serb nationalist sentiments, declaring "No one should dare to beat you!" to a crowd of ethnic Serbs gathered in Kosovo Polje protesting violence by the {ethnically Albanian} Kosovo police forces. The gradual revival of nationalist expressions in Yugoslavia from the early 1970s accelerated after the death of Josip Broz Tito, the country’s leader for life, who actively suppressed nationalist and counter-revolutionary voices in the immediate post-war era. Milosevic grasped the symbolism of 28 June 1389 {St. Vitus Day} in his speech "on Serbs, battles and Yugoslavia" to reclaim an ethnicised, "liberated" identity for Serbs grounded in their historical sacrifices and that broke from the rather political {that is, communist and centrist} identity Serbs had adopted with in the wider Yugoslav context. Though elements of the speech were dampened to fit the state narrative of brotherhood and unity {"equal and harmonious relations among Yugoslav peoples are a necessary condition for the existence of Yugoslavia"}, Milosevic mobilised the myth of the betrayal of the Serb people at Kosovo Polje by Vuk Brankovic to unite Serbs against a perceived
but undeclared "Other"; this "Other" would manifest in the Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians against whom war was waged throughout the 1990s.

The importance of the Gazimestan speech highlights the ability of elites to manipulate distant cultural memories in order to exacerbate or to foment violence, whether symbolic or physical. Here, I explore "memory abuse", that is, the manipulation of memory beyond a certain, intangible threshold whereby violence inevitably results, as an analytical lens to view the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Slobodan Milosevic's speech, though calling for unity amongst Serbs and amongst the constituent peoples of the SFRY, has been identified as a point of rupture with the Yugoslav past and its neutered discourse on ethnicity that encouraged further actors, political or otherwise, to create ethnocentric propaganda in the lead-up to the Croatian War of Independence in 1991, later spilling into the Bosnian War from 1992 to 1995 and the Kosovo War of 1998-99. Though lacking traditional elements of hate speech, Gazimestan opened opportunities for exploiting memory in public forums - radio, television, print and film - that in the coming years would stimulate widespread social and physical violence.

Taylor McConnell is a PhD researcher in Sociology at the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh.

Samaila Suleiman, Bayero University, “Authoring Dissent: Middle Belt Historiography and the Discursive Production of Violence in Northern Nigeria”

Central to the recurring inter-communal conflicts between the dominant Hausa-Fulani Muslims and non-Muslim minorities in northern Nigeria is the production of narratives of victimhood and resistance. However, most studies of conflict in the region have only focused on social, economic, political, religious and environmental factors, ignoring salient historiographical/textual and discursive roots and processes of the phenomenon. Typical of the thriving culture of conspiracy theories in Nigeria, historical writings on the non-Muslim minorities (which I refer to as Middle Belt historiography) feeds on a specter of Islamophobia around the notions of "Hausa-Fulani Jihad" and "Islamization agenda". This paper interrogates how the extra-textual meaning-assigning agency of this paranoid historiography is manufactured and weaponized in conflict situations.
As monster-making technology, these narratives originally popularized by journalists gradually sneaked into the academia, creating a dissident community of discourse - academic authors, activists, priests and publishers who together constructed a popular cultural resentment against the Hausa-Fulani Muslims. The consumers of these narratives were constantly reminded of the historical injuries of the 19th jihad wars in Hausa land and mobilized along the most dreaded discursive idioms - "Kaduna Mafia: the Killer Squad", "northern minorities, why we fight them", "Hausa-Fulani violence", and "pastoral jihadism", which featured regularly in both academic and popular discourse. Between 1980 and 2016 more than 100 violent communal clashes - in which thousands of people including women and children lost their lives - were reported in the volatile Middle Belt areas of Jos, Benue and Southern Kaduna. To what extent did the Middle Belt dissident historiography function as incentive to these violent clashes? This paper is based on in-depth inter views with journalists and academics, and a critical discourse analysis of historical texts and newspaper editorials. Located within critical work that is attuned to the salience of knowledge-conflict nexus, the paper reveals how venomous historical narratives, lacking in rigorous social theory, acquired functional discursive properties and social meaning. My preliminary reading of these toxic discourses suggests deep-seated intersection between historiography, victimhood mentality, vengeance and violence.

Samaila Suleiman received her B.A. and M.A. in History from Bayero University Kano, and a PhD in Historical Studies from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. She is a recipient of the Ibrahim El-Tayyeb prize for the best final year student in History Department and the Faculty of Arts, Bayero University Kano where she presently teaches.

**PANEL 6.4 Religion and Violence**


The 1994 Rwandan genocide was the culmination of years of ethnic adversity,
worsened in the four years of civil war that preceded the genocide. During these years of war and throughout the genocide, the Rwandan Hutu propagandist media spread a message of hatred against the invading Rwandan Patriotic Front, and the Rwandan Tutsis. Although the propaganda has been studied and discussed, the religious aspects of it have been generally overlooked. In fact, the question of the role of religion in the Rwanda genocide has mainly been limited to the role of the Churches and their representatives, rather than the question of the role of faith. I argue that if we are to fully understand this genocide - in light of the fact that more than 90 percent of the Rwandans adhered to Christianity - we need to understand how the faith of the Rwandans was manipulated to create a reality in which the genocide was acceptable.

The aim of my research is therefore to provide an insight into how the Rwandan media - the RTIM radio station and the Kangura magazine - used religiously influenced imagery and language to convince their audience that exterminating the Tutsis was morally acceptable in the eyes of God.

Through the use of J. L. Austin's Speech Act theory, combined with the conceptual and contextual methods of Quentin Skinner, my research shows that the propagandists were arbitrarily using mythologies - both Christian and pre-Christian - to prove that the Tutsis had no rights to or in Rwanda. They were attempting to create a Rwandan God from the pre-Christian Imana and the Christian God, a God for the Hutus who did not favour the Tutsis, while the Tutsis were portrayed as devil worshippers, heathens, or atheists. By questioning the faith of the Tutsis they were portrayed not only as a threat to Rwanda, but as a threat to God.

With this method and the media material, my research puts the dehumanisation or devaluation of the Tutsi in a new light. Previously the popular notion is that an animalistic form of dehumanisation was the main instrument - referring to the Tutsis as cockroaches - while my study shows that while the animalistic references certainly were demeaning, the main devaluation came through the references to religious mythologies. The Tutsis had been a favoured group in pre-Christian Rwanda, and in the colonial era they were said to have been the true descendants of Ham, and therefore a people with a Biblical origin. The propagandists used these mythologies to portray the Tutsis as an arrogant race, superior invaders and conquerors. While they were described as inhuman, it was not by pushing them down to the level of
animals, but rather in the opposite direction, and in doing that, the Hutus metaphorically portrayed themselves as the David to the Tutsi Goliath.

Olov Simonsson is PhD candidate at the History Department at Uppsala University since 2013, with a specialisation in the history of genocides.


The regime transition from repressive-authoritarian to a more liberal-democratic government in 1998 has brought a significant change for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedom in Indonesia. Despite there is yet a comprehensive measure to resolve the country’s past historical injustices that happened during late President Soeharto’s 32 years ruling, a wide range of normative commitment has been taken, which brought 'freedom' into public discourse. (Hasen, 2004) While freedom itself is mostly regarded as western product by the majority Indonesians, it is also by this virtue challenge and threat to democracy could be posed. (Crouch, 2012)

This presentation argues that the absence of transitional justice mechanism from authoritarian regime contributes to a failure in reshaping identities amongst particularly religious group Indonesians. As a consequence such a failure sustains the nature of repressive regime towards certain groups of people, by labeling or omitting the public to label them as 'infidel' or 'deviant '. From the Ambon (Maluku) and Poso (Central Sulawesi) religious-nuanced conflict that occurred at the outset of reformation era, up to the recent Ahmadiyah and Shiites persecution, these labels have eventually found channels through religious sermon, particularly in Islam as the majority in Indonesia. (Fuller, 2011)

This kind of post-authoritarian phenomenon in reproducing hate to the labeled enemies through religious activities, i.e. fatwas, sermons and preachers, is arguably similar to the repressive method used by the previous authoritarian regime in eliminating the so-called 'state-enemies'. Based on the 1965/55 Communist Purge Case investigation for instance, the involvement of religious activities to incite mass murder is undeniably significant. (Wahyuningroem, 2013. Fernida, 2014) As a result, today’s words behind sermon also to some point alienated not only other religious groups, but also towards the long perceived ghost of communism. (Assyaukanie, 2009)

Even worse, the parameters to determine 'stat
e-enemy' appear to be evidently wider after the regime transition, as the political interest involved has been becoming vast due to the decentralization politics brought into effect. (Bertrand, 2002)

From a historical perspective, this presentation shall cover on the discussion of how religious activities, while being enjoyed social privilege in most part of Indonesia (Hefner, 2001), has been very vulnerable to be infiltrated by political interests backed by presumably military and/or paramilitary forces, such as Laskar Jihad (Jihadist troopers), in reproducing relationships that are conflictual and built on hatred, fear, prejudice, and negative stereotypes. The perpetuated authoritarian regime measure to "maintaining stability by imposing solutions from above and creating patrimonial linkages" has become the major factor in contributing to the situation. Finally, it also appears that certain class within the society took advantage for such a reproduction of hate through religious sermon. (Kingsley, 2012)

Harison Citrawan is currently serving as a human rights researcher at the Indonesian Ministry of Law and Human Rights (since 2011), and a public international law lecturer at the LSPR Graduate School of Communication, Jakarta (since 2013).

PANEL 7.1 Genocide Denial (2)

Rachel Hatcher, Concordia University, "The Fundacion contra el Terrismo: Denying Genocide Denial to Invite Violence against the Other"

Guatemala's former de facto head of state, Efrain Ríos Montt, entered a courtroom in March 2013 to stand trial for genocide and crimes against humanity for the military's massacre of 1771 indigenous Ixil. He was found guilty for these crimes and condemned to 80 years in prison on 10 May 2013. The victory over impunity was short-lived. Ten days later, the ruling was overturned on a legaltechnicality.

During the course of the trial, Guatemala's public places exploded with debates about whether genocide had been committed in Guatemala or not: Si hubo genocidio (Yes there was genocide) or No hubo genocidio (There was no genocide). Generally, conservatives and Guatemalans with ties to the military denied that genocide had been committed in Guatemala while those with ties to human rights and victims'
organizations were equally insistent that \textit{si hubo genocidio}.

The \textit{Fundación contra el Terrorismo} (Foundation against Terrorism) is one of the rare exceptions to this general trend. The Fundación is an organization with close ties to the military and its counter insurgency campaigns against the guerrilla. The Fundación aims to defend members of the military against charges made against them for human rights violations committed during Guatemala's "internal armed conflict" (1960-1996).

In contrast to other conservatives, and in contrast to the argument Rios Montt's defense attorneys used, the Fundación believes that genocide was committed in Guatemala. In the series of pamphlets published while the trial was underway, titled "The Farce of Genocide in Guatemala: the Catholic Church's Marxist Conspiracy," the Fundación argued that certainly the military was not responsible for genocide (and so \textit{no hubo genocidio}), but that, nevertheless, \textit{si hubo genocidio} and the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) was responsible. Rather than deny that genocide had been committed, the Fundación denied that the military had perpetrated genocide.

In this paper, I argue that the way that the Fundación denies that the military committed genocide against indigenous Guatemalans incites violence. In these publications, the Fundación compiled a list of former guerrilla/"terrorist/activists" who have, according to the Fundación, created a lie about genocide as a way to take revenge on the military that defeated them on the field of battle. This kind of list has a long history in Guatemala. During the conflict, for example, death squads drew up lists of enemies to be eliminated. Often, these enemies were described as terrorists. Describing someone as a terrorist discursively justifies violence against him or her. This was true during the conflict, and is perhaps even more true in the post-9/11 era. Moreover, not only do "terrorists" generally pose a threat to the nation simply because they exist, in the Fundación's view, the "terrorists" of the past and present are supported and funded by foreigners or foreign governments and so pose a threat to Guatemala's sovereignty. All of these strategies construct the guerrillas of the past and now the human rights activists of the present as "the other", giving patriotic Guatemalans permission to threaten or kill them in order to save the nation.

Dr. Rachel Hatcher received her PhD in history from the University of Saskatchewan in Canada. Hatcher currently is a Postdoctoral fellow at Concordia University as part of the
government of Québec’s Merit Scholarship Program. She is also a research associate at the Institute for Reconciliation and Social Justice, at the University of the Free State in South Africa.

Mathew Turner, Deakin University, “Volksverhetzung: Historians, Public Policy, and Holocaust Denial in Germany, 1965-1994”

As is well known, in the Federal Republic of Germany today, it has is illegal to deny systematic murder of European Jews by the National Socialist regime during the Second World War. Under the legal category of Volksverhetzung, (“inciting the people”) denying the Holocaust has been a criminal offence in Germany since 1994. Less clear, however, is the way in which these laws evolved and - specifically - the role that professional, contemporary German historians played in their conception. Was it a case of historians standing by idly as Germany’s political and diplomatic minders outlawed Holocaust denial? Or, did contemporary German historians themselves act to stimulate this policy discussion?

This paper argues that through both public and scholarly confrontation of the Holocaust - in particular, the deliberate distortion of historical facts for political purposes, and historians acting as expert witnesses for the prosecution in legal action taken against Holocaust deniers - German historians played a pivotal and understated role in the shaping of public policies and legal measures to combat Holocaust denial in Germany. Sitting at a nexus between politics and scholarship, this paper examines the role that German historians played in the Volksverhetzung trials of two Holocaust deniers in particular - Wilhelm Staglich and Erwin Schorborn, in the 1970s - and both the public, political and judicial contribution made by historians in their role as expert witnesses. It scrutinises the connections between historical research and public engagement of German historians, and deployment of their expertise in combating Holocaust denial, and of law-maker s’ evolving attitudes towards a legal resolution. The paper ultimately argues that the German example reveals how historians can, within their capacities as public intellectuals, confront historical lies, the denial of facts, and hate speech misinformed by distorted historical argumentations, to useful effect.

The period of focus for this paper is 1965 to 1994 - with the former year the point at which both German historians became involved in high-profile criminal cases of
Holocaust perpetrators, and knowledge of the Holocaust became widespread in West Germany. The latter year is that in which Holocaust denial was formally made illegal. Research for this paper was made possible through a DAAD Research Grant for Doctoral Candidates, awarded in 2014. Archival research was conducted at the Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfeld, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, and Institut für Zeitgeschichte Munich. Support and advice was also received from Prof. Dr. Norbert Frei.

Dr Mathew Turner is an academic historian at the University of Melbourne, and Deakin University, in Australia.

Kasturi Chatterjee, FLAME University, "'The Final Stage of Genocide': Strategies of Genocide Denial by Turkey and Pakistan in the Genocide of Armenians (1915-1923) and Bangladeshis (1971)"

Genocides are prone to be followed by genocide denial. Constituting a final blow to victims of genocide- as elimination of memory after physical elimination- genocide denial is for this reason defined as the final stage of genocide. The reasons for denying are as varied as the strategies employed in denial. States that indulge in denial to plead non-responsibility most commonly engage in: (1) justifying state action(s) as resulting out of wartime necessities or contingencies, (2) downplaying the number of victims and/or the scale of atrocities, (3) counter-charge of mutual culpability, (4) obliteration of the memory of genocide from the national narrative, and (5) revisionist writing of history. Seeking to elaborate on the politics of genocide denial, this paper takes stock of two cases of denial by the perpetrator states: the genocide of over one million Armenians through 1915-1923 by Ottoman Turkey, and the genocide of about one to three million Bangladeshis in 1971 by Pakistan.

Where Turkey's denial of the Armenian genocide receives international spotlight, the genocide of Bangladesh is largely remains relegated to obscurity. But given that both Turkey and Pakistan have repeatedly indulged in denying any charge of genocide- at most, expressing regret over "the events" leading to massacres- they constitute valid objects of analysis and comparison when studying genocide denial. Even as proper normalization of relations between Armenia- Turkey and Bangladesh-Pakistan continues to remain hostage to the perpetrator state's stance of denial several years after the said genocides, this paper seeks to understand what propels
state behaviour towards denial in both cases, and what strategies are used to pursue denial in each case.

Kasturi Chatterjee holds a PhD in International Politics Division from the Centre for International Politics, Organisation & Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, India.

PANEL 7.2 Manufacturing Otherness (2)

Annelle Sheline, George Washington University, “The Strategic Use of Islamophobia and Religious Intolerance by Arab Muslim Regimes”

Acts of violence by Muslim individuals have heightened fears about a perceived causal link between Islam and violence. While Islamophobic narratives have been identified in American and European media, less attention has been paid to the ways in which the governments of Muslim-majority countries, specifically Arab regimes, have contributed to and benefitted from Islamophobic discourses. In many Arab contexts, Islamist groups constitute the primary form of political opposition. Following Islamists’ increased popularity in many Arab societies in the 1970s and 80s, ruling regimes felt threatened by Islamists’ calls for political reform. However, increased international fears of terrorism and subsequent Islamophobia have served the interests of ruling regimes, many of which amplify Islamophobic discourses in order to discredit Islamist opposition activists as would-be terrorists. Non-Muslim Islamophobic assumptions are often based on misinformation and ignorance. In contrast, when ruling Arab regimes endorse discourses linking Islam with violence, they seek to avoid taking responsibility for the ways in which their rule can contribute to desperation and political violence. In addition to painting Islamists as purveyors of terror rather than legitimate political opponents, Sunni Arab ruling regimes periodically engage in the production of hate speech directed at other sects, specifically the Shi’i and Ibadi regimes of Iran and Oman. State control of religious, educational, and often media establishments permits regimes to use these institutions to encourage sectarianism and intolerance of forms of religion that do not comply with that endorsed by the state. Based on nine months of fieldwork in three
Arab monarchies, the research contributes to studies of hate speech by highlighting the ways in which governments can generate or exacerbate intercommunal tensions. While hate speech may be more typically associated with fonge or radical groups, the state can be actively involved in the production of hate speech, especially when doing so serves the interests of the political elite.

Annelle Sheline is a PhD candidate in the department of political science at George Washington University.

**Mario Ranalletti, Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero, “Permission to Kill. Le catholicisme intransigent et la fabrication d’une altérité négative pour justifier le recours à violence extrême par les escadrons de la mort argentins (1955-1976)”**

Le 24 mars 1976 l’année mena le sixième coup d’État du XXe siècle en Argentine. Le putsch est justifié par les militaires et leurs allies civils comme le dernier recours pour arrêter l’action de « la subversion », souvent adjectivée « marxiste », « communiste », ou « apatride », selon le locuteur. Dans les milieux putschistes, « subversion » est un mot qui désigne, en le stigmatisant, un très large ensemble d’acteurs, lies de près ou de loin à des idées et à des pratiques de gauche : guérilleros, travailleurs, intellectuels, artistes, universitaires, dirigeants politiques et syndicaux, religieux, étudiants… Qu’ils soient révolutionnaires les armes à la main, intellectuels engagés, prêtres ouvriers ou bénévoles aidant dans les bidonvilles, pour les putschistes tous autant qu’ils sont travaillent à faire tomber l’Argentine dans les « griffes du communisme international ».

Pour combattre « la subversion », le gouvernement de facto met en œuvre un système clandestin dont les exécuteurs sont des « escadrons de la mort » qui se livrent, sans limite ni contrôle, à toute sorte de violences et de sévices. Mais ces violences et crimes de masse — on estime à 30.000 le nombre de morts et/ou « disparus » — ont symboliquement commencé bien avant 1976.

La figure de « la subversion » est né d’un long processus de construction, initie dans les années 1950, d’une altérité négative à l’intérieur du monde militaire argentin. Un réseau intégré par des militaires, des civils et des religieux s’est chargé de l’élaboration d’un imaginaire de la destruction basé sur l’idée de l’existence d’un ennemi caché à l’intérieur de la société (Feierstein 2007; Franco 2012), travaillant pour des pouvoirs extérieurs et/ou imaginaires (le Pouvoir juif, l’URSS, le progressisme)

Cet commentaire propose de retracer les grandes lignes de cet endoctrinemenf, se focalisant sur le rôle joué, les discours et les enseignements par les catholiques intransigeants. A partir des études de Jacques Sémelin sur le massacre (Sémelin 2005) et celles de Albert Bandura sur le « désengagement moral » (Bandura 1999), cette communication lie le processus de déshumanisation des individus stigmatisés comme « subversifs » en tant que condition préalable avec le passage à l’acte de la violence extrême dans le cadre du terrorisme d’Etat argentin (1976-1983). Notre intérêt est notamment de montrer comment les paroles et les enseignements des catholiques intransigeants argentins (c’est-à-dire, l’endoctrinemenf) étaient des Words That Kill.

Mario Ranalletti est enseignant-chercheur à l’Université nationale Tres de Febrero. Il est rattaché à l’Institut d’études historiques de l’UNTREF, codirecteur du Centre d’études sur la mémoire et le temps présent (UNTREF-Centro Cultural de la Memoria Haroldo Conti).

Carolyn Kay, Trent University, ““Every German Hates the French!’: German Children and Wartime Propaganda 1914-1916”
In World War One, young German children were encouraged by wartime pedagogy to hate the enemy, and many girls and boys internalized these ideas of "us" versus "them." This kind of nationalism was a crucial factor in the willingness of German adults in 1933-1945 to accept Nazism and its racial war. My paper would consider how German middle-class and working-class children were shaped by wartime pedagogy from 1914-1916, so that they imagined the war as an essential struggle of Germans against those enemies who jealously sought to harm and limit them. The war was presented to children as involving adventure, glorious violence, self-sacrifice, and military heroism, and students were taught to passionately hate the British, French and Russians. School essays on the war often produced examples of children's excessive zeal. Take, for example, these comments from several Breslau schoolboys, aged thirteen and fourteen, when asked to write on 'What I think about our enemies'. The first exclaimed, 'If I were to capture the bloodthirsty grand-duke of Russia I would hang him upside down'. Another stated very clearly: 'Every German hates the French; me too [...] I am also full of anger for the English'. Not to be outdone, a third boy writing on the German occupation of Belgium declared: 'The Belgians are gross people. It often happens that they cut off all the limbs from our wounded soldiers. Every Belgian who is caught in the act should be tortured unto death'. And in another violent expression of aggression, a fourteen-year-old student wrote: 'I only wish that I could be a soldier. Then I would stand across from the English - whose skulls I would smash in with my rifle butt, so that they wouldn't know if they were coming or going'.

To psychologist Alfred Mann, who studied these essays for a publication entitled *Children's Inner Lives and the War* (1915), such comments by schoolmates made clear that the 'thirst for revenge and the feeling of hatred is deeply placed within the emotional and intellectual worlds of many German children'.

Schoolchildren, especially boys, were passionate about war pedagogy in the classroom that blamed the Allies for beginning the war and for supposedly desiring Germany's destruction; they were also affected by the burgeoning war literature for boys, including sensationalist adventure stories in which heroic German soldiers defended the east from Russian barbarity, or, in the west, held off bloody attacks by French and English troops. Girls could express such sentiments, too. As one thirteen-
year-old writer put it: 'Everyone hopes that a Zeppelin will fly over England as soon as possible, because the hatred for our cousins across the canal is at its worst." It was these kinds of nationalistic exhortations that thrilled so many young Germans and set a pattern of nationalistic and militaristic thought against the "other" that would help in the success of Nazism. I will also address war art produced by the children in school, often revealing violent scenes of killing the enemy.

Carolyn Kay is a history professor at Trent University in Ontario, Canada.

**PANEL 7.3 Reception of Hate Speech**

_Sarah Ambiyo, Kenyatta University, and Angelina Nduku Kioko, United States International University – Africa, “Total Loyalty: Perceptions and Responses of the Kenyan Public to 'Hate Speech'”_

Charismatic leaders have had power over citizens for as long as forever. Mass violence as a result of 'othering' particular sections of the citizenry by such leaders has resulted in atrocities on those 'othered' both in history and in many multi-ethnic settings currently. In Kenya, political mobilisation, especially before and during the election period capitalises on creating dissatisfaction with the 'other'. The post-election violence of 2007/2008 in Kenya was traced to hate speech (Republic of Kenya, 2008), and the build-up to the 2017 elections and the response to the annulled presidential elections saw much polarisation on ethnic grounds. After the 2007/2008 violence, the government established the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) to foster national integration and create the necessary institutions to check hate speech (NCIC, 2010). However, systematic and extensive use of false facts, flawed argumentation, divisive language, and dehumanizing metaphors directed towards specific ethnic groups continue to flood the media, and even when the perpetrators are apprehended, convictions have been rare.

This paper describes the perceptions of and response to 'hate speech' by the Kenyan public, and draws conclusions on how these perceptions and responses relate to and/or predict the judiciary decisions to convict or acquit those charged with hate speech. The paper further, evaluates how these perceptions and responses impact the national fight
against 'hate speech'. The primary data for the study was two video clips of hate speech, identified on the basis of the 'speakers' having been charged with hate speech. Data on perceptions was gathered by use of a questionnaire and focus group discussion. The respondents to the questionnaire self-reported themselves on their views and attitude towards certain aspects of 'hate speech'. The focus group viewed the video clips and was probed to discuss whether or not they perceived the utterance as constituting 'hate speech'. The respondents to the questionnaire were found to be polarised on political party lines, and the focus group discussion exonerated the speakers from 'hate speech'. The study recommends that the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) should pursue civil education on the role of the public in ending hate speech, and that the courts should pronounce heftier sentences so as to deter would be offenders.

Sarah Ambiyo is currently pursuing a PhD in Linguistics at Kenyatta University in Nairobi. Angelina Nduku Kioko is a Professor of English and Linguistics at the United States International University – Africa.

**Philip Dunwoody, Juniata College, "Understanding Trump and Ethnic-Persecution through Ideology, Social Norms, and Threat"**

What ideologies promote receptivity to "words that kill"? This paper utilizes political psychology research to address the rise of Donald Trump and support for ethnic-persecution. I cover what we know about the ideologies of those who are most prejudiced and when they are likely to act.

The best individual predictors of prejudice are authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (SDO). Authoritarianism is an adherence to traditional norms, submission to authority, and tendency to punish deviants (Altemeyer, 1981). SDO is the belief that group-based hierarchies are natural and just (Pratt et al, 1994). Trump's rhetoric speaks to these ideologies. His slogan, *Make America Great Again*, harkens back to a time when white men held more power simply because of their group membership. At rallies, Trump recalled the good old days where troublemakers would be carried out on stretchers. He has also suggested that he alone can fix America's problems. Authoritarianism has consistently been used to predict political intolerance, the targeting of outgroups, and antidemocratic attitudes (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer, 1981; Dunwoody & Funke, 2016). Authoritarianism and SDO powerfully predict a
range of ethnocentric and antidemocratic attitudes. In the US, they also predict support for Trump (MacWilliams, 2016; Choma & Hanoch, 2017).

The expression of prejudice is moderated by social norms and perceived justifications. Crandall and White (2016) found that both Trump and Clinton support ers perceived a greater acceptance of discriminatory speech after Trump was elected. The election of Trump served as a signal that social norms prohibiting ethnic-persecution are loosening. Arguing that immigrants and Muslims are a threat to American values (e.g., Trump claimed Islam hates us) and resources (they are taking our jobs) are ways to appeal to those high in authoritarianism and SDO. Rhetoric emphasizing the threat of specific groups acts as a justification for the expression of prejudice. As expected, the Southern Poverty Law Center reported an increase in hate-crimes following Trump’s election.

Immediately after the Charlie Hebdo Paris attacks, Dunwoody and McFarland (2018) presented 602 US participants with hypothetical scenarios. We asked participants to imagine that due to rising Islamic terrorism, the US government passed a law requiring all Muslims to register with the government. Almost 20 percent of participants indicated that they would tell their friends they agreed with the law and would tell police about known unregistered Muslims. Next, we asked participants to imagine that the US government had outlawed Islam. About 10 percent of respondents indicated they would tell a friend they agreed with the law and tell police about known Muslims. Between 2 and 3 percent reported that they would personally participate in attacks against Muslims. Authoritarianism and SDO increased perceptions of Muslims as threatening which then served to justify participants’ reported likelihood of engaging in ethnic-persecution. Judgments of Muslims as threatening were not based on specific concerns about Muslims, but rather to participants’ high levels of ethnocentrism.

Trump and the alt-right have adopted a siege narrative. They claim that "their" way of life is threatened and that this threat justifies their extremism.

Philip T Dunwoody is currently a Professor of Psychology at Juniata College in Huntingdon, PA, USA. He earned his PhD in Psychology from the University of Georgia in 2000 with a focus on human judgment and decision-making.
A short nationalist hate campaign as aftermath of the election of Gabriel Narutowicz (9.12.1922) for the first Polish president (then killed by the nationalist fanatic Eligiusz Niewiadomski) effected in a huge anti-Semitic riots in the capital of the reborn Poland which lasted with nearly a week (from 9.12-16.12.1922). Socialists Jews and even 'Jewish-looking' persons were dragged in the alleys and beatened brutally and unconscious. At least two persons were shot down, many others wounded left on the streets. Amid most of the violators dominated both university students and lower secondary school pupils of the Warsaw intermediate schools.

Quite interestingly, in the historical perspective, these events seems to be the first public demonstration of a new rightist politics that had firstly affected the student body then the whole home grown nationalist movement (National Democracy, Narodowa Demokracja/Endega) in the late 1920s and eventually the Polish politics in interwar period.

However, my paper will, first of all, analyze different public discourses about the Jews; political violence of young post-war generation, and the power of discriminatory language in relation to main treat to the 'Polish cause', the Enemy-Within, the Jews. I would like to demonstrate how this language of hatred affected not only actors but as well the opponents. My paper will also scrutinize the particular elements of that orchestrated campaign e.g. tropes, imageries, legends and myths, conspiracy theories and rumors and gossip about Jews that have appeared at these various stages of those events. It will reconsider how this language helped to engender an innate simmering distrust, traditional stereotypes into an ideological hatred of the Jews in the 20th-century Poland. Nevertheless, in the end I’d like to prove that this discourse though impacted on either the new generation of nationalists or even though on cultural identity of the new Polish establishment, had a longer tradition at least reaching the Revolution of 1905.
Grzegorz Krzywiec is a research fellow at the Institute of History, Polish Academy of Sciences.

**PANEL 8.1 MEDIA AND VIOLENCE (2)**

**Nicki Hitchcott and Hannah Grayson, University of St Andrews, “Valérie Bemeriki, the Voice of Rwandan Hate Radio”**

Between April and July 1994, as many as one million Rwandan people were killed in one of the most brutal genocides of the twentieth century. The victims were mostly Tutsi, but also Hutu who refused to participate in the killings. In 1993, the radio station RTLM (Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines) by was set up in protest against peace talks being held in Arusha, Tanzania, between the then President Juvenal Habyarimana and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) who had been at war with the Rwandan government since October 1990. A popular radio station with Rwandan youth, RTLM combined contemporary music broadcasts and humour with messages inciting hatred and violence against the Tutsi. During the genocide, presenters whipped up support for the attempted extermination of the entire Tutsi population who were all targeted as presumed accomplices of the ‘enemy’ RPF.

Valerie Bemeriki was one of the best-known presenters on RTLM, appearing in just under 20% of all the station’s broadcasts. During her radio shows, she persistently encouraged the genocidaires to keep up with their ‘work’ and exterminate the ‘enemy’ who were identified as cockroaches and snakes. She also regularly read out lists of so-called Tutsi sympathizers, provoking targeted attacks by individuals. Having fled Rwanda when the RPF ended the genocide in July 1994, Bemeriki was arrested in the DRC in June 1999 and brought back to Rwanda to face trial. In 2009, she was convicted of, and pleaded guilty to, crimes of genocide by a Rwandan *gacaca* court and sentenced to life imprisonment. She is currently serving her sentence in Nyarugenge prison.

In 2015, Bemeriki was interviewed in prison by Paul Rukesha, a genocide survivor and director of the Genocide Archive of Rwanda. This archive is managed by our project partner the UK- and Kigali-based NGO, the Aegis Trust. In the interview,
Bemeriki was asked about her work at RTLM and her reflections on what happened in 1994 and afterwards. This paper draws on material from this unpublished interview currently stored in the Genocide Archive of Rwanda. Beginning with a description of Bemeriki’s role as a genocide propagandist, our paper analyses the ways in which this perpetrator evaluates the role of hate speech in the genocide in her own words. Using discourse analysis, we consider how Bemeriki’s own testimony demonstrates the continuing influence of genocide ideology even on those who have confessed and asked for forgiveness for crimes of genocide. But we also focus on the signs that Bemeriki may have grown psychologically through her time in prison. Through close reading of her testimony, we consider whether there is any evidence of positive psychological growth such as empathy, increased wisdom and a change in the way in which a person relates to others. In doing this, we reflect on the effectiveness of current Rwandan government policies that attempt to replace discourses of hatred and divisionism with narratives of unity and reconciliation.

Nicki Hitchcott is based in the School of Modern Languages at the University of St Andrews. She is the author of *Rwanda Genocide Stories: Fiction After 1994* (2015) and is the Principal Investigator on the AHRC-funded project, 'Rwandan Stories of Change' [www.rwandan.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk](http://www.rwandan.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk).

Hannah Grayson is a Research Fellow at the University of St Andrews on the AHRC-funded project 'Rwandan Stories of Change' [www.rwandan.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk](http://www.rwandan.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk) in partnership with the Aegis Trust.

**Kay Chadwick, University of Liverpool, “Broadcasting Hate in Occupied France”**

The development of radio in the interwar period of 1919-1939 created a mass audience for propaganda, transforming its delivery and impact. When conflict broke out in 1939, governments worldwide recognised radio’s potential as an instrument of war, and the medium became both a significant part of the machinery of wartime communication and a locus for psychological combat. In the case of occupied France in particular, radio allowed expatriate voices abroad (principally in Britain and the United States) and their counterparts back home to engage in a sustained war of words played
out on a virtual battlefield, where arguments over 'truth' and 'lies' flew back and forth, and where the prize was the hearts and minds of the unseen audience.

Two highly skilled players on this stage were Paul Creyssel and Philippe Henriot, the principal voices of the collaborationist Vichy regime. The two men were parallel and rival speakers, each broadcasting weekly on Radio Vichy from early 1942 to the end of 1943. During that period, Creyssel held the top propaganda post at Vichy while Henriot operated without official portfolio. But Creyssel was ousted in his favour at the end of 1943, at the behest of the German s. Henriot went on to broadcast twice daily in 1944. But his high-profile position was short-lived, for he was assassinated by the Resistance at the end of June, silencing his voice of collaboration.

This paper focuses on the wartime broadcasts of Creyssel and Henriot as a means of highlighting and analysing historical manifestations of hate speech. It examines how the two men specialized in targeting the 'other', manufacturing negative identity discourses which sought to foster fear and intolerance of 'undesirables', such as Jews, Communists, Socialists, Free French abroad and resisters at home. The broadcasts teem with classic propaganda strategies such as name-calling, scapegoating, card stacking, faulty analogies, the misuse or embellishment of facts, and the use of loaded terminology. All are mobilized to political ends, in the interests of persuading listeners that the 'rational' and 'right' way to think is that 'undesirables' are 'contaminated' and warrant exclusion to restore and protect the health of the national body. Creyssel and Henriot both peddled this same message, but their styles differed enormously. Henriot was more extreme than Creyssel in the tone of his analysis, and more vehement in his depiction of Vichy's enemies. But Creyssel's hate was no less extreme, despite its more subtle expression. As this paper demonstrates, Second-World-War hate speech flourished in occupied France.

Dr Kay Chadwick, Reader in French Historical Studies at the University of Liverpool, UK, is a specialist in French Second-World-War studies. She teaches and researches on the Vichy regime, collaboration, wartime propaganda, the everyday experience of the Occupation, and the representation of the années noires in literature, history and film.
Hannah Westley, American University of Paris, “‘Headline Shock!’ The Mail Online, Symbolic Violence and Social Networking”

Building upon my recent research, which examines how online news consumption has far-reaching consequences for the genre of news, I would like to propose a paper that examines the affective economy of online news headlines.

An newspaper headline has always had to ‘tell and sell’ the story. From broadsheets to tabloids, headline style s have varied widely but as the news industry evolves online and competition for advertising revenue depends on numbers of clicks garnered, has the emphasis in headlines changed from the ‘tell’ to the ‘sell’? Giving rise to the umbrella term ‘clickbait,’ associated with simplification, sensationalism and provocation, other headline trends include the Upworthy style, forward referencing, question headlines and negative impact headlines. In the current political climate, where polarizing discourse is gaining traction across social media, is news worthiness subject to new criteria? Are headlines ‘ideological structures increasingly strident?’

Through a content analysis of Daily Mail articles distributed through third party platform s over a five day period, this paper will raise questions about the apparent ‘coercive’ rhetorical techniques that seek to persuade readers to click, like and share. The Daily Mail as a middle market tabloid is situated between ‘quality’ newspapers and red-top tabloids. In the UK, it is the second biggest selling newspaper after The Sun with an average daily newspaper circulation of 1,510,824 copies. Its website, Mail Online, is the most visited English language news website with an average daily unique browser figure of 14.8 million in 2016. With over 12.7 million followers on Facebook alone, 97% of the Mail’s total social reach stems from Facebook. What happens to the Mail’s headlines when they are rewritten for social media distribution? Do they maintain the headlines of long tail keywords, researched and utilised for their popularity in the search engines? What effect do they seek to have on the social media user?

A framework of affect theory opens up space for thinking about how we are affected by headlines and the ways in which we respond. Headlines reformulated for social media encourage us to respond emotionally, via a physical response or gesture (clicking) before we have registered the reasons for our reaction. Affect deals with
states of in between-ness: in the capacities to act or be acted upon. This corporeal dimension allows us to consider how we respond to headlines in an instinctive and reactive fashion. Rhetorical analysis alone is an inadequate tool for examining the emotional impact headlines seek to have. Our relationship with news on the small screen takes place in a political-material context but is, at the same time, an individual and particular embodied experience. Affect theory raises questions about systems of circulating forces in individuals that interact with histories.

Hannah Westley completed her PhD at Cambridge University, followed by an Entente Cordiale Scholarship for post-doctoral research. After working as a journalist, she now lectures in journalism and communication at the American University of Paris.

Christine Goding-Doty, Northwestern University, “Meme Magic and the Problem of Playful Coloniality”

The Great Meme War of 2016 ended with a major victory—the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States. For the alt-righters who conceptualized themselves as being "at war" the election was just a battle in a long line of imagined conflicts, but it was one that gave them time to regroup, develop new strategies to secure their position, and make new memes.

This paper will explore the ways memetic practices have been instrumental in revitalizing white nationalism for the 21st century as both a political project of empire-making and as a digital site of play and imagination. The term "meme magic" invokes this mix of the ludic and the pernicious as it describes the IRL (“in real life”) effect of the memes that promote white nationalism and white supremacy. Meme magic refers to the kind of materiality a meme accumulates, or the force it gathers as it spreads beyond its creators to influence the formal realm of politics. An internet meme is the propagation of digital content, shared from one user to another. It references both the content that is shared (messages, jokes, words, photos, videos, gifs, dance, gestures, etc.), and the action of it being shared across one or more digital platforms, as well as the way the process of participation in the meme, and the development of it as it congeals into an identifiable and codified referent. The idea of meme magic not only lends political heft to the violent jokes and snark of the alt right,
but it attempts to explain the alluring nature of white nationalist memes themselves and why they go viral. I argue that allure emerges in the intersection where the digital meets the colonial and amplifies its attendant desires—the desires for land, resources, and racial dominion.

This paper will demonstrate the way memes have been the major tool in securing a future for the contemporary white nationalist project by reconfiguring the conception and importance of the state itself in favor of a pan-white alliance whose terrain is the digital platform. Digital modes of sociality present an opportunity to recuperate frontier as a virtual performance and to rewrite the history of how the power of whiteness itself was constructed. The idea of meme magic sanitizes a recommitment to values of empire and domination in the digital age, recasting the racially violent ideologies of white supremacy traditionally rooted in hate and inequality into a different emotional landscape that emerges from digital play—or, magic. If the notion of coloniality denotes the modes through which colonial values and organizations of power continue to reverberate into the present, memes and meme magic generate a dynamic discursive and performative repertoire for the millennial generation to participate in a project of white supremacy both online and off. This paper reads a number of memes and memetic performances IRL to theorize the relationship of whiteness to the viral and the virtual in the 21st century.

Christine Goding is a Ph.D. student at Northwestern University in cotutelle with the Ecole Normale Superieure.

PANEL 8.2 LANGUAGE OF VIOLENCE

Nini Gottesfeld, Independent Scholar, "Fatal Words: When Casual Dialogue Turns into Lethal Weapons"

The continuum linking symbolic violence to physical violence is at the center of this paper. A well-known genre of the power of words that kill is manifested in incitement leading toward physical violence. This genre involves three "partners": inciter; "incitee" (who will advance the physical violence); and victim. The incitement pattern is constructed as follows: the inciter creates a false comparison between the victim
and a negative object, whose malice is known and is in no need of proof. This comparison mobilizes a myth, usually unfounded, which carries with it a punishment or distancing from society. Because of the inherited comparison pattern, the "incitee" makes the (false) connection and acts upon it.

For example, Yitzhak Rabin, the former Israeli prime minister assassinated in 1995 by a right-wing radical Israeli Jew: Rabin was consistently termed "traitor" by right wing politicians in Israel for negotiating with the Palestinians and for his willingness to return territories. According to the inciters' myth, these territories belonged to the Jewish people, whereas the Bible is the definitive proof for this. In addition, the agreed-upon assumption is that traitors should be punished or distanced from society. Consequently, the "incitee" receives the consistent message, absorbs it and acts upon it. This is a clear recipe for, how words that kill ("Rabin is a traitor") bring about the "incitee" to commit physical violence.

In this paper, I discuss a different genre of the power of words that kill. I analyze what I term in my book, Words That Kill (2006), the concept of disguised words. These are words and language patterns that might carry a hidden verbal abuse. As opposed to the above-mentioned genre that includes three "partners," this genre has only two: attacker and victim. The difficulty in identifying these words stems from frequency. If they appear seldom, their use may be harmless; however, frequent employment of the disguised words proves to be powerful. Therefore, use of frequent disguised words can be termed words that kill.

Serving the covert violence, these words operate as verbal "silencers" by the abusers. The practical outcome of the word kill in words that kill takes place in three ways: (a) weakening the victims by shaking their self-confidence and consequently leading to their "death" in their own eyes; (b) destruction of the true self: since the victims try to avoid attacks, they frequently attempt to please the attackers by erasing their true self; (c) actual death stemming from physical diseases that could have been caused indirectly by nonstop verbal abuse.

The following is an example for reprimanding, criticizing, and imposing guilt in the disguise of a question: I'm hungry. Do you have to talk on the phone now?

Implications:
• Statement: "You are supposed to make me dinner"
• Reprimand and criticism: "You are talking too much on the telephone" OR "You don’t do what you are supposed to do"
• Command: "You have to do it now"

Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never break me (The Christian Recorder, 1862); Really?

Nini Gottesfeld is an independent scholar and a popular lecturer on the linguistic analysis of domestic violence and the study of constructive communication. She was trained in Israel and received a BA in Hebrew and Arabic linguistics from the Hebrew University and MA in Education Administration from Tel Aviv University.

Simo Määttä and Ulla Tuomarla, University of Helsinki, “Lexical Reiteration and Discursive Authority as Performative Techniques: Analyzing Hate Speech Online”

In this paper, we analyze lexical reiteration and discursive authority as performative techniques materializing hate speech in an online discussion forum.

The concept of performativity was coined within analytical philosophy of language in order to describe utterances which not only describe the world but are also constitutive of action (Austin 1962). Subsequently, performativity has spread to a wide array of disciplines. Thus, postcolonial theory (Bhabha 1990) and gender studies (Butler 1990) have emphasized the role of context and the importance of felicity conditions in making the performative successful. "French theory" has played a major role in these conceptualizations of performativity. Thus, Derrida (1972: 365-93) stresses reiteration and circulation as the source of performative power: this power derives from the fact that the utterance has already been repeated several times and has become a sort of signature and a ritual. Bourdieu (1982: 100-106) affirms that performative power ultimately resides in the social position occupied by the utterer. Studies of freedom of speech and hate speech influenced by French theory include MacKinnon’s (1993) account of pornography as performative discourse that silences women and Butler's (1997) analysis of hate speech.
This paper analyzes lexical reiteration and the ways in which words and expressions are endowed with discursive authority in a large Finnish online discussion forum (Suomi24). First, we will explain briefly how the performative dimension of hate speech can be explained by reiteration/circularity and discursive authority. Second, we will explain our data collection methods. Subsequently, we will analyze the life span and itinerary of a couple of powerful neologisms that succeeded in becoming highly quoted in the Suomi24 discussion forum. By showing a few empirical examples, we will first demonstrate how participants come up with new words that have pejorative or clearly negative connotation in order to gain attention when they refer to other people and groups of people. Typically, these new formations flirt with the semantic ambiguity of the neologism.

Subsequently, we analyze quoting practices that combine the idea of reiteration and discursive authority by showing how original ideas and words spread on a discussion forum from one participant to another and from one discussion group to another and sometimes even outside the discussion forum. The goal is to gain a better understanding of the discursive mechanisms generating hate speech online.

Siom Maatta is University Lecturer in French at the Department of Modern Languages at the University of Helsinki and teach translation, interpretation, and linguistics.

Ulla Tuomarla is University Lecturer in French at the University of Helsinki. She is a discourse analyst whose research focuses on hate speech and verbal aggression in computer-mediated communication, especially in social media.

Régine Waintrater, Université Paris Diderot, “Killing in the Language. Analogies and Differences between the Shoah and the Genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda”

In this presentation, I’ll focus on the exclusion process that takes part before each genocide. My speech will compare the nazi and the Hutu uses of common language before and during the two genocides.

As Victor Klemperer showed in his major opus LTI, the language of the Third Reich, the perpetrators always begin by expelling their future victims from the current language, before throwing them out of the human species.

This process can be divided in two different linguistic directions:
The first one is the euphemisation, a way of masking the very actions of the perpetrators by using everyday words, in order to avoid protest and indignation.

The second is, on the contrary, a way of exaggerating and hysterizing, in order to emphasize the negative characteristics of their future victims.

These two schemes are very clear, and one can compare the Nazi press productions with the Hutu press and radio before and during the genocide. Even if we speak of different cultures, different places, different histories and different languages, one can see the way the perpetrators bend and twist the common language in order to dehumanize the group which is designated as non-human, and "killable".

Régine Waintrater is a psychoanalyst and former Assistant Professor in Clinical Psychology, University Paris 7-Diderot.

Florent Brayard, Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, “To Extermiate: Hitler, Mein Kampf and the Jews”

D’un bout à l’autre de sa carrière politique, de Mein Kampf à son suicide, Hitler n’a cessé de parler des Juifs et il n’a cessé de même, suivant des fréquences il est vrai variables, de parler d’extermination. La question de la préméditation génocidaire a constitué pendant longtemps un enjeu majeur dans l'historiographie de la Shoah. Puisqu’il avait désigné les Juifs comme cibles et qu’il avait menacé parfois de les exterminer, Hitler aurait précocement formulé, pensait-on, le projet de les tuer vraiment, un projet finalement mis en œuvre de manière tardive. Si de telles visions télégologiques n’ont plus cours, la récurrence de propos haineux et menaçants dans la bouche de l’activiste devenu Führer n’en est pas moins, ou n’en est que plus frappante. Une enquête rigoureuse suppose d’essayer de répondre à plusieurs questions : que veut dire « exterminer »? Quels sont les groupes que Hitler, tout au long de sa carrière, a menacé d’exterminer ? quels buts politiques poursuivait-il en proférant ces menaces et, finalement, en mettant en œuvre une politique de meurtre systématique ?

Florent Brayard est historien, directeur de recherches au CNRS, membre du Centre de recherches historiques (EHESS-CNRS). Il a publié plusieurs ouvrages sur l’histoire du négationnisme et celle dela Shoah.
PANEL 8.3 COUNTERING VIOLENCE

Jacqueline Royster, Georgia Institute of Technology, “The Myth of the Barbarian: Cultural Logic and the Need for Transformative Rhetorics”

This presentation casts attention on the historical construction of others as "barbarians" and on ways in which this rhetorical framing has established and enabled a naturalized otherness via race, place, and gender (as particularly problematic identity markers) in the creation of toxic discourses, social domination, and discriminatory practices. The springboard example is the issue of lynching in the context of the United States as "authorization to kill" and the resonance of this horrific practice in the persistent contemporary issue of police violence against African American men, women, and children.

With the three operational terms of barbarianism, cultural logics, and transformative rhetorics, the intention is to make a case in the effort to foment a sustainable peace (whether locally or globally) for the need to shift paradigms in rhetorical constructions that support: a globalized view of what it means to be human; a more robust understanding of rhetorical listening, empathy, compassion, respect, courage, language well used, etc. as vital elements in an ever-evolving, well-deliberated management system for authentic and sustainable cross-cultural engagement.

Jacqueline Jones Royster, Dean of the Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts at the Georgia Institute of Technology, holds the Ivan Allen Jr. Dean’s Chair in Liberal Arts and Technology and is Professor of English in the School of Literature, Media, and Communication.

Charlotte Baker, Lancaster University, “Arts for Social Change: Countering the Discourses behind Ritual Attacks on People with Albinism in Africa”

Since 2007, over 500 attacks on people with albinism have been recorded in 27 African nations, fuelled by rising demand for their body parts for use in witchcraft-related rituals. In Western societies, with predominantly pale-skinned populations, people with the genetic condition albinism often pass unnoticed but in sub-Saharan Africa, it is
the most visible of conditions. This visible difference has inspired a web of myths and beliefs that lead to discrimination, stigmatisation, and social exclusion. As Baker et al. acknowledge 'one of the greatest impediments to a person with albinism taking full part in society is the tissue of myths and beliefs that continue to be attached to albinism'. These beliefs have a profound effect on people with albinism from the moment of their birth until their death. They range from misunderstandings and misconceptions to stereotypes and myths: People with albinism are born because their mother has been unfaithful; children with albinism are not intelligent and will not benefit from education; albinism is contagious; people with albinism belong to the spirit world; people with albinism do not die. Such is the power of these various beliefs that in parts of Africa they limit the life potential of people with albinism. At the most extreme, they are manipulated for economic gain, as justification for ritual attacks that violate human rights.

While civil society, governments and the United Nations have taken action to try to combat these ritual attacks and killings, the complexity of the issue and the secrecy surrounding the trade in body parts mean that many African states have been slow to respond and have been criticised for insufficient action to prevent these attacks and to prosecute their perpetrators. While governments must ultimately take responsibility for defending the human rights of people with albinism, this paper contends that greater importance must be given to combatting the beliefs that drive the trade in body parts. Panning particularly to the potential of music, film and theatre for advocacy, the paper argues that the arts can play an important part in enhancing understandings of albinism and bringing about positive social change.

Dr Charlotte Baker is Senior Lecturer in French and Francophone Studies in the Department of Languages and Cultures at Lancaster University in the UK. She was awarded Knowledge Exchange Fellowship and Welcome Trust funding.

Nathalie Segeral, University of Hawaii, “The Rhetoric of Dehumanization in the Writings of the Rwandan Author Scholastique Mukasonoga”

Cette communication se propose d’étudier la rhétorique de la déshumanisation ayant conduit au génocide rwandais des Tutsi dans quatre ouvrages de Scholastique.

En effet, Mukasonga, en tant que femme rwandaise tutsie, ayant elle-même perdu la majeure partie de sa famille dans le génocide, se trouve dans une position de triple aliénation ou marginalisation : de par son sexe, son ethnicité, son origine géographique. Ainsi, ses ouvrages, qu’il s’agisse de romans ou de récits autobiographiques, ont à cœur de (re)donner une voix à celles qui, comme elles, ont survécu - ou non - à la violence d’une Histoire s’efforçant de les réduire au silence.

M’appuyant, entre autres, sur le concept de mémoire multidirectionnelle élaboré par Michael Rothberg, je démontrerai comment les nombreux parallèles établis avec le génocide des Juifs par les Nazis servent à créer des passerelles entre différents moments historiques tout en utilisant la rhétorique de l’opprimeur à des fins de réappropriation de sa propre histoire et de dénonciation. Par le biais de la littérature, la rhétorique de la violence est ainsi sublimée en rhétorique de la survie, dans le but de transmettre et témoigner et d’éviter que la carte de la visibilité de la souffrance mondiale ne se limite à celle du pouvoir. Les mots deviennent vecteurs mêmes de réincarnation et réappropriation, par l’auteure, de ce corps féminin que les Hutus visaient tout particulièrement à détruire pour ses capacités de reproduction de l’espèce.

Ainsi, l’écriture de Mukasonga, presque entièrement construite autour de la thématique de la maternité et du corps féminin, peut-elle se lire comme une écriture du corps, permettant le dépassement cathartique du statut victimaire et la réappropriation de son histoire par la corporalité, par opposition à la rhétorique deshumanisante de l’opprimeur.

Nathalie Segeral is Assistant Professor of French at the University of Hawaii-Manoa. She received her Ph.D. in Francophone Studies from the University of California, Los Angeles, in 2012. Her teaching, research and publications revolve around women's writings of memory in genocide and madness narratives in the contemporary Francophone world.
Zona Zaric, École normale supérieure de Paris, “Cosmopolitanism and Compassion”

Dominant understandings of politics are founded on positivist readings of instrumental rationality, dismissing emotion and subjectivity in favour of a distant objectified gaze or, in the case of political realists, asserting the inseparability of conflict based on contradictory interests. Compassionate co-experiencing and co-suffering, by way of contrast, presupposes a sense of shared humanity, of being-with-others, and therefore contains the seeds of a cosmopolitan project. Notwithstanding cosmopolitan moral theories which assert common humanity, shared destiny and equal moral worth, often tragically fail to generate adhesion - towards a sensitive understanding of these ethical and existential truths capable of being mobilized to effectuate social change. The ability to imaginatively dwell in and be with others is limited by various socially constructed segmentations that cannot be overcome simply by abstract theorizing. The most immediate issue is that compassion and effective solidarity tend to dissipate with distance (physical or social). Even if there is an abstract understanding of the equal worth of all human beings, derived from the moral teachings of the major religions and secular philosophies that assert such equality, that abstract understanding of shared humanity does not translate readily into compassion or indeed altruism towards others: the intensity of compassion weakens as one moves from family to community, from community to the imagined community of the nation (B. Anderson), and thence to humanity as a whole.

This implies the need for an active and purposeful mobilization of compassion and making it into a political and social concept, not remitting it to those rare moments of moral shock that briefly unify society, when an unexpected event generates sufficient moral indignation to move people into collective action (for instance mass terrorist incidents or the televised deaths of immigrants off the shores of Europe).

Zona Zaric is a researcher in political and moral philosophy, in the final year of her PhD at the Ecole normale supérieure in Paris. She holds a law degree from the University of Belgrade and a master’s degree in international relations from the American University of Paris.