Abstract
When companies adopt social or environmental policies, opposition from the political right has made such policies increasingly difficult to sustain, pushing major institutional investors to pull back their support. This project asks whether that opposition is really about the substance of the policies, or about who decides — the sense that a small group of "elites," corporate managers and the heads of institutional investors, imposes these policies from above. The hypothesis is that democratizing the decision, for instance through a shareholder or beneficiaries assembly, would raise support for these policies among right-wing individuals, and would also make the outcome seem more legitimate to them even when they still disagree with the policy itself.
Bio
Adi Libson is a lecturer in the Law Faculty of Bar-Ilan University. He earned both his BA in the PPE (Philosophy, Political Science and Economics) program and his LLB from the Hebrew University. He received his LLM from the NYU Law School and his PhD from Bar-Ilan University. He was a research fellow in the Program on Corporate Governance of the Harvard Law School. His main current research projects are on shareholder's pro-social preferences and their implications on corporate governance; antitakeover and antiactivist strategies and how to confront them; Utilization of the corporate tax as a corporate governance mechanism.
